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Abstract  
The concept of sustainability has recently become integrated into mainstream commercial spheres 
of cocoa-chocolate industries, whilst the concept remains elusive and debateable in the political 
sphere. The sustainability initiatives attempt to improve both farm management and farmer 
livelihoods by voluntarily integrating certification schemes (e.g., RA, Utzcertified, and Fairtrade) 
along with other initiatives. Exploring the implications of the sustainability initiatives beyond vertical 
industrial governance, this study contributes to the extant literature on GVCS/GPNs and provides an 
understanding of the extension of sustainability concept into horizontal extrafirm bargaining 
strategies. This study highlights the increasing industrial-centred power beyond a reorganisation of 
industrial activities of two case studies, Mars and Nestlé. The initiatives have resulted an increase 
vertical coordination with the upstream cocoa production networks, as the schemes become an 
instrument to minimise the supply risks. Also, the horizontal engagement through public private 
partnerships has created a negotiation space with extrafirm actors, yet the state participation in 
sustainability (keberlanjutan) discourse appeared to support local industrialists and the transnational 
firms to secure cocoa supply. Sustainability has strengthened the firm position in the upstream 
production networks, but the local actors and farmers continue struggle to overcome increasing 
market barriers and uneven competition. Eventually, the initiatives emphasize the economic 
interests, but at the expense of the cheaper productive capital supplied by the smallholder farmers 
and creating new processes of uneven development.  
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But the net effect on increasing scale, centralisation of capital, 
vertical integration and diversification within the corporate form 
of enterprise has been to replace the ‘invisible hand’ of the market 
by the ‘visible hand’ of the managers.    
                                                                                                                      
David Harvey, Organisation of capitalist production, 1982 
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1. Introduction  
Mars Sustainable Cocoa initiatives. Nestlé Cocoa Plan. Mondelēz Cocoa Life. Olam Grow Cocoa. Barry 
Callebaut Cocoa Horizon. Cargill Cocoa Promise. These are the sustainability initiative brands that 
have been promoted by the global cocoa‐chocolate firms since early 2010s. The firm initiatives are 
branding to illustrate both intention and expectation from supporting cocoa communities in cocoa 
producing countries including Indonesia. Banding together under a sustainability label, the firms are 
responding to complex territorial issues that affects the supply chain practices and structure, 
particularly in the most cocoa producer region including West African countries and Indonesia.  In 
addition to the territorial issues, cocoa production also dominated by the dispersed five million 
smallholder farmers whose livelihood depending on the fluctuated farm gate price and uncertainty 
of environmental deterioration challenges.  Under the somewhat ambiguous notion of sustainability, 
the transnational firms have (somewhat) encouraged the adoption of sustainable farming practices 
across the supply chain actors under different global partnership projects as well as third party 
certification schemes.     
The complex issues in the upstream cocoa production regions and emerging firm sustainability 
initiatives are linking to global cocoa price, in 2000 the global price as low as US$ 1000/ ton and 
slowly increase price reached more triple by 2010, but recently the global price decline to less than 
US$ 20001 following steady increase of cocoa production in Ivory Coast and Ghana. The low‐price 
problem hit the smallholder farmers was initially following by the emerging social issue of child 
labour practices in West African countries including Ghana and Ivory Coast2, in addition to unstable 
political condition such as the emerge of 2004 civil war was in Ivory Coast3. These issues are beyond 
the reach of influence for leading industrial actors who based in Europe and America. Disruption of 
these risk environments (eg. social issues, changing political regimes, and consumer group and civil 
society pressures) are challenging the long‐term economic growth of cocoa‐chocolate industries and 
requiring more coordination with stakeholders minimise their risks.  
From the above perspective, these sustainability initiatives are more than just philanthropic 
outcomes or simply showcasing the firms perceived social responsibility. Aiming to sustain their 
competitiveness as well as a defensive response to the emerging socio‐environmental issues, they 
                                                          
1 Overview of cocoa supply and demand presented by Laurent Pipitone during the ICCO Cocoa Market Outlook Conference, 
London, 27 September 2016 (see Appendix A).  
2 Mali’ children in chocolate slavery, published on 12 April 2001 [Retrieved on August 2017] 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1272522.stm; International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) report in 2002, 
on  Child Labour in the Cocoa Sector of West Africa: A Synthesis of Findings in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria. 
Croydon, [Retrieved on August 2017] http://www.aktiv‐gegen‐kinderarbeit.de/files/2008/05/iita‐west‐afric‐child_labour‐
study‐cocoa.pdf  
3 The chocolate war erupt in Ivory Coast, published on 14 May 2004, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/14/rorycarroll ; Ivory Coast crisis: Impact on the international cocoa 
trade, published on 9 March 2011 , http://www.bbc.com/news/business‐12677418  
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attempt to promote ‘a sustainable cocoa supply chain’ by improving both farm management and the 
farmers’ livelihoods.  Adopting a value chain approach, transnational cocoa‐chocolate firms are using 
the market as a governing instrument, either by enforcing self‐regulation of responsible sourcing or 
integrating third‐party certification schemes (e.g., Rainforest Alliance, UTZCertified, and Fairtrade) 
into their supplier standard. With a scale beyond a single state or region, these initiatives contribute 
to increased coordination of upstream cocoa production networks and the reshaping of rural 
landscapes.  
The aim of this study is to broadly explore the implementation and implications of firm‐led 
sustainability initiatives as strategic instruments for increasing vertical coordination of the 
production network, but which also extend an influence ‘horizontally’ to the broader social and 
political landscapes where upstream nodes are located. Comparing the strategies of two lead firms, 
Mars and Nestlé, this study also seeks to identify the trajectories that emerge for farm‐level 
upgrading by actors engaged in these sustainability initiatives, and how this may be reshaping new 
patterns of uneven development.  
Acknowledging the integration of a sustainability notion into business practices raises basic 
questions; for example, why sustainability? How have cocoa‐chocolate businesses integrated 
sustainability across the supply chain? Will sustainability also contribute to improved economic and 
social conditions for the upstream suppliers, the smallholder farmers?  Or does it simply imply 
‘business as usual’? The economic and business scholars suggest that the adoption of a sustainability 
concept will both enhance economic growth and create a sustainable business (Porter and Kramer, 
2011; Azapagic, 2003; Linnenleucke and Griffiths, 2010). Empirical studies have indeed found a 
positive correlation between economic and environmental performance (Wagner, 2005; Lo and 
Sheu, 2007) by integrating sustainability into regular business operations. Overall, most of the 
literature focuses on business management and ethics, as corporate sustainability delineates the 
different ways of integrating sustainability into business practice; for example, using it as a driving 
force to reconfigure economic value by creating social value in today’s competitive global economy.   
Meanwhile, the existing literature on Global Value Chains‐Production Networks (GVC‐GPN) 
emphasizes how different actors are coordinating chains (or networks) in different ways to capture 
greater value, and how they are becoming more competitive in the process. They recognize the 
markets’ dominance, and the growing power of the transnational firms4 in terms of economic scale, 
which have influences far beyond a single territory and industry. But, their economic activities are 
not immune to the uncertainties that may lie beyond the coordinated supply chain. It may not be 
sufficient to simply organise and manage your direct supply chain to ensure long‐term economic 
growth. To accomplish a long‐term vison of ever‐growing industries requires not only economic gain 
from commercial practice, but also being able to respond to social, political and environmental 
uncertainties. The sustainability notion of not compromising the future generation’s needs fits well 
to the long‐term vision of sustaining the supply chain and industry growth.     
                                                          
4 Transnational firm refers to a company that conducts economic activities in many countries   
3 
 
Through sustainability initiatives, transnational firms are voluntarily enforcing international socio‐
environmental laws that has been lack of enforcement by the states including the biodiversity 
conservation standards5 and ILO convention on social issue (re. child labour practices). This 
voluntary action aims to minimise the supply risks and consumer trust as the firm integrated the 
laws into self‐regulated responsible sourcing policy. Also, along with imposing the certifications 
schemes across the supply chain, transnational firms are also extending sustainability engagement 
across non‐economic actors at different spatial scales.  Despite increasing vertical coordination, the 
sustainability engagement also extends towards non‐economic actors, such as in the form of multi‐
stakeholder ‘roundtabling’, i.e., providing equal standing at the negotiations table to enhance higher 
expectations of accountability, transparency and inclusiveness (Ponte, 2013). In effect, I will argue in 
this thesis that sustainability has become a mantra: (1) to increase vertical coordination with supply 
chain actors; (2) to develop tighter links with supplier partners; and (3) to open a negotiating space 
with non‐economic actors; (4) to serve overall firms’ interests but at the expense of cheaper 
productive capital supplied by the smallholder farmers. Indeed, the sustainability notion is becoming 
more popular and adopted as part of the firms’ long‐term strategic action to sustain industry 
growth.  
To date, few studies have recognised the extended roles that lead firms play beyond their 
commercial sphere (Ponte, 2014; Barrientos, 2014; Selwyn, 2013; Gereffi and Lee, 2016). This study 
contributes to the debate surrounding the dynamic governance of GVCs and GPNs. The literature on 
the governance of GVC has been well documented, but greater focus is required on how lead firms 
seek greater value through industrial vertical coordination and upgrading. There is also a growing 
literature on how non‐economic actors are influencing industrial governance (Giovannucci and 
Ponte, 2005; Raynolds et al., 2007; Barrientos et al., 2011; Ponte, 2014; Selwyn, 2013; Tallontire et 
al., 2011), thereby adding external pressure for the global brands to be more socially and 
environmentally responsible. These studies identified the dynamic modes of governance linking 
upstream agro‐food productions that are beyond the interfirm industrial coordination.  
An overemphasis of the vertical aspects of industrial governance in GVC theory has drawn criticism 
from the proponents of GPN approaches, who argue that global production and consumption 
processes construct a highly complex network structure that involves interaction of diverse actors 
across multi‐scalar territorialities (Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe at al., 2008). 
Maintaining the leading role of global firms, this approach broadens industrial governance and 
highlights the interconnected roles of economic and non‐economic actors. Following these intricate 
roles and relationships, the GPN approach perceives governance as a coordination strategy that is 
dependent and highly dynamic within different spatial networks. Thus, each lead firm may (or may 
not) apply more than a single coordination strategy reflecting their diverse independent capitalist 
capabilities, which will affect the (re) configuration of its production networks.   
Yeung and Coe (2015) allude to the analytical causality of four dependent strategies for lead firms in 
the (re)configuring of GPNs based on different historical and geographical contexts: intrafirm 
                                                          
5 Reinforcing regulations against sourcing from the forest conversion and deforestation areas, and adopted High 
Conservation Values (HCVs) standards.  
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coordination; interfirm control; interfirm partnerships; and, extrafirm bargaining.  The first three 
strategies resemble the fivefold analytical governance as suggested by Gereffi et al., (2005), while, 
the extrafirm bargaining strategy is novel and remains under‐explored.  They argue that 
incorporation of an extrafirm bargaining strategy is critical for better understanding how the 
financial drivers of firm behaviour intersect with a wide range of non‐economic issues. The 
intersection of these strategies is necessarily dependent upon the particular geographical contexts 
where the GPN touches down. Pursuant to the increasing adoption of a sustainability concept, this 
thesis specifically explores the incorporation of a sustainability concept into the extrafirm bargaining 
strategies of lead firms in the development of Indonesia’s cocoa sector.  
1.1 The emergence of sustainability initiatives in the cocoa sector 
Speaking at the 2015 World Economic Forum in Davos, Nestlé CEO Paul Bulcke6 commented: ‘Should 
business lead the social agenda? I would say very clearly, no, it should not lead the agenda, but it 
should be part of it. It’s a nuance that’s very important… You need long‐term relationships…you are 
trying to link up with society in a positive way, and it makes business sense.’    
Bulcke expressed this observation during a panel discussion on how businesses should address 
today’s global, social and environmental challenges. It represents economic actors’ expectations that 
their participation in meeting the sustainable development goals are simply part of the agenda, 
while at the same time seeking to build a set of long‐term business relationships with society for 
positive outcomes. In effect, it is two sides of the one coin, i.e., to partially address social and 
environmental challenges, but also to achieve economic gain from engagement with the various 
challenges to sustain business opportunities. On the other hand, the traditional concept of corporate 
social responsibility is generally regarded as voluntary action, e.g., doing social good, but it is often 
disconnected from long term business strategies and regular operations. Corporate social 
responsibility simply presents the firm as a good citizen and does not necessarily serve their business 
interests.  
The transnational firms’ growing interest in sustainability in the cocoa sector has seen the notion 
gradually integrated into sourcing practices to ensure that the cocoa bean is sourced from the 
sustainable farming practices. The notion of the cocoa‐chocolate firms participating in sustainable 
development in the context of sustainable cocoa farming practices implicitly linking to the economic 
aspect of supply risks rather than social and/or environmental aspects, as the CEO of Nestlé framing 
as positive long‐term relationship with the society that will make a business sense. Linking to this 
economic aspect, the emerging cocoa‐chocolate firm sustainability initiatives was following by slowly 
increasing cocoa price in 2000s, while growing investment and market expansion in emerging 
                                                          
6 Nestlé Chief Executive Officer Paul Bulcke delivered a speech at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland 
on Friday, January 23rd, on the role of business in society. His speech may be found at 
http://www.nestle.com/media/mediaeventscalendar/allevents/davos‐wef‐2015, [Retrieved, January 2017] and the quote 
from recent World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland, published on  26 January 2015 
http://www.foodnavigator.com/Market‐Trends/Nestlé‐CEO‐Business‐should‐not‐lead‐the‐social‐agenda.   
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countries like in Asia, Latin America and Africa7. With the market expansion leads to increasing 
demand while upstream cocoa production dominated by the smallholder farmers who were facing 
declining yield because of the ongoing pest‐disease infestation, soil deterioration, and climate 
change treats. Also, learning from the long record of previous experience among the cocoa 
communities that growing cocoa led to cocoa boom and followed by bust period after few decades.  
The recent bust period was experienced by Brazilian (Alger and Caldas, 1994) and Malaysian (Ruf and 
Siswoputranto, 1995) cocoa producers who both countries suffered from dramatic declining because 
of Witches Broom disease and Cocoa Pod Borer infestation, respectively.  
Despite the uncertainty of supply security from the smallholder farmers and complex political‐
environmental, the complex supply chain structure within the cocoa producing countries also 
another challenge to deliver an effective sustainability interventions.  While over the last decade, 
the growing presence of transnational traders in the producing countries offers opportunity for the 
local actors to improve global market accessibility and integrate into the global value chain, yet the 
lack of organisational and institutional capabilities has challenged this process of integration. In the 
other hand, the transnational cocoa traders and grinders who have established their local presence 
have expanded the functional capabilities and increase competition for the domestic value chains.   
Following the recent re‐structure of industrial cocoa production networks, the branded chocolate 
manufacturers slowly had distanced themselves from upstream production by applying outsourcing 
strategies then required a greater vertical coordination strategy to maintain their control and 
organise their production networks, to develop relationships with dispersed smallholder farmers. 
This growing trend of outsourcing strategy aligns with the emerging sustainability initiatives that 
focus on how to overcome the coordination and risk management issues, while also recognising the 
intermediate competent suppliers as key actors to connect the branded lead firms and the upstream 
cocoa production. Thus, to deliver sustainability initiatives, the transnational intermediate firms 
have been required to establish upcountry trading function and set‐up their own sustainability 
divisions, to directly engage with smallholder farmers. Following these efforts to ensure a 
sustainable supply chain, few chocolate manufacturers (e.g., Mars, Hershey, Ferrero, and 
Lindt&Sprüngli) announced their commitment to sourcing 100% third party certified cocoa while 
also developing their own sustainability initiatives. 
In addition to reorganising the supply chain structure, the lead firms’ engagement in sustainability 
initiatives have also involved entering partnerships with a range of cocoa stakeholders to sharing 
resources to scale‐up sustainability initiatives. They are funding public private partnership programs 
(PPPs) and (or) sub‐contracting implementation to competent and experienced organisations. The 
lead firm’s active contributions to such partnerships has meant they have been recognised as equal 
partners for delivering development programs. These different forms of sustainability programs are 
complementing lead firm market demand for sustainable cocoa and becoming an instrument to 
incentivise the scaling up of sustainability initiatives across the supply chain.  
                                                          
7 Analysis: Where is confectionary production moving, published on 22 August 2013 –link; The ones to watch: Euromonitor 
pinpoints three chocolate markets in the Middle East and Africa, published on 22 July 2015 ‐‐link  
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Table 1.1 shows the major transnational firms’ sustainability initiatives in the Indonesian cocoa 
sector since the early 2010s. These ongoing initiatives have common stated goals: to achieve a 
sustainable supply chain and to improve the farmers’ livelihoods. With their closely‐related 
emphasis on sustaining supply by improving productivity and quality, these objectives are noticeably 
also pursuing the firms’ interest in sustaining the industries while at the same time attempting to 
improve smallholders’ livelihoods.  
Table 1.1 The ongoing transnational firm sustainability initiatives in Indonesia8 
Sustainability Initiatives 
(Commencing Year) 
Slogan and Objectives Partners 
Mars Cocoa Sustainability Initiative, 
MCSI (2011) 
‘Securing cocoa’s future’ 
Achieving a sustainable supply of high 
quality cocoa. 
Non‐government organisations, 
International and national research 
institutes, Local governments of 
cocoa‐producing areas, local 
universities and vocational schools, 
certification bodies, and contracted 
suppliers. 
Nestlé’s Cocoa Plan, NCP (2011) ‘Supporting farmers for better 
chocolate’ 
Improving cocoa farming livelihoods 
and cocoa quality. 
National research institute (re. ICCRI), 
contracted suppliers, various non‐
government organisations, and 
national and local governments. 
Mondelēz, CocoaLife (2013) Thriving cocoa communities and 
sustainable supply. 
National research institute (re. ICCRI), 
contracted suppliers, contracted non‐
government organisations, and 
national and local government. 
Barry Callebaut, CocoaHorizon (2012)  Boosting farm productivity, increase 
quality and improve family livelihood. 
Contracted suppliers and buyers, 
local governments, certification 
bodies, and non‐government 
organisations.  
Olam, GrowCocoa (2012) Achieving sustainable supply chain 
and development of strategic 
partnership to improve the livelihood 
of cocoa farmers and their 
communities 
Contracted buyers, Non‐government 
organisations, and certification 
bodies. 
BT Cocoa, BTCare program (2012) Transforming cocoa farming into a 
viable and sustainable business for 
smallholders through market driven 
approach. 
Contracted suppliers and buyers, 
national and local governments, and 
non‐government organisations.  
Cargill, CocoaPromise (2013) Improving bean quality and yield, 
raise farm productivity and income 
and support farming communities.  
Contracted suppliers, local 
governments, non‐government 
organisations, and certification 
bodies.   
                                                          
8 All website of firm sustainability initiatives, [Retrieved on January 2017] http://www.mars.com/global/sustainability/raw‐
materials/cocoa ; http://www.nestlecocoaplan.com/ ; https://www.cocoalife.org/   https://www.barry‐
callebaut.com/sustainability/cocoa‐sustainability ; http://growcocoa.com/  ; http://www.btcocoa.com/about‐
us/corporate‐responsibility ; https://www.cargill.com/sustainability/cocoa‐promise/cocoa‐promise‐in‐action  
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The global cocoa sector is characterised by an oligopolistic global market structure with a small 
number of lead firms (both chocolate manufacturers and grinders) sourcing from a dispersed supply 
base of more than five million of cocoa farmers. This suggests a highly uneven power structure 
throughout the GPN.  The smallholder farmers from different producing countries will compete to 
generate economic rent from the efficient cocoa farm production and quality in the face of highly 
competitive downstream production networks. The voluntary nature of market incentives to 
encourage ‘sustainable farming practices’, as defined by the major firms, appear to be undermined 
by these uneven power relationships, as market premiums are often left to be negotiated between 
smallholder farmers and downstream buyers. As the dispersed and rather unorganised farmers are 
connecting to the contract suppliers, the actual negotiation process is often only between the lead 
branded firms and the contract suppliers. 
Understanding the complexities of rural livelihoods in cocoa producing countries, in addition to the 
uncertainty of political commitment to support the cocoa sector and the lack of formal 
representation of smallholder farmers, the transnational firms are instead seeking support from the 
North based cocoa stakeholders and organisations to support their initiatives. Through the adoption 
of the somewhat ambiguous notion of sustainability, these activities have received both support and 
endorsement from international development agencies and other stakeholders. Concurrently, 
partnerships with the public actors and cocoa stakeholders, e.g., Cocoa Sustainable Partnership 
(CSP) and the Partnership for Indonesia Sustainable Agriculture (PISAgro) have been established in 
Indonesia.  
Since 2006, CSP (a forum dominated by well‐financed transnational firms and international agencies) 
is playing the leading coordination role in Indonesia, but has struggled to gain Indonesian 
government support. Meanwhile, the government has established a board affiliated with the 
Indonesian Coffee and Cocoa Research Institute (ICCRI), known as the Indonesian Cocoa Board 
(Dekaindo). CSP, a multi‐stakeholder forum, has evolved from a communication platform into a 
coordination forum with growing number of members from different background and interests, not 
limited to transnational industrial actor but also supporting firms (e.g. agro‐chemical companies, 
research institutes, and micro‐finance institutions) and civil society groups. The nature of 
partnership requires active participation to not only support development of the cocoa sector, but 
also to gain legitimacy from the local cocoa stakeholders including the government. PISAgro, also a 
multi‐stakeholder forum, was established with the support of the World Economic Forum in 2011. 
PISAgro specifically identified an exclusive position for the government as a key partner to 
strengthen the social and political legitimacy of the forum. The government was actively enrolled 
alongside another thirty partners from the private sector, international agencies and civil society 
groups. Both CSP and PISAgro have set out their roadmap of targeted goals to be achieved by 2020, 
primarily focusing on farm productivity and secondarily addressing social and environment aspects. 
Most economic actors have a development strategy to sustain long‐term economic growth. Linked 
to the unstable and dispersed upstream cocoa production, and the need to ensure a sustainable 
supply chain and improve smallholder farmers’ livelihood, this strategy requires more than a narrow 
platform of corporate social responsibility. Upstream cocoa production is embedded in rural 
livelihoods, and these complex economic and social interactions become an environmental risk for 
lead firms. This is exacerbated by further disruptions emerging from local political conflict, 
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consequences of environmental deterioration, or from unfavourable policy implemented by the 
cocoa producing governments. These risk environments are generated by non‐economic actors 
beyond the conventional reach of the North based industrial firms. Exposure to such risks are 
affecting the production networks, which are resulting in new strategies to capture gains from the 
growing industries and opportunities to become market leader in the emerging countries. 
Minimising such risks means expanding the coordination beyond the supply chain and business to 
business relationships. It requires broad engagement with a range of stakeholders to work together 
to minimise such risks. Accordingly, sustainability has become a key concept to ensure industrial 
actors’ interest in long‐term business development, whilst also contributing to, and responding to, 
various social and environmental issues.   
1.2 The Global Production Network for cocoa 
The cocoa‐chocolate value chain is generally divided into four different segments of functional 
activities: (1) cocoa farm production; (2) trading; (3) cocoa processing; and, (4) chocolate 
manufacturing. These functional activities have mostly been undertaken separately since the 
colonial period. Whereas cocoa production is concentrated in tropical developing countries, cocoa‐
chocolate manufacturing and marketing are concentrated in the developed consuming countries.  
Due to this fragmented distribution, the intermediate trading actors play crucial roles in connecting 
the separate upstream and downstream activities. Within this cocoa value chain, the value 
generated by the associated economic activities is mainly concentrated near the end‐market, which 
is dominated by a few transnational firms. Upstream cocoa production, which involves lower value 
activities, is more laborious and primarily managed by more than five million of smallholder farmers.  
The geographical production and consumption of cocoa has a characteristic North‐South pattern 
(Barrientos et al., 2007). The Ivory Coast and Ghana contribute approximately 70% of world 
production, while European countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the US, feature among the biggest importers. Cocoa production is characterised by small scale 
farming with more than five million farmers depending on this sector for their livelihoods. The 
manufacturing of chocolate products near sites of consumption reflects the industry’s historical 
development that has been dominated by a few transnational industrial actors, primarily 
headquartered in Europe and North America. The innovative industrial production has been key to 
these firms remaining competitive, at the same time upstream farming development continues to 
lag behind technologically. Farmers continue to struggle with land degradation, low yields, and the 
high cost of maintenance required to sustain cocoa farms.   
Data gathered from the annual report of the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) shows growth 
in production of cocoa bean and processed bean over the last fifteen years (ICCO, 2014), with 
significant growth of cocoa production in the major producing countries. Gradually, the dominant 
producing countries are engaging with industrialisation policies to process raw cocoa beans, and 
these countries are also becoming significant grinders of cocoa beans into intermediate products. 
Because fewer cocoa beans are traded globally, it is fuelling competition at the upstream level.  
European and North America ‐based transnational firms, including Barry Callebaut, Cargill, ADM, and 
Ecom are increasingly investing in cocoa grinding facilities adjacent to (and within) cocoa producing 
countries, thus diversifying and upgrading the export revenues. However, the final market remains 
relatively undeveloped in the producing countries. At the same time, the European and North 
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American based firms are rapidly expanding their market into other emerging countries across 
different regions, for example the Asia‐Pacific region, Russia, the Middle East, South America and 
Africa.   
As consumption slowly expands, the actors behind this expansion remain dominated by a small 
number of transnational cocoa‐chocolate firms (both cocoa grinders and chocolate manufacturers). 
The increasing concentration amongst intermediate actors (cocoa processors) has resulted in 
vertically integrated processing and trading segments, through mergers and acquisitions (see section 
4.1). While global traders are becoming bulk processors, the well‐established cocoa processors are 
also diversifying their processing activities into the production of couverture (industrial) chocolate. 
The latter involves the production of a wide range of chocolate products in addition to the 
intermediate cocoa products of cocoa butter, powder and paste (see Figure 4.5). By establishing 
vertically integrated processing facilities, global processing‐trading firms are putting competitive 
pressure on small‐scale domestic processors from cocoa origin countries such as Indonesia.    
Since the early adoption of cocoa outside the origin region of amazon forest in Latin America, the 
cocoa cultivation has been recognised by the emergence of new ‘pioneer fronts’, that defined as 
large group of immigrants rapidly clearing tropical forest to plant cocoa (Clarence‐Smith, 1996).  
Clarence‐Smith (1996) argued that the from the Maya lands of pre‐Columbian America to Western 
African countries and Southern Sulawesi, the emergence of cocoa pioneer fronts because of the 
social availability of forest to transform into cocoa farms.  The looser regulation on the forest 
protection and mobility of labour through inter/intra state migration were played crucial part of 
emerging ‘pioneers fronts’ across the spatial scale and further to shift cocoa producing region from 
the Amazon basin region to West African countries (Clarence‐Smith, 1996). Currently, only Ghana 
and the Ivory Coast account for 70% of global production, while approximately 10% is produced by 
Indonesian farmers (ICCO, 2014).   
Within the downstream industry, the chocolate manufacturers have maintained an integrated 
production network for highly differentiated products while largely outsourcing the production of 
intermediate cocoa products to independent suppliers. These suppliers have conventionally 
maintained several cocoa processing facilities close to chocolate manufacturing sites (ie. near 
consumer markets). Over a period of time, the intensive commercial relationship between the 
chocolate and cocoa industries has improved the processed cocoa supplier capability. The processed 
cocoa suppliers have also invested in research and development for efficient processing function 
through computerised processing machinery as a response to meet the complex processed cocoa 
demand from the chocolate manufacturers. This commercial interaction has strengthened the cocoa 
processors capability and competency on supplying complex and sophisticated cocoa‐based 
products. Fold (2002) describes the relationship between the competent suppliers and dominant 
buyers as a ‘turn‐key’ relationship, suggesting that these processor/suppliers have become more 
concentrated and able to exert nearly as much influence over the value chain as the chocolate 
manufacturers themselves. By 2007, most of the major chocolate manufacturers (e.g., Nestlé, 
Cadbury and Hershey) had dismantled their own cocoa processing facilities and entered into 
negotiated long‐term supply agreements with these competent suppliers, at the same time 
allocating more resources to the development of their core‐competences (most notably branding 
and product innovation).   
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Prior to 2010, transnational trading expanded into developing countries, following the market 
liberalisation for most of their agricultural crops associated with a weakened role for the state in 
managing upstream production and capturing the export revenue from the high‐value of tropical 
crops. Prior to this, a resource‐based development strategy emphasized the significant contribution 
of smallholder farmers in generating national revenue. This meant it became the object of 
government control, particularly from dominant producing countries such as Ivory Coast and Ghana. 
However, as the next largest producer, the Indonesian cocoa sector received limited state interest 
and was relatively unregulated by government before the 2000s. A combination of a relatively liberal 
trading market and high global demand for cocoa nourished the growth of competitive domestic 
trading functions. In seeking economic rent, the international trading firms slowly established their 
presence in Indonesia and became competitive actors alongside the local trading firms, establishing 
up‐country buying stations in most of cocoa producing regions, particularly in Sulawesi.  
More recently, following the growing market and the branded manufacturer investment of 
chocolate industry in the Global South, the Indonesian government (like the major West African 
cocoa‐producing countries) has attempted to intervene downstream in the cocoa sector. The 
Indonesian government publicly announced the encouragement of downstream cocoa industries 
(Ministry of Industry, 2010), following by implementing a tariff barrier (an export tax) in 2010. It 
aimed to become a highly‐integrated cocoa producing and processing country.  By limiting the 
export of raw cocoa bean, the government incentivised investment in cocoa processing. However, 
the growing investment in this segment has been dominated by transnational firms both through 
new investments and by acquisition. For example, Cargill and Olam entered functional upgrading 
after building cocoa processing facilities and becoming vertical integrated firms, while Petrafood 
disintegrated and sold their processing facilities to Barry Callebaut, and Ecom acquired Armajaro 
trading. These acquisitions and new investments by transnational trading firms resulted in an 
increasingly concentrated cocoa processing segment with a small number of major processors, with 
vertically integrated production networks with both cocoa trading and processing functions.  
These developments, as well as changing the domestic chain structure, slowly eliminated the 
international trading function as a discrete activity, as it becomes more integrated with the 
processing function. Globally, the processing segment became more concentrated, with 
approximately three quarters of global processed cocoa produced by eight processors (Barometer 
Consortium, 2015). Forty per cent of the global chocolate manufacturing segment was now 
dominated by six major transnational firms.  With the cocoa value chain increasingly dominated by 
two sets of downstream actors (processor‐traders and manufacturers), a power asymmetry has 
evolved that tends to favour a small number of powerful buyers and continues to weaken the 
bargaining position of the five million of smallholder farmers.  
1.3    Indonesian cocoa sector 
From a territorial perspective, the Indonesian cocoa sector has developed rapidly during the last 
decade, and has captured the attention of the state, which earlier attempted to downstream the 
sector by reforming trade policies and providing incentives to invite foreign direct investment. At the 
same time, transnational firms have become more involved in upstream activities through delivering 
a range of extension services and building vertical coordination with the smallholder farmers. They 
have created a market for sustainable cocoa by incentivising the adoption of voluntary sustainability 
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certification schemes and implementing mainstream cocoa farm extension services for farmers.  The 
dynamic role of both political and economic actors in the development of the Indonesian cocoa 
industry and their increased attention to upstream sustainability interventions suggests that lead 
firm strategies are increasingly affecting various aspects of rural and industrial development.   
1.3.1 State role in cocoa development 
Indonesia has been a theatre of cocoa boom and bust since the colonial period, with geographic 
shifts of growing and trading activities, and ever‐changing actors. Although, the recent development 
of upstream cocoa development in Sulawesi region marked a ‘pioneer fronts’ scenario, the abundant 
forest and adequate supplier of labour whereas the local migration to the Central and Southeast 
Sulawesi regions was dominated by the Bugis9 farmers from the populated Southern region. 
However, the emergence cocoa pioneer fronts were not new in Sulawesi region (Clarence‐Smith, 
1996). Cocoa was first introduced by the Spanish into North Sulawesi late in the 16th century, at a 
time when Manila was the main market, frequent pest and disease outbreaks have diminished 
farmer interest in continuing to grow the crop. During the comprehensive Dutch colonialization of 
Indonesia in the late 19th century, the crop was reintroduced into Java in the form of large cocoa 
estates owned by private Dutch firms. To support cocoa sector development, the colonial planters 
established a cocoa and coffee research centre along with other cash crop research centres, e.g., 
sugar cane, natural rubber, coconut, tea and kina. During the 1950s, following Indonesian 
independence, most of the private plantations became state‐owned plantations. A lack of 
investment and poor management resulted in the new government having little impact on 
agriculture development, but rather showed greater interest in extractive mineral‐based resources, 
which appeared more profitable than investment in estate crops. In a very short period of time, the 
development of the cocoa sector went backwards.  
Although the Indonesian government plays an important role to open forest accessibility for the 
pioneer fronts, yet the government had limited interest to develop upstream cocoa development. 
During the collapse of oil price in 1980s, the government attempted to develop cash crop sectors to 
generate short‐term export earnings from the lucrative global market including cocoa to minimise 
the dependency on fuel‐based revenue.  The central government introduced two stages of cash 
crops program: (1) The rehabilitation of export crops (PRPTE) program and, (2) the development of 
special areas (P2WK) program. Despite these efforts, the farmers showed limited interest in 
adopting cocoa production (Ruf and Lancome, 2004), in addition to low global market price.  Not 
until the collapse of Malaysia’s cocoa plantations in the 1990s, this was a pivotal moment when 
growing nearby market demand encouraged expanding cultivation across Indonesia. This led to the 
spontaneous and voluntary adoption of cocoa production in Sulawesi, become the major cocoa 
producing region as well as defined Indonesia as the third largest cocoa producer after Ivory Coast 
and Ghana (Figure 1.1 shows the major producing provinces and Figure 1.2 shows the dynamic 
development of cocoa sector in Sulawesi region).  
                                                          
9 Bugis, also called Buginess people are the major ethic group reside in Southern Sulawesi (Celebes Island) region and 
extensively has migrated to less density regions within Sulawesi island.  
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Figure 1.1 Three‐year average (2010‐12) of the area of cocoa cultivation across Indonesia (in 
hectare) 
 
This spontaneous adoption of cocoa originated in the relationship between farmers and traders, 
rather than as a direct result of government policy. The local traders and collectors played an 
important role in establishing the local market, as well as in knowledge exchange that enabled the 
smallholder farmers to establish cocoa farms. However, the diaspora of the cocoa boom in Sulawesi 
was more widespread than in East Kalimantan that closer to the export market (Sabah, Malaysia), 
because of suitable accessible forest in Southeast and Central Sulawesi, the labour migrants from 
populated Southern region, and connected the local market to export networks in Malaysia and 
Singapore. Access to abundant new frontier land, along with family networks, facilitated knowledge 
exchange among the migrants and the existing farmers (Ruf and Lancon, 2004: 175). Subsequent to 
the rapid growth of cocoa farming areas in the South, Southeast and Central Sulawesi provinces 
(Figure 1.2), within less than twenty years Indonesia became the third largest producer of cocoa 
beans after the Ivory Coast and Ghana. However, deterioration of forest rent from the ‘pioneer 
period’ creates basic problems of cocoa economies, especially for the industrial actors who have 
expanded the market investment and manufacturing facilities through Asia region, including 
Indonesia and expected supply security from the Sulawesi farmers particularly. It was only in 2008, 
that another large‐scale intervention in cocoa farming was reintroduced by the government, through 
the GERNAS program that provided various direct supports to cocoa smallholders. In 2010, the 
Indonesian government introduced a new agenda of economic development, as it attempted to 
follow in the footsteps of neighbouring countries (Singapore and Malaysia), which had already 
developed downstream cocoa industries.  
1.3.2 Ongoing development challenges  
Cocoa production across the producing countries is dominated by smallholder farmers. In Indonesia, 
90% of total annual production is produced by such farmers, with the remainder produced by state 
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and private‐owned plantations. The expansion of cocoa farming for more than three decades has 
resulted in an estimated 1.66 million hectares being planted with the crop, 60% of which is located 
on the island of Sulawesi (Ministry of Agriculture, 2014). But, production has remained stagnant in 
Sulawesi since 2005 (Figure 1.2). The ongoing infestation by cocoa pod borer Conopomorpha 
cramerella (Snellen), black pod disease Phytophthora palmivora, and vascular streak dieback 
Oncobasidium theobromae (McMahon et al., 2015), together with ageing cocoa trees and soil 
depletion, has negatively impacted farm profitability. The yield continued to decline despite the 
efforts to restore the farm productivity (e.g. various donor programs such as SUCCESS Alliance, 
AMARTA, and the Gernas program), while available forest resources for further expansion were also 
scarce. The smallholder farmers found themselves facing a ‘bust’ phase that could only be alleviated 
by a shift in production, i.e., introducing new crops, simply abandoning their farms, or seeking 
alternative livelihoods.                                                                                                                       
Figure 1.2 Growth of Cocoa Production on the Island of Sulawesi (1980‐2014) 
                                 
Source: BPS, Indonesian Bureau of Statistics10 
Farming is the prime livelihood for most of the rural communities in Sulawesi, with cocoa farming 
the major source of income for those households engaged in its cultivation. The cocoa farming 
system in Sulawesi is a mix of monoculture and intercropping depending upon the geographical 
location. Households often own multiple plots whose combined area is generally less than two 
hectares. Although every individual farmer employs a different strategy to minimise farming risk, 
farm production remains a risky business, as farmers are exposed to the uncertainty of outbreaks of 
pest diseases, weather disruption, input supply uncertainty, and market‐related risk (Hazell, 1992; 
Moschini and Hennerssy, 2001). Considering these risks, farming has become less attractive for rural 
households, urging them to seek alternative livelihoods that may alleviate their vulnerability. In 
addition to the current development of a downstream industry, this stagnated production 
                                                          
10 Indonesian bureau of statistic for agriculture and mineral, sub‐section estate crops, [Retrieved, October 2016]  
http://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/839 
14 
 
challenges the sustaining of the emerging cocoa industry not only in Indonesia, but also across the 
Asian region. 
1.4    Contribution to Global Production Network Theory 
During the last two decades, the global value chain analysis framework has attracted the interest of 
a range of powerful multilateral institutions and development agencies. This analytical framework 
offers systematic ways to enhance the economic actors’ competitiveness and to integrate into the 
global economy. Notwithstanding, the framework tends to emphasize interfirm governance 
strategies in generating greater value from various industrial upgrading processes, giving less 
attention to the external actors’ roles and their influence over how value is generated. Broadening 
the interfirm governance approach, Yeung and Coe (2015) propose a dynamic theory of global 
production networks. Structured upon the growing economic power of the transnational firms, the 
theory maintains leading actor‐centred analysis, and provides novel insights into why and how the 
organisation and coordination of GPNs varies within and across different industries, sectors and 
economies.   
Yeung and Coe (2015) introduced four sets of independent variables (so called casual drivers) that 
are interrelated and are re‐shaping firm specific strategies. These are the three competitive 
dynamics‐i.e., market imperatives, cost‐capability ratios, and financial discipline, along with industry‐
specific risk environments. In the context of cocoa production networks, such networks are 
dominated by North‐based transnational firms that enjoy stable and regulated business 
environments compared to most cocoa‐producing countries’ environments. However, with the 
growing market trending towards the Global South, and the functional upgrading occurring within 
the cocoa‐producing countries, investment by transnational firms is facing relatively new risks, 
despite their capacity to manage the three competitive dynamics.  Attempts to preserve long‐term 
business strategies require a manageable and sustainable supply chain. By adopting the 
sustainability concept, the transnational firms are delivering a range of upstream interventions 
beyond their commercial sphere not only to overcome social and political instability, but also to 
manage other risks in order to sustain their current investments.  
According to Yeung and Coe (2015), the wide range of non‐economic actor backgrounds have 
diverse rationalities that will drive them to engage differently with production networks and to 
reshape inter‐firm governance and the strategies of lead firms. The extrafirm bargaining strategy 
provides an analytical nexus on how economic activities intersect with noneconomic issues, in this 
case social justice, environmental deterioration and political instability. Yeung and Coe define the 
strategy as a contested two‐way process of negotiating and accommodation between firms and non‐
economic actors, the aim being to reach a mutually satisfactory outcome in creation and the 
capturing of value through global production networks (2014: 51). However, it is unclear how this 
process can achieve such an outcome while an individual firm approach to a non‐economic actor 
may draw negative publicity. Considering the transnational firms’ value chain intervention involving 
sustainability initiatives, this study seeks to discern how this symbiotic relationship is developing 
within the cocoa‐chocolate industry. This will of necessity, require exploring and identifying different 
approaches to negotiating processes specifically related to upstream interventions in order to 
sustain the current expansion of downstream economic activity.   
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Regarding the motivation behind the extra firm bargaining strategy, Yeung and Coe (2015) suggest 
three interrelated objectives: (1) seeking market power; (2) securing proprietary rights; and (3) 
gaining social and political legitimacy.  These three objectives indicate how to strengthen and 
enhance the lead firms’ positions, which are linked to their core‐competencies. While extra‐firm 
bargaining has conventionally occurred in downstream segments of the chain, this study seeks to 
identify the main objectives underpinning increasing upstream economic engagement, and how 
these objectives relate to the possibility of minimising the upstream risk and value capturing from 
coordinated production networks.   
Having observed that integration with GPNs is often driven by gain, Coe and Yeung (2015) argue that 
value capture is the most important dimension in developmental terms. ‘Value capture’ refers to the 
ability of individual firms to retain their surpluses by incorporating and exploiting various resources, 
e.g., labour, capital, technology, and knowledge into their economic activities. In the context of 
cocoa production networks, value capture has primarily concentrated on downstream production 
activities. This segment captures more value through near market innovation and production 
efficiency, while more laborious and low value upstream activities are often externalised to millions 
of smallholder farmers.  However, due to the uncertainties surrounding the environmental, social 
and political issues on the upstream activities, this segment has attracted the interest of the 
transnational firms. This engagement is increasingly framed by notions of sustainability, this study 
will explore how voluntary sustainability initiatives are linking to value capturing and supporting the 
downstream activities.  
This asymmetrical value capturing between the downstream and upstream actors has become the 
major argument in GVC and GPN literature, specifically on the ongoing production and contribution 
to diverse patterns of uneven spatial development.  The emerging upstream interventions, however, 
remains open to understanding how value creation is captured through firms’ sustainability 
initiatives. The direct involvement of transnational firms in the implementation of these initiatives 
has immediately enrolled smallholder producers in the global production network and consequently 
subjected them to increased global economic competition. With the transnational firm presence 
near the cocoa‐producing region occurring in parallel with the government’s intention to 
industrialise the cocoa sector, the concept of capturing value is useful for understanding the 
relationship between the vertical and horizontal forces that drive economic rural development.  This 
study focuses on transnational firms’ upstream economic activities, explores the development 
outcomes of value creation from the upstream segment, and attempts to fill the gap in the well‐
documented literature of industrial economic activities.  
1.5    Research questions 
This study broadly examines to what extent the sustainability concept has been inserted into the 
GVC‐GPN, specifically in the Indonesian cocoa sector. It is particularly focused on the upstream 
segments of cocoa production networks.  Drawing on the global production network perspective of 
multi‐dimensional and multi‐scalar analysis, this study addresses the following three interrelated 
questions:  
1. How are transnational cocoa‐chocolate firms defining, negotiating and governing 
sustainability across the global production network?  
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2. How is the Indonesian government responding to increasing upstream sustainability‐linked 
interventions throughout the production network? 
3. What are the trajectories of the sustainability initiatives for smallholder farmers and who 
captures the value of upgrading at the farm level? 
Despite the vertical market coordination of sustainable cocoa, the first question looks specifically at 
extrafirm bargaining coordination through firm sustainability initiatives. The implementation of 
these initiatives has been diverse, depending on the individual production network structure and 
characteristics of the firms. This was not only in the sense of their position in the global production 
networks, but also involving the ownership, organisational structure, and product portfolio. The first 
question refers to the sustainability initiatives of two dominant chocolate firms, the family‐owned 
business Mars Incorporation, and the Swiss‐based shareholding corporation Nestlé S.A. Although 
both firms enjoy a dominant global market share, they have different characteristics ‐ derived from 
historical and economic perspectives ‐ that motivate the certain extent of engagement in cocoa 
sustainability initiatives.   
The GVC approach has tended to over‐emphasise value generation through industrial inter‐firm 
governance and the upgrading process. This generalisation of industrial governance has drawn 
criticism from some GPN scholars who argue that the organisation and coordination of GPNs (or 
GVCs) are significantly diverse within and across different industries, sectors and economics (Yeung 
and Coe, 2014). The GPN approach facilitates the conceptualisation of the firm sustainability notion 
into the extrafirm bargaining strategy. This extrafirm bargaining strategy from the GPN perspective 
conceptualises as extra endeavour to not only minimises risk and uncertainty, but also elicits greater 
value from the complex upstream activities. Most economic activities ‐ particularly those of the 
agrofood industries ‐ intersect with noneconomic issues that involve diverse extrafirm actors (see 
Yeung and Coe, 2014).  
For the second question, I use a case study based upon the Indonesian cocoa sector to demonstrate 
that cocoa, one of the country’s strategic commodities, has also been subject to state intervention, 
and this highlights the fact that the political dimension plays an important role in GPN dynamics. 
Increasing upstream activities is not only filling the regulatory gap on integrating the international 
conventions on human rights and biodiversity conservation into sourcing policies, but also signals 
the increased up‐country presence and vertical coordination among the transnational leading firms. 
Accordingly, putting pressure on Indonesia’s domestic firms to remain competitive. The firms’ 
initiatives are challenging the traditional government role of public service delivery, and it is unclear 
how the government can respond to these initiatives while at the same time attempt to preserving 
its interest on capturing the added value from vertically integrated domestic production networks.  
Finally, what will be the trajectories of value capture resulting from the firm sustainability initiatives 
for the rural smallholder farmers? By unpacking the implementation of sustainability initiatives of 
two lead firms provides, I will develop an understanding about the extent to which initiatives affect 
participating smallholder farmers. The third question will contribute to previous debates of industrial 
and uneven development, as the value capture embedded in sustainability initiatives were following 
by different type of farm‐level upgrading process.   
1.6   Structure of thesis 
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Following the introduction to the thesis, Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework to inform this 
study. The chapter reviews contemporary theories of global production networks‐global value chains 
and how the emerging concept of sustainability is integrated into corporate business practices. 
Despite ongoing debate over the elusive meaning of the term, the adoption of sustainability 
concepts through the value chain not only broadens the economic actor roles beyond the economic 
domain, but is also reconfiguring the structure of cocoa‐chocolate production networks.  
Chapter 3 explains the methodologies applied to explore the changing nature of firms and their 
production networks in the cocoa sector. The study is based on a case study of two market leaders, 
Mars and Nestlé. It uses both firms’ production networks as the unit of analysis, with data primarily 
collected from interviews undertaken across the firms’ supply partners and stakeholders. I also 
explain other methodologies, including content analyses of firm publications and online media‐
related reports, the collection of secondary information from legitimate organisation and media 
websites, my engagement as a participant‐observant in various multi‐stakeholder meetings, 
workshops and conferences. The application of different research methods enhances the validity of 
the research findings, and triangulation is introduced to generalise reliable findings from the 
analyses of detailed information based on individual firm’s stories and experiences.   
Chapter 4 overviews global dynamics in the development of cocoa‐chocolate industries with a 
specific focus on emerging market development in the Asia pacific region. Linked to this 
development, I discuss the leading roles of chocolate branding manufacturers in the (re) 
configuration of global cocoa‐chocolate production networks that has resulted in more concentrated 
downstream networks and vertical coordination across the supply chain. Responding to this 
development, further discussion focuses on the capitalist competitive dynamics affecting lead firms, 
and how these are affecting their capability to manage the risk environments in order to sustain 
their global market dominance. These causal drivers have led to different strategies applied by Mars 
and Nestlé to govern and organise their production networks, and to manage upstream risks 
through extra‐firm bargaining.   
Chapter 5 presents the increasing market demand for ‘sustainable cocoa’ after the lead firms 
announced their public commitment to source cocoa beans from sustainable sources, and how this 
has affected their supply partners. This is followed by a presentation of different governance 
strategies and the state of sustainability initiatives in Indonesia, as implemented by Mars and Nestlé. 
The chapter compares both firms’ engagement in domestic sustainability initiatives that are 
accompanied by increasing vertical coordination with the upstream actors and extension of 
horizontal coordination with the extra‐firm actors.   
Chapter 6 discusses how the state is responding to the emerging firm sustainability initiatives, while 
transforming and industrialising the Indonesian cocoa sector. This chapter explores the national 
perspective of the dynamic role of extrafirm actors in the GPN, and how the Indonesian government 
has responded to the ongoing sustainability intervention by introducing cocoa affiliated policy and 
regulation. The territorial based analysis discusses the dynamic interactions between the changing 
policy incentives and the orientation of transnational firms, which collectively influence the local 
production network structure. This chapter will identify the strategies and initiatives undertaken by 
the Indonesian state as a response to increasing upstream interventions and the growing dominance 
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of transnational trading firms in supply production and distribution. This chapter shows how the 
government is attempting to protect a few group of domestic firms against the more competitive 
transnational firms.  
While the previous chapters have shown the implication of sustainability initiatives on configuring 
the cocoa production network, Chapter 7 focuses on farm level trajectories and value capture as 
types of upgrading are introduced to the smallholder farmers. This focuses on different forms of 
farm‐level upgrading under two distinctive programs: the increasing adoption of certification 
schemes and the Mars CDC‐CVC business extension model. Unpacking different forms of upgrading 
introduced from both interventions emphasises the significance of capitalist capabilities in obtaining 
the upgrading and continuing participation in the lead firm production networks.  
Following the discussion on value creation and capture at the farm‐level, Chapter 8 discusses further 
implications of value capture on regional development. Focusing on the island of Sulawesi, this 
chapter analyses the interplay of value trajectories and regional asset accumulation, between the 
state‐led strategic coupling via industrial policy and transnational firms’ capitalist decisions via 
improving economic scale‐scope of production. To understand the aggregate effects of value 
capture on strengthening Sulawesi’ supply‐based assets, this chapter structurally identifies the 
increased role of transnational firms on improving regional assets and further contributing to 
regional development. This chapter highlights the increasing regional dependency on transnational 
forms and emerging patterns of uneven development, and the exclusion of less competitive actors 
from cocoa production networks through lead firm sustainability initiatives. Finally, the conclusion 
highlights the link between the lead firm sustainability initiatives and emerging pattern of uneven 
development. 
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2. Theoretical framework: Corporate Sustainability and                         
Global Production Networks (GPNs)  
The focus of this study is upon on the emergence of cocoa‐chocolate transnational firm engagement 
with notions of sustainability in the contemporary world economy. This literature review identifies 
the growing interest in sustainability as a governing concept, and the recognition of transnational 
firms as key partners contributing to sustainable development. Despite the debate inspired by the 
elusive meaning of the term, the adoption of the sustainability concept into the emerging firms’ 
upstream value chain interventions has extended the economic actors’ roles well beyond the 
economic domain. From a development perspective, value chain analysis has emerged as a 
prominent contemporary analytical framework for understanding power relationships and value 
capture that can result from involvement in the global economy.  
Over the last two decades, this framework has been adopted by a range of powerful multilateral 
financial institutions and international development agencies (UNCTAD, 2013; Neilson, 2014; OECD 
and WB group, 2015). In addition, this period has seen the growing power of civil society groups’ 
attempts to incorporate private regulations and voluntary sustainability certification schemes into 
the GVC‐GPN. Their interventions have led to increased external pressure to address socio‐
environmental issues. Thus, in addition to conceptualising the integration of the sustainability 
concept into production networks, this review seeks: (1) to identify the limitations of the 
overemphasis on industrial governance and economic upgrading in the GVC literature and the need 
to accommodate growing horizontal forces; and (2) to contextualise current understanding of the 
upstream extra‐firm bargaining strategies employed by lead firms to facilitate sustainability. 
2.1 Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
2.1.1 Sustainability as a concept  
Sustainability reflects to the idea of sustainable development that was articulated in 1987 as 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.  While the term sustainable development has been criticising 
as an oxymoron, or at best as ambiguous and distorted definition (Johnston et al., 2007), the 
growing interventions framing into ‘being sustained’ by a range of actors, thus the term also has 
become a synonymous with ‘sustainability’. They argued that Sustainable Development perceived as 
vehicle to perpetuate the corporate and institutional interests whilst simply framing the impression 
of adherence on environmentally‐sound principles, thus this weaken interpretation also extends to 
sustainability.  
With increasing interests from the corporations to incorporate sustainability idea into their 
organisation and eventually considered as strategy to drive the economic growth (Baumgartners and 
Ebner, 2010) that recently called corporate sustainability. The concept of corporate sustainability 
has reoriented the transnational firms’ interest towards the broader aspects of their responsibilities 
that beyond social dimension and adding economic and environmental dimensions, together they 
are integrating into business activities. Because the broader context invites greater openness for 
interpretation, the adoption of the concept is moving away from simply engaging with the altruistic 
aspects of corporate social responsibility or initial idea to sustain the earth carrying capacity.  
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Recognising the importance of the economic actors’ contribution to sustainable development, in 
1992 the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) created a forum called the Business Council for Sustainable Development (subsequently 
renamed the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The global 
acknowledgement that a firm has a responsibility to pursue ‘sustainability’, once regarded as the 
domain of philanthropic individuals and organisations, marked a shift within mainstream corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) towards broader aspects of responsibility to the economy, society and 
environment. The firm’s interest in the concept of sustainability was linked to the earlier idea of 
‘sustainable development’, which had a nuanced longer term vision of meeting present needs 
without compromising future needs. From a business perspective, this was soon reflected in a desire 
to sustain both current and future business needs. 
Nowadays, the sustainability concept has become popular among business leaders competing for 
international and regional sustainability awards that recognise their commitment to ‘sustainable 
business practices’. For example, since 2010, the World Economic Forum (WEF) has been seeking 
‘new sustainability champions’.  Recently, ASEAN awarded ASEAN corporate sustainability awards to 
companies that had demonstrated and promoted a sustainable development agenda. Such awards 
recognise the economic actors’ endeavours to implement ‘environmentally (sound) sustainable 
business practice’ as part of their core business competencies in the absence of well‐developed and 
enforced international standards for environmental and social issues.   
2.1.2 Sustainability in corporate practice  
Historically, the concept of sustainability was driven by concern over the limits of the earth’s 
carrying capacity to support the ecosystem (Meadows et al., 1972).  As the concept became popular, 
almost every project or initiative adopted the term, partly because its value was open to definition 
rather than it being an empirical concept. Its value can be different for individuals, organisations, or 
communities (Harvey 1996).  Banerjee (2008:64) has argued that the discourses surrounding 
sustainable development are becoming increasingly corporatized. The notion of sustainability is 
increasingly constructed, manipulated and represented in popular business media in addition to the 
academic literature. For example, the Dow Jones report on Sustainability Group Index, based on a 
survey of 500 companies, identified corporate engagement in sustainability as aimed at increasing 
long term shareholder value by integrating economic, environment and social growth opportunities 
into their corporate strategies (Banerjee, 2008). Moreover, he argues, sustainable development 
discourse has shifted focus to corporate sustainability to sustain (long term) growth opportunities, 
displacing the initial focus from caring about planetary limits as stated in the Brundtland report 
(Banerjee, 2003). Recognising the importance of the corporate contributions to reifying the path to 
sustainability using market exchange to achieve global sustainability implied promoting sustainability 
as business as usual, rather than fundamentally changing business practices to work within social 
and ecological limits. 
The adoption of sustainability by the corporate actors in the cocoa‐chocolate sectors is often 
referred to as a cocoa sustainability program or initiative.  The former Hershey vice president 
director of CSR (Long, 2008: 317) argued that,  
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‘CSR is not synonymous with sustainability, which may form just one part of a company’s 
broader CSR program, although it should be a key ingredient of the overall policy. Instead the 
strategy sessions made it clear that sustainability links most directly to two key areas of 
Hershey’s business: supply-chain management and environmental stewardship practices, both 
of which are common to many other businesses’.  
Although this actor suggests that the adoption of sustainability should fall under CSR, recently the 
sustainability concept has become more integrated with firm value principles, such as ‘well‐being’ 
(Mondelēz) or ‘creating shared value’ (Nestlé), or a direct social response to supply chain practices 
(Mars and Lindt &Sprüngli)11. It suggests that the adoption of the sustainability concept means going 
one step further than the altruistic concept of social responsibility.    
Within the global cocoa sector, the concept of sustainability has gained the interest of various 
industry stakeholders. Multi‐stakeholder partnerships have been established to promote the 
integration of the concept into business practice, bridging the chocolate consumer and supply 
countries. The establishment of a Roundtable for Sustainable Cocoa Economy (RSCE) in 2007 aimed 
to build a consensus of defining a measurable concept to achieve a sustainable world cocoa 
economy with the support of the major European cocoa consuming countries (most notably the 
Netherlands), and cocoa producing countries (particularly Ghana). The main agenda for a sustainable 
world cocoa economy included establishing sustainable supply chains from cocoa production to 
consumption, and building a collaborative institutional framework to promote sustainable practices 
across geographical scales.   
Transnational cocoa‐chocolate firms have been developing sustainable (responsible) sourcing 
standards and codes of conduct since early 2010. Voluntary enforcement has extended to other supply 
chain actors, despite having implemented self‐design sustainability initiatives (as presented earlier in 
Table 1.1). Before officially launching their sustainability initiatives, Mars engaged with a range of 
sustainability‐affiliated partnerships and programs in an attempt to address cocoa supply challenges 
(Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004). According to Mars, partnerships offer various ways to engage with 
government, research and development institutions, and conservation agencies. They encourage the 
development of a holistic and integrated approach to both environmental and economic 
sustainability, including a commitment to private sector‐led growth in rural areas. The usage of the 
notion of sustainability has allowed firms to expand their interaction and to engage with non‐
economic actors, with a specific aim to address supply challenges. A similar notion of partnership 
approach was proposed by the President of Blommer chocolate who stated: ‘[W]hat we created was 
a sustainable commercial system, linking the end buyer with the farmer, to drive value for both 
farmers and end users’ (Blommer, 2011: 22).  Linking to the framework of ‘commercial sustainability’, 
he suggested direct markets between smallholder farmers and cocoa traders and processors would 
enable farmers to capture greater value. 
                                                          
11  http://www.mondelezinternational.com/well‐being;   http://www.Nestlé.com/csv;   
http://www.marschocolate.com.au/sustainability/sustainability/; http://www.lindt‐spruengli.com/sustainability/ 
[Retrieved on January 2017].   
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From these lead firm perspectives, the primary motivation driving engagement with sustainability was 
to ensure social responsibility (or social legitimacy in the minds of consumers) and to overcome supply 
challenges. This appears to imply a shift away from the original concept of sustainable development, 
and its concern over the earth carrying capacity.  As a concept that has been integrated differently 
with the business culture at different levels of engagement, this growing recognition has been 
incorporated into firm supply chain strategies. Not only from the incorporation of international labour 
and environmental law into the industrial sourcing policies, but also in the form of delivering various 
sustainability programs.  
2.1.3 Debating corporate sustainability  
The UN’s endorsement of transnational firms as key partners to achieve sustainable development 
goals opened a window of opportunity for firms to gain positive recognition and make contributions 
to the UN agenda that was previously introduced through a public policy agenda. As the concept 
became more popular, various interpretations emerged of the terms “sustainable” and 
“development” (Elliott, 2012; Williams and Millington, 2004). Some critics commented on how the 
term had been used in a variety of ways depending upon the organisations’ interest in justifying or 
embellishing their actions, and rendering it as an oxymoron (Johnston et al, 2007: 60; Redclift, 
2005:213; Christen and Schmidt, 2012; Connelly, 2007). However, in the commercial sphere, the 
concept of corporate sustainability continued to be linked to the popular Brundtland slogan (WCED, 
1987) referring to the enduring satisfaction of human needs across generations (Banerjee, 2008); 
Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; Bansal, 2005; Sharma and Henriques, 2005). 
Literature focusing on business management and ethics has explored the integration of 
‘sustainability’ within business culture (Banerjee, 2008; van Marrewijk, 2003; Wilson, 2003) and the 
development of distinct criteria and strategic approaches to the adoption of corporate sustainability 
(Dyllick and Hockerts, 2002; Benn et al, 2007; Young and Tilley, 2006; Baumgartner and Ebner, 2010; 
Porter and Kramer, 2011). Further studies then focused on developing normative assessment tools 
for corporate sustainability such as effective measurement and reporting (Knoepfel, 2001; Wheeler 
and Elkington, 2001; Salzmann et al, 2005; Atkinson, 2000; Perrini and Tencati, 2006; Burritt and 
Schaltegger, 2010), prescriptive guidelines for sustainable businesses (Azapagic, 2003; Linnenluecke 
and Griffiths, 2010; Orlitzky et al., 2011), and empirical analyses of the positive correlation between 
economic and environmental performance (Wagner, 2005; Lo and Sheu, 2007). Overall, these 
contributions highlighted the different ways through which the concept has been incorporated and 
institutionalised into business practice as an instrument to sustain long‐term industry growth.  
With respect to the business literature, Porter and Kramer’s (2006, 2011) studies captured the 
interest of business and management scholars by introducing the concept of Creating Shared Value 
(CSV). Linking strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) with the company’ competitive 
advantage, they introduced strategic CSR that moved beyond generic social impact towards shared 
social values (Porter and Kramer, 2006). They argued that by investing in social capital and building 
symbiotic relationships, the success of both the company and the community would become 
mutually reinforcing. For example, Nestlé’s commitment to investing in local dairy infrastructure in 
India enabled the company to obtain a stable supply of high‐quality fresh milk, whilst eliminating the 
extra costs of middlemen. From a CSV perspective, the value is more than just doing good by 
changing sourcing practices, but in further exploring how the firm could reconfigure its operations to 
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generate economic value by creating social value and driving growth in the competitive global 
economy. Finally, they argue that shared value is defined as a total pool of economic and social 
value, rather than as simple redistribution of revenue introduced by third party certification schemes 
in the form of a market incentive (Porter and Kramer, 2011).   
Critiques of incorporating the sustainability concept into business practice pertain to the over‐
emphasis of corporate interest in value creation as a strategy employed at the expense of other 
segments of society. As Banerjee (2008) argues, such strategies are zero sum games in the sense 
that the nature of corporations are inherently driven by an economic rationale (such as a shift to 
greener energy or zero waste practices leading to cost saving and increased efficiency). Ensuring 
social welfare remains the basic role of governments, a role that will presumably never be entirely 
usurped by corporations. Banerjee (2008) further suggests that corporations’ self‐decisions to 
relocate their production facilities to other locations due to increasing labour costs are clearly not 
considered in the interest of societies and livelihoods reliant on the corporations. The latter’s 
strategies are independently employed to increase shareholder value and financial returns. They are 
not designed around social justice or morality. A similar argument was directed towards 
environmental elements, where reframing nature as a market commodity dependent upon 
corporate sustainability tends to corrupt the social good of the environment rather than protect it 
(Nyberg and Wright, 2013).  
Incorporating sustainability into strategic business development, however, does signal a changing 
corporate culture. The various emerging corporate sustainability initiatives, including public 
reporting of their ethical and social performances, was in effect moving beyond philanthropic CSR. 
This initiative has remained voluntary and is often imposed by firms operating at the consumer 
interface of the value chain. The extent to which these self‐enacted private regulatory attempts to 
fill the missing gap in public regulation are actually re‐shaping governance regimes across the supply 
chain remain under explored in the literature.  Global acknowledgement by international 
development agencies of lead firms as key partners in development supports their claims to 
contribute to the development of rural communities under a commitment to sustainability. The 
implications, for less efficient upstream economic actors (including smallholder producers) and rural 
development, of these emergent corporate discourses also remain uncertain.  
2.2 Lead firms and the global economy  
The emergence of corporate sustainability has occurred at the same time as the global economy has 
continued to be fundamentally restructured towards networks of spatially dispersed economic 
functions coordinated by dominant lead firms. Business and management scholars argue that 
incorporating the sustainability concept makes business sense as it will help build mutual 
relationships with other actors that extend beyond generic altruistic and social impact motives. At 
the same time, critical sociology and economy geography scholars have tended to argue that the 
strategic decision of economic actors to adopt sustainability is motivated by economic interest, not 
primarily by social or moral justice. Recognising the implementation of sustainability across the 
supply chain in the form of increasing global private regulation is linked to increasingly diverse 
upstream value chain interventions by lead firms. The following literature review explores the 
theories of Global Value Chains and Production Networks (GVC‐GPN) as a way of making sense of 
current global economic organisation and firm strategies. 
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2.2.1 Global Value Chains (GVCs) and Global Production Networks (GPNs) 
Over the last few decades, the GVC‐GPN approach has drawn the attention not only of academic 
scholars, but has also been extensively adopted by various multilateral economic development 
institutions and donor agencies including the WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, and USAID. The structural 
framework proposed by the GVC inspired the development agencies to deliver programs which they 
introduced as ‘value chains for development’ (Neilson, 2014). They advised how to incorporate local 
economic activities into the global economy, and how to gain economic benefit from higher value 
and market accessibility. The development practitioners recognise that the GVCs are becoming a key 
driver for long term structural development (UNCTAD, 2013; Neilson, 2014; OECD and WB group, 
2015). From an academic perspective, this approach provided an analytical framework for 
understanding the distribution of power and value across the chain, including how a firm can gain 
from plugging-in to the global supply chain. However, given global oligopolistic market structures in 
sectors such as cocoa, market power rests with a few powerful transnational actors who maintain 
asymmetric power relationships with millions of unorganised small producers. This remains a 
problematic concern. 
Early studies of GVC‐GPN drew upon world‐system research seeking to understand capitalism’s 
territorial scope, and how the chain structure reproduced a stratified and hierarchical world‐system. 
Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977; 1986), who introduced the commodity chains concept, referred to a 
network of labour and production processes across multiple states resulting in a final product. Their 
analysis focused on the historical reconstruction of industries in the sixteenth century. They highlight 
state‐centred power in the forms of industrial and trading regulations that shaped global production 
systems and economic flows between states.  
Then, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1994) claim that the emergence of globalisation and trade 
liberalisation in 1990s, shifted the focus from state‐centred development to firms, framing the 
power and control exercised within the global supply chain (which they referred to as Global 
Commodity Chains‐GCCs). The rise of the transnational firms’ leading role recognised the importance 
of globalisation processes, particularly how participation in commodity chains facilitated the 
upgrading of industries in developing countries. With a focus on the power dynamic within the 
capitalist world economy, this broad approach was subsequently embodied within various 
terminologies, including ‘value chains’ (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001), ‘Global Production Networks’ 
(Henderson et al., 2002), ‘cross‐continental food chains’ (Fold and Pritchard 2005), and as ‘Global 
Value Chains’ (Gereffi et al., 2005). Overall, these approaches provided a structural analysis of the 
nature of power relationships across space and their implications for uneven regional development.  
Earlier, the GCC approach introduced a producer‐driven and buyer‐driven commodity chain 
governance framework.  While, the producer‐driven governance was characterised by capital and 
technological‐intensive industries (e.g., automobiles, electronic appliances) and the lead 
manufacturer had a central role in controlling a production system comprising several tiers of 
distributors who were vertically coordinated. The buyer‐driven chains were characterised by labour‐
intensive industries (e.g., apparel and agricultural crops) and the subcontracting suppliers were 
coordinated with a certain degree of control exercised by retailers or brand‐design merchandisers. 
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The buyers drive what product to produce without necessarily produce because they had the market 
capacity to create the market and sell the branded products.   
Although the buyer‐driven chains were more resembled to the labour‐ intensive industries, not all 
the agro‐commodities were following this approach, particularly the colonial crops such as cocoa, 
coffee, cane sugar and natural rubber. In cocoa, Gibbon (2001) identified the major horizontal 
coordination role played by the state’ firm such as monopoly of domestic marketing function like in 
Ghana and Ivory Coast before 1990s. Both states were playing coordination roles from delivering 
extension services, supplying inputs, maintaining quality control, and recovering credit to control 
over the farm gate price. As the state marketing board monopolised the upstream market, the 
vertical coordination with the lead buyers performed by few international trading and brokering 
companies (Gibbon, 2001; Fold, 2001).  Within the context of West African cocoa production, the 
chains were not driven or dictated by the transnational lead buyer, but the producer countries also 
were actively in setting the rules of the game, both in price and quality terms, (Gibbon, 2001). While 
at the industrial production, Fold (2002) identified ‘turn‐key’ (or modular) chain structure where the 
branded chocolate manufactures established vertical coordination with the capable chocolate‐cocoa 
producers to deliver specific characteristics and quality credentials of industrial chocolate and cocoa 
products, depending on the spatial market demands, specific brands and functional characteristics.   
Following the improvement of information and technology, and the increased outsourcing strategy 
of manufacturing firms, more diverse market demands (e.g. organic, fair‐trade, less sugar, high 
flavanol, the dyadic typology of governance was unable to accommodate the emergence of more 
complex patterns of chain governance. As supplier capabilities in exporting countries improved and 
vertically‐integrated industries were dismantled, the introduction of a more dynamic analysis of 
inter‐firm governance was accompanied by the replacement of the term ‘commodity’ to ‘value’. The 
term ‘commodity’ suggested undifferentiated products, and the term ‘value’ reflected the 
increasingly popular notion of value‐added (Sturgeon, 2008). The formalisation of the terminology 
into global value chains, Gereffi et al., (2005) extended the dynamic governance structure to five 
types that specifically describe how suppliers relate with lead firms: (1) market; (2) hierarchy; (3) 
modular; (4) captive; and, (5) relational. The structure provides a framework for firms in developing 
countries to demonstrate how to improve their position within the chain by generating and retaining 
value added. This approach has shifted away from the traditional world system approach, as Bair 
(2005) argues, much of the chains literature opposed the previous macro and holistic perspective of 
a world‐system approach, and GVCs have increasingly focused on the meso level of sectoral 
dynamics and the micro level of firm upgrading. 
Dismantling cocoa marketing boards in Ivory Coast and (partially) following by Ghana has weaken 
the state horizontal function and emerging the voluntary sustainability certification schemes to 
pressure the dominant transnational firms to taking responsibility on social and environmental issue 
have also contributing to more dynamic governance of global cocoa value chain. Defining quality 
credential as common rules of the game expanded for not only measuring the cocoa bean quality 
credentials, but also including all the process of farming practices and supply chain practices. While 
the recent development in global cocoa production networks shows an integrated trading‐
processing function and growing concentration of supply capacity of few transnational chocolate‐
cocoa producers beyond the five‐fold categorising of governance. With more concern over 
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sustaining the cocoa industries, the international traders are also cocoa and chocolate producers 
adds another inter‐firm challenge for the branded chocolate manufacturers on how to maintaining 
their control over the first‐tier suppliers and the upstream smallholder farmers. Thus, integrating 
sustainability into the current trend of outsourcing supply strategy plays crucial role in maintaining 
the lead firm control over the industrial chocolate‐cocoa and upstream cocoa production. Thys study 
contributing to dynamic governance of chocolate‐cocoa production networks related to the growing 
trend to incorporating sustainability concept into the firm strategy. Also, this study filling the gaps 
over dominant study that focus on West African Countries and offers different geographic context of 
local chocolate‐cocoa production networks in Indonesia.  
Overemphasis of the linear and vertical metaphor of the GCC‐GVC approach to the conceptualisation 
of complex global production and consumption process also drew scholarly criticism from the 
proponents of global production networks (GPNs, Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Coe at 
al., 2008). Henderson et al., (2002: 442) argue that: 
...[S]uch processes are better conceptualised as being highly complex network structures 
in which there are intricate links -horizontal, diagonal, as well as vertical -forming multi-
dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activities. 
GPN scholars make reference to the complex network of structures underpinning the global 
economy. This network involves the interaction of diverse actors, institutions and interest groups 
from economic, political, social and cultural spheres. Their actions are embedded in multi‐scalar 
territorialities of asymmetrical power relationships that inherently produce diverse spatial 
outcomes. This argument has become the main foundation supporting the construction of the initial 
GPN framework that specified the three interrelated conceptual categories of value, embeddedness 
and power. Yet, the conceptual approach remains inadequate for developing a theory of GPN due to 
its explanatory and causal limitations, which led to a more recent, dynamic configuration of global 
production networks (Yeung and Coe, 2014:31‐32). 
In a quest to reframe existing generalisations at the industry level, Yeung and Coe (2014) introduced 
a new GPN model (which they refer to as GPN 2.0) to introduce causal mechanisms of independent 
capitalist dynamics that shape actor‐specific strategies, which in turn drive the dynamic 
reconfiguration of production networks within specific industries and localities. They define global 
production networks as ‘an organisational arrangement comprising interconnected economic and 
non‐economic actors coordinated by a global lead firm and producing goods and services across 
multiple geographic locations for worldwide markets’ (Yeung and Coe, 2014: 32). This definition 
broadens the previous GVC definition that tended to focus more upon the industrial process, and 
coordination of the conception of a product or services towards the near end market (Kaplinsky and 
Morris, 2001; Gereffi and Fernandez, 2011). However, both the GVC and GPN approaches emphasise 
the key roles of lead firms that own a certain degree of power and authority to govern the chain or 
network. GPNs, however, emphasize the diverse interconnected roles of economic and non-
economic actors within the spatial network rather than merely considering them as external forces 
that influence the networks. 
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GPN 2.0 theory introduces broader capitalist dynamics, as independent variables, as the raison 
d’être for global production networks, which combine with the prevailing risk environment to drive 
firm practices and strategies. GPN 2.0 introduces three dynamic forces as causal conditions that 
determine specific lead firm strategies: (1) cost capability ratios; (2) sustaining market development; 
and, (3) financial discipline (Yeung and Coe, 2014). While, these dynamics drive the value capturing 
activities of economic actors, this is combined with their ability to manage risk environments. 
Notwithstanding the inherent uncertainty of these external forces, Yeung and Coe (2014) suggest 
five different forms of risk: economic, product, regulatory, labour and environmental. While the risks 
related to individual firm capabilities tend to be manageable, the risk associated with non‐economic 
actors can be unpredictable and unprecedented, although this risk is negotiable (Yeung and Coe, 
2014). In an attempt to bridge this gap in the literature, this thesis looks at how firms use their 
economic power to persuade and extend their coordination with non‐economic actors to minimise 
risks that could impede their determination to capture maximum value from particular production 
processes, and how ‘sustainability’ is employed to this end.   
A combination of these capitalist competitive dynamics defines the firm’s strategy to reconfigure 
global production networks. Regarding dependent variables, Yeung and Coe (2014) suggest the 
following three industrial strategies (akin to governance types): intrafirm coordination, interfirm 
control and interfirm partnerships, along with an extra‐firm bargaining strategy. The inclusion in this 
model of an extra‐firm bargaining strategy is a departure from previous governance models in the 
GVC literature. Indeed, the diverse interests of emerging global rulers, the growing presence of civil 
society groups (including certification bodies for sustainability), and policy interventions by the state 
have significantly influenced the creation of value‐added in particular production networks. In their 
attempt to move beyond the over‐emphasized intra and inter firm governance strategies, Yeung and 
Coe (2014) argue that economic processes are interrelated with non‐economic issues that are 
produced by diverse non‐economic actors. Thus, extra‐firm bargaining strategies are crucial to 
providing this analytical nexus.   
2.2.2 Extra-firm bargaining strategies 
There is thus an increasing recognition of the significant roles of non‐economic actors and the 
unpredictability of risk environments that could possibly lead to disruption of economic process. 
Reflecting the under‐exploration of this uncertainty in the literature, my thesis explores the extra‐
firm bargaining strategies within upstream production networks. The emergence of corporate 
sustainability discourses and initiatives appears to reflect such strategies. Yeung and Coe (2015) 
categorise extra‐firm actors based on their functional roles and spatial impact on the production 
networks; the state, international organisations, labour groups, buyers and civil society 
organisations. Yet, how the firm is engaging with the extra‐firm actors to pursue their interests 
remains unclear.  
Earlier GCC‐GVC literature tended to address the role of extra‐firm actors in reshaping inter‐firm 
governance as largely external to the value chain (Coe and Yeung, 2015). However, some scholars 
had argued that these actors play significant roles particularly in creating and reshaping the 
agrofood value chains (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005; Tallontire 2007; Raynolds, 2009; Tallontire et 
al., 2011; Ponte, 2014).  Ponte and Sturgeon (2014) suggest the notion of polarity governance, in an 
attempt to capture the multiple levels of governance interactions among the actors within the chain 
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and beyond. This includes the following: micro level governance (dynamics of dyadic exchange such 
as referring to a fivefold governance structure); meso level governance (how the coordination 
linkages between the nodes are influenced by both upstream and downstream activities as the 
result of different factors embodied in the nodes); and, macro level governance (the intention to 
analyse the whole power of the dynamic resulting from different polarities of power).  According to 
Ponte and Sturgeon (2014: 215): 
‘Multipolar’ chains are different from ‘markets’ as they are strongly shaped by the 
explicit strategic actions of powerful actors (both inside and outside the chain), even if 
they exhibit multiple foci of power and various kinds of linkages. This has implications 
for how the micro and meso elements of GVC governance are embedded into the macro 
level. 
...A focus on polarity, ranging from unipolar to multipolar governance allows the 
construction of plurality of drivers and of driving mechanisms that go beyond the well-
established dichotomy between buyer-and producer driven governance.  This plurality 
acknowledges that not only firms, but also other actors such as standard-setting bodies, 
international NGOs, social movements, certification agencies, labour unions, and 
consumer associations can have a bearing on GVC governance.  
This proposition also recognises the narrow conception of industrial governance. Ponte and 
Sturgeon argue that existing GCC‐GVC governance types suggest that the power in the chain resides 
mainly in one functional position, which they refer to as unipolar. Indeed, Ponte (2013) had earlier 
identified the emerging multipolar chain in palm oil as moving away from being unipolar and 
government driven, as the industrial actors are negotiating voluntary standards and certification 
with both the standard makers and environmental and social groups in accordance with multi‐
stakeholder initiatives. This adds to earlier conceptions of dynamic governance, such as Fold (2002), 
who suggested a bipolar governance mode where power in the cocoa chain was shared between 
chocolate manufacturers and grinders.  
The growing power of non‐economic actors in reshaping agrofood governance is well documented in 
the coffee value chain (Raynolds et al., 2007; Bacon et al., 2008; Henson and Humphrey, 2010; 
Reinecke et al., 2012). The increased demand for certified coffee over the last few decades has been 
driven by lead firms (often branded roasters), who control large market shares. The booming 
sustainable coffee market highlights certification schemes as a promising way to fill the regulatory 
vacuum resulting from globalisation and the declining role of the state in regulating environmental 
and social relations (Raynolds et al., 2007; Henson and Humphrey, 2010; Reinecke et al., 2012). 
These private sustainability standards and regulations are conventionally viewed from an 
institutional perspective, which interprets the role of such standards as addressing the insufficient 
willingness and capacity of states to regulate social and environmental issues, rather than 
interpreting the role of economic actors to negotiate standards and (or) influence the public policy 
environment. Consistent with the growing contemporary complexity of political‐economic systems 
and socio‐cultural change, economic actors are realising that delivering business as usual may not be 
sufficient to overcome unpredictable outcomes driven by non‐economic actors or the physical 
environment.   
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From a GPN perspective, the extra‐firm bargaining strategy recognises the actor‐specific interaction 
with the networks that previously emphasized only interfirm governance. This concept enriches GPN 
theory by acknowledging that both economic and non‐economic actors are pursuing an extra‐firm 
bargaining strategy for interrelated objectives, market power, proprietary rights, and social and 
political legitimacy (Yeung and Coe, 2015). These objectives are relevant to lead firms whose primary 
focus is on near end market core‐competencies, e.g., increasing market dominance, continuing to 
maintain expansion across emerging countries, securing the proprietary rights of novel functional 
compounds, retaining economic rent, legitimising responsible and ethical firms, and protecting them 
from consumer criticism.  The increase in the cocoa‐chocolate transnational firms’ upstream 
intervention through a range of sustainability initiatives was initially driven by interrelated risks 
beyond the firms’ outreach, linking to unstable supply and socio‐political issues (Bitzer et al., 2012; 
Barrientos, 2013). Departing from the intention to minimise these risks, upstream economic 
activities are necessarily diverse due to specific territorial contexts and challenges. For example, the 
cocoa bean supply chains in West African countries have been challenged by reports of forced 
labour and political turmoil, while low quality and stagnant farm productivity prevail in Indonesia, 
and low productivity was noted in the Latin America.  
As part of a broader effort to manage upstream risk environments, firms pursuing extra‐firm 
strategies attempted to build alliances (or partnerships) with non‐economic actors, most commonly 
through sectoral and multi‐stakeholder forums (Ponte, 2014; Fuchs et al., 2011). Within a range of 
global multi‐stakeholder forums, the powerful transnational firms’ presence became accepted as a 
key‐partner in development (Hartwich et al., 2008; Pattberg (ed.), 2012; FAO, 2016; Narrod et al., 
2009). But, this global recognition was not automatically followed by national and regional 
recognition, as the transnational firms were often seen as rivals rather than as partners. As a result, 
such partnerships, facilitated by North‐based international organisations, were interpreted as an 
attempt to legitimise corporate representation and participation in the public domain. As well as 
seeking political legitimacy from the nation state, the transnational firms are collaborating with non‐
economic actors to deliver sustainability initiatives and a range of extension services for upstream 
economic development, that were previously delivered by the state (Fransen and Kolk, 2007; Alvarez 
et al., 2010; Dentoni and Peterson, 2011; McCarthy et al., 2012).  
This extended role of the transnational firms beyond the economic domain and across territorialities 
was facilitated through sustainability discourses which highlighted the importance of horizontal 
modes of coordination within supplier communities. But, vertical coordination in the forms of 
private regulation and voluntary certification schemes to reach smallholder producer will not 
necessarily result in upstream economic and rural development. Using multi‐stakeholder forums as 
instruments to coordinate with non‐economic actors, the transnational firms established themselves 
as key partners participating in delivering sustainability programs ‐ often in the form of public private 
partnership ‐ for sharing funds, exchanging resources and information, and eventually responsibility 
(Shapiro and Rosenquist, 2004; Blommer, 2011; Bitzer et al., 2012). The notions of sharing resources 
and risk through partnerships, and promoting mechanisms to achieve sustainable agricultural 
development were the subjects of FAO reviews for agribusiness development in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia (FAO, 2016: ix). Partnerships were defined as:  
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‘formalised partnership between public institutions and private partners designed to address 
sustainable agricultural development objectives, where the public benefits anticipated from 
the partnership are clearly defined, investment contributions and risk are shared, and active 
roles exist for all partners at various stages throughout the PPP project lifecycle’.    
As dynamic development instruments, partnerships explicitly position private firms as equal partners 
in reshaping and negotiating the objectives and outcomes of the partnership with diverse non‐
economic actors.   
While the transnational firms were building relationships with non‐economic actors, domestic firms 
in Indonesia were building close relationships with the state.  In this way, they gained access to 
influence national policies such as programs, distribution of subsidies, and land concessions. In the 
Indonesian timber commodity chain, Gellert (2003) stresses the importance of political alliances 
between the state and local capitalists to facilitating upgrading, and to supporting further alliances 
within the market between local capitalists and Japanese firms. Although such political alliances 
were more common during the Soeharto regime, Soesastro and Basri (2005) argue that among the 
elite capitalist groups who hold key positions in the public and private sectors, patron‐client 
relationships remain strong. The capitalist groups organise lobbies and articulate the rhetoric of 
agricultural protectionism on the basis of poor farmer interests, which deceptively protect powerful 
rent‐seeking groups (Kim, 2005). The roles of local capitalist groups remain of considerable 
importance as they negotiate and bargain public policies and trading regulations in their favour.  
2.2.3 Economic and social upgrading in value chains 
Global value chain theory suggests industrial (or economic) upgrading as a pathway to capture value 
from integration with the global economy. Gereffi (1995, cited by Talbot, 2002:708) proposes three 
state‐related strategies to promote upgrading: (1) policy and institutional reform creating an 
enabling environment; (2) attracting and managing foreign direct investment (FDI) to promote 
development and enhance local firm competitiveness; and, (3) participation in regional economic 
blocs. However, as Talbot (2002) argues, these strategies do not explain why some regions or firms 
gain and others fall when adopting such a strategy. For example, inviting FDI may not be sufficient to 
enhance the domestic firm competitive advantages in a weak institutional system.  Among studies 
understanding this failure, Cramer (1999) argues that labour force skills are not enough to gain 
success. Additional factors related to state intervention in policies and external market condition are 
crucial factors.  
The case study of South African Wine shows that simply upgrading the product quality, process and 
functional activities may not guarantee the capture of value added because the rewards may not be 
enough to cover the upgrading cost. Downgrading may prove a better option in response to higher 
demand for bulk inexpensive wine (Ponte and Ewert, 2009). Similarly critiquing the apparel industry, 
Tokatli (2013) claims that the proposed upgrading framework lacked sensitivity regarding different 
competencies and the business environment. Thus, despite concern over fetishizing upgrading with 
positive development outcomes in the agrofood sector, the process of facilitating upgrading is more 
complex than simply enabling firm innovation and accessing new markets (Selwyn, 2011). Improving 
the farming process, through organic or quality production for example, will not necessarily result in 
higher value for the producer because of higher operational and labour costs. On the other hand, 
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value can be generated outside of upgrading. Furthermore, earlier studies (Barrientos et al., 2010; 
Selwyn, 2013; Milberg and Winkler, 2011) clearly demonstrate that gaining from a firm’s economic 
upgrading does not necessarily lead to social upgrading, while social upgrading may occur in the 
absence of economic upgrading.       
Responding to concerns over deterministic processes of economic upgrading, Gereffi and Lee (2016) 
note the inadequacy of economic upgrading within the global value chain framework. They 
introduce six trajectories of social upgrading with diverse key drivers and actors in different forms 
that extend beyond market dynamics: market, CSR, multi‐stakeholder, labour‐centred, cluster‐
centred, and public governance.  However, altruistic CSR initiatives by lead firms have limitations 
when seeking to promote fair labour conditions in low technology industries. This is partly due to an 
increase in shifting global production from the strictly regulated developed countries to less 
regulated transitional‐developing countries. Barrientos et al., (2011:324) suggest expanding the 
scope of CSR’s upgrading concept, as ‘the process of improving the rights and entitlements of 
workers as social actors, which enhances the quality of their employment’. However, enforcing 
social‐environmental laws across supply chain partners can lead to increasing production costs and 
the voluntary nature of private regulation seems to be insufficient to deliver meaningful outcomes 
for vulnerable groups.  
Selwyn (2014), who emphasizes the importance of territorial context, also notes the extension of 
value capturing beyond economic activities, as non‐economic actors increasingly influence the 
strategies the lead firms employ to govern and configure the global production networks. He argues 
that supplier firms’ upgrading success and failures are tied to local development processes that 
result in inclusion and exclusion from GVCs. The development process of the lead firms’ node is 
influenced by the surrounding regional/national economy (Selwyn, 2014: 9). With the support of the 
state as facilitator and protector of innovation, lead firms have the capability to manage the 
diffusion of innovation, enforce updated innovation, and replace previous systems. Buoyed by 
dynamic market power, they are able to retain lower profits and wage rates through selected 
competent suppliers (O’Hearn, 1994, cited in Selwyn, 2014). 
The earlier literature on value chain upgrading drew heavily upon the experience of organisational 
integration through buyer‐driven industrial networks in labour intensive industries and export‐
oriented industrialisation from East Asia. This development strategy required the government ‐as 
primary facilitator ‐ to create supportive conditions through infrastructure investment and business 
friendly economic policies. However, elsewhere, supplier countries’ increased participation in the 
global production networks resulted in poor levels of value capture. This was particularly evident in 
the labour intensive, low value and technology driven spheres (including agrofood), which led to 
intense competition associated with emerging social and environmental issues (Ponte, 2002; 
Blowfield, 2003; Talbot, 2002; Arnold and Pickles, 2011; Milberg and Winkler, 2011; Barrientos et al., 
2011). The literature reveals that plugging-in to the global production network was not always 
associated with equal distribution of gain from economic activities.  
There are limitations to economic upgrading within global production networks where emerging 
countries were becoming the factories of the world. While a country may benefit from a labour 
surplus, value chain engagement is not necessarily followed by improved social welfare. Social 
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upgrading, which is becoming a promising trajectory to pursue, can be linked to economic 
upgrading. But, what remains unclear are the different pathways through which lead firms are 
pursuing the non‐economic actors to address the complexities of territorial‐ based socio‐
environment issues, particularly in developing countries. Considering that the lead firms’ 
engagement with sustainability discourse within the global cocoa production networks is driven by 
concerns over economic and social risk, it remains unclear whether such engagement offers 
mutualistic value capturing trajectories for downstream and local upstream actors. 
2.3 Strategic coupling and regional economic development 
Previously, Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) articulated a significant role for the state within the 
lens of dyadic producer and buyer driven governance. Gereffi (1994: 100) explained how export‐
oriented development emerged through buyer‐driven governance in labour intensive industries. 
Governments in importer countries applied protectionist policy in organising the commodity chains 
that influenced the geographical pattern of sub‐contract export manufactures in developing 
countries (Bair, 2005:167‐168). Hence the gains for lead firms were at the expense of cheaper 
productive capital supplied by the export‐oriented countries leading to uneven development.  
Unpacking different patterns of uneven development, GPN approach introduces three level of 
analysis:  1) Applying actor based approaches that focus on the firm‐level dynamics of value 
creation, enhancement and capture in the production networks; 2) The sub‐national region level, as 
a key site for territorial analysis of the intersection with global production networks; and 3) Including 
macro political‐ economic structures, within which the production networks and process of regional 
economies are embedded (Coe and Yeung, 2015: 170). As the value capture from coupling to GPN 
actors was considered a necessary condition for regional economic development, this value needs to 
be retained and redistributed by firms within the specific regions, rather than being repatriated or 
transferred to other regions. The retained value leads to a regional improvement of economic 
conditions when regional institutions have the capability to transform the value into regional assets 
by complementing the strategic needs of lead firms in the global production networks. With this, 
territorial distinctive institutions and horizontal social relations shape trajectories, which are 
inherently dynamic and continuously evolving (Coe and Yeung, 2015).   
With plugging-in to the GPN as a key mechanism to stimulate economic development, Coe and 
Yeung, (2015) suggest that this coupling process evolves over time following the rapidly changing 
strategic needs of leading actors’ in global production networks. Understanding how regional assets 
may best complement the strategic needs of firms requires active interactions between the regional 
institutions and GPN actors, in addition to strengthening the region‐specific assets as a bargaining 
entity. Such interactive effects of both dimensions’ shape regional development. This process, 
however, cannot be constructed as deterministic or construed as a functionalist argument, because 
the process does not necessarily lead to positive outcome of development (Coe and Yeung, 2015).  
Despite this time‐space dynamic and evolving notion of a coupling process, Coe and Yeung, (2015: 
133‐4) suggest three modes that regional economies couple with GPNs based on differing degrees of 
autonomy: 1) Indigenous couplings‐have considerable autonomy and value capture since regional 
actors are able to reach‐out and construct GPNs; 2)  Functional couplings‐ have some degree of 
autonomy and value capture where the regional actors productively meet the needs of GPNs, either 
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through inside‐out (re. reaching out to establish transactional relationship) or outside‐in (re. inviting 
investment in to particular territories); and 3) Structural couplings‐have dependency as the regional 
actors remain weakly embedded to GPNs and continue to supply an intermediate segment.     
2.4 Corporate sustainability and GPNs  
Responding to a combination of social pressures from consumers and longer term supply 
constraints, cocoa‐chocolate firms are embracing the sustainability concept in an attempt to 
integrate socio‐environmental issues into their business practices. The emergence of sustainability, 
in tandem with recent attitudes towards CSR, is occurring simultaneously with new strategies in 
industrial governance. These efforts to incorporate complex social and environmental issues require 
engagement with diverse non‐economic actors (including national and local governments) to 
negotiate and coordinate value capture trajectories. This involves collective programs, independent 
monitoring of performance, and reinforcing social‐environmental requirements into the firms’ 
responsible sourcing standards.  While economic actors are expected to be socially responsible and 
to contribute to sustainable development, they also need to sustain long‐term competitive 
advantage. Coe and Yeung (2015), referring to extra‐firm bargaining strategies, stress that industrial 
governance has limitations in the conceptualisation of how lead firms are engaging with non‐
economic actors.  
Summary  
This thesis adopts the dynamic GPN theoretical framework of Coe and Yeung (2015) with an 
emphasis on upstream development. Reflecting on increasing transnational lead firm engagement in 
both sustainability discourses and upstream intervention, the thesis explores the incorporation of 
sustainability into industrial governance and extra‐firm bargaining strategies to improve upstream 
competitive capitalist dynamics that minimise the risk environments posed by external actors and 
factors. Given that upstream cocoa production is geographically fragmented and beyond the control 
of the downstream actors, sustainability may offer a horizontal instrument for connecting and 
managing both upstream and downstream economic activities. 
The debate surrounding the sustainability concept remains focused on the elusive meaning of the 
term, and how best to integrate the concept into business practices, rather than on addressing 
complex socio‐environmental issues that shape uneven development. Focusing on development 
perspectives, value chain analysis has emerged as a prominent contemporary analytical framework 
for understanding power relationships and value capturing where the transnational lead firm is the 
centre of analysis. With the growing attention on the Global Commodity Chains‐Global Value Chains 
(GCC‐GVC) as key drivers of long‐term structural development (UNCTAD, 2013; Neilson, 2014; OECD 
and WB group, 2015), the approach has received criticism for overemphasising the linearity and 
vertical metaphor of value chain industrial governance. The Global Production Networks (GPN) 
scholars highlight the complex network structure of interactions among diverse actors, institutions 
and interest groups. The actions of firms are embedded in multi‐scalar territorialities of 
asymmetrical power relationships that inherently produce diverse spatial outcomes that further 
shape different patterns of uneven development.  
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Reframing existing understandings of industrial governance, recently Yeung and Coe (2014) 
introduced a new GPN model (which they refer to as GPN 2.0) to introduce causal mechanisms of 
independent capitalist dynamics that shape actor‐specific strategies, which in turn drive the dynamic 
reconfiguration of production networks within particular industries and localities. This approach 
emphasizes the diverse interconnected roles of economic and non-economic actors within the 
spatial network rather than merely considering them as external forces that influence the networks. 
Moving beyond the over‐emphasis on intra and inter firm governance strategies, Yeung and Coe 
(2014) argue that economic processes embodied in firms are interrelated with non‐economic issues 
exposed and produced by diverse non‐economic actors, thus extra‐firm bargaining strategy is crucial 
to providing this analytical nexus.  As part of a broader effort to manage upstream environmental 
risks, firms pursuing extra‐firm strategies attempted to build alliances (or partnerships) with non‐
economic actors, most commonly through sectoral and multi‐stakeholder forums (Ponte, 2014; 
Fuchs et al., 2011).  
Global value chain theory suggests industrial (or economic) upgrading as a pathway to capture value 
from integration with the global economy. However, supplier countries’ increased participation in 
the global production networks has also resulted in poor levels of value capture. The literature 
reveals that plugging-in to the global production network was not always associated with equal 
distribution of gain from economic activities (Talbot, 2002; Ponte and Ewert, 2009; Milberg and 
Winkler, 2011; Barrientos et al., 2011; Selwyn, 2013; Tokatli, 2013). As the value capture from 
coupling to GPN actors become a necessary condition for regional economic development, this value 
needs to be retained and redistributed within the firms in the particular regions, rather than 
repatriated or transferred to the other regions. As such, territorially distinctive institutions and 
horizontal social relations are shaping such trajectories, with profound implications for processes of 
uneven economic development.   
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3. Research approach and methodologies 
To briefly restate the aims of this thesis, I seek to: 1) address how transnational cocoa‐chocolate 
firms are defining, negotiating and governing sustainability across the global production network; 2) 
to assess how the Indonesian government is responding to increased upstream sustainability‐linked 
interventions by lead firms; and 3) understand the upgrading trajectories of sustainability initiatives 
for smallholder farmers in Indonesia.  
To address these research questions, I adopt a case study approach. Hardwick (2009) claims that a 
case study approach focuses on intensive analysis of particular places, groups or specific issues, 
often incorporating mixed methods of data collection and analysis of different viewpoints from 
diverse respondents. This study has selected two case studies of the world’s leading chocolate 
confectionary manufacturers: Mars, a family‐owned company established on 1911; and Nestlé 
established on 1866, which has been a publicly‐listed shareholding‐owned corporation for more 
than 100 years. Both are globally and nationally engaging with sustainability discourses, and have 
been implementing sustainability initiatives in Indonesia for a number of years. A case study 
approach has been adopted to explore the extrafirm bargaining strategies of lead firms, along with 
their sustainability initiatives. This study has employed the following primarily qualitative research 
methods: data collection from in‐depth and semi‐structured interviews; focus group discussions; 
content analysis of reports and media publications; and a questionnaire survey in addition to 
quantitative information gleaned from secondary sources. In addition, triangulation of evidence and 
findings from different sources and stakeholders has been undertaken to enhance the credibility of 
findings and conclusions.   
3. 1 Case selection 
Six leading chocolate manufactures are controlling 40% of global market share including Mars and 
Nestlé (Barometer Consortium, 2015). Originally produced butter cream candy, Mars soon 
diversified to chocolate bars and become one of the earliest established chocolate manufacturers in 
the US, currently Mars has expanded to pet food and sauces industries. Mars has been operating in 
Indonesia since 1996, the early candy manufacturer in North Sumatra province was close‐down 
(Respondent CC1, pers. comm, 2015) because of small competitive local market, but Mars maintains 
the cocoa processing in South Sulawesi province and directly involving in upstream cocoa production 
development.  Nestlé, which originally started as a dairy business in 1866, has grown through 
mergers and continued diversifying its various product portfolios, including the chocolate‐
confectionary segment.  With dairy product line, Nestlé Indonesia outsources chocolate‐cocoa 
products for chocolate flavour beverages and dairy products. Maintaining the historical value of the 
origins of their product lines, Mars and Nestlé are currently implementing different outsourcing 
strategies according, at least in part, to the degree to which the product line contributes to the 
firms’ total revenue. More than 30% of Mars’ total revenue comes from its chocolate and 
confectionary segments, with significant revenue from other food and beverages. Of the two 
companies, Nestlé has a more diverse product portfolio and according to a recent financial report, 
its confectionary segment only contributed approximately 8.5% of total sales, beverages contributed 
28%, and a combination of nutrition‐based and dairy product lines contributed approximately 33%.  
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Nestlé commenced production in Indonesia earlier than Mars, established as PT. Food Specialities 
Indonesia in 1971, later changing to PT. Nestlé Indonesia in 1993. This subsidiary firm established 
factories in East Java and Banten provinces to produce dairy, coffee and nutrition‐based products, 
while their chocolate‐confectionary factories were located elsewhere across the region (in Thailand, 
Japan, China and Australia). Following the recent expansion of Milo and cereal factories in Indonesia, 
Nestlé began to outsource processed cocoa products to specialised suppliers including BT Cocoa and 
Barry Callebaut in 2011. After 2006, Nestlé dismantled its global cocoa processing facilities and 
shifted to an outsourcing strategy with specialised and independent partners depending on the 
market geography, while strengthening its investment in product research‐development and food 
safety.  
Mars, meanwhile, established a subsidiary cocoa processing facility in Indonesia in 1996 under the 
name of Mars Symbioscience Indonesia (MSI) and in 2004 built a confectionary manufacturer in the 
North Sumatra, but latter closed because of competitive domestic market12. A pioneering company 
that established a cocoa processing facility in the Sulawesi region during a time when cocoa trading 
operations were more common and exporting cocoa beans were more profitable than selling to local 
cocoa processors. The Mars subsidiary faced supply challenges from international trading firms and 
domestic exporters who competed to source cocoa from small producers. Starting with a small‐sized 
processing facilities, MSI supplied processed cocoa to its parent company in the US. Concomitant 
with the growing market in the Asia region, recently MSI increased the processing capacity to supply 
Chinese chocolate factories.     
These operational differences have seen both firms employing different approaches and strategies 
to engage with upstream cocoa production activities. However, because supply risk has 
accompanied the expansion of cocoa processing facilities, Mars began actively implementing cocoa 
sustainability programs in early 2000, building relationships with both global and domestic non‐
economic actors to support small cocoa producers.  In 2006 MSI, together with other cocoa 
stakeholders, became one of the co‐founders of a multi‐stakeholder forum, the Cocoa Sustainability 
Partnership (CSP).  In contrast, Nestlé shifted their strategic focus to chocolate manufacturing and 
branding, and became more dependent on its supply partners and less directly engaged with 
upstream cocoa production. While Nestlé has generally opted to work collaboratively with their 
supply partners and cocoa stakeholders, it is also one of the co‐founders of the Partnership for 
Sustainable Agricultural (PISAgro), established in 2011, where it is active in the dairy, coffee and 
cocoa working groups. It should be noted that Nestlé has had a much stronger degree of direct 
engagement with Indonesian farmers in both the coffee and dairy sectors than in cocoa. 
Both firms are engaging with sustainability initiatives in the Sulawesi region. The smallholder farmers 
from this region have experienced a range of sustainability projects and programs since early 2000. 
                                                          
12 In 2004, Mars have established a confectionary manufacturer to produce Starbust chocolate brand in Medan, North 
Sumatra. The operation was only few years before closing down because of competitive domestic market,  published on 8 
August 2008, http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2008/08/08/13101484/coklat.murah.untuk.indonesia  
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The Mars Cocoa Sustainability Initiative (MCSI) was initially established in the Northern area of South 
Sulawesi province, and subsequently expanded to Central and Southeast Sulawesi. The 
implementation of MCSI also extended to its supply partners (such as Ecom and Olam) who owned 
extensive up‐country buying stations across West, South, Southeast, and Central Sulawesi.  Nestlé’s 
supply partners mainly operate in West Sulawesi, for example in partnership with processing firms 
such as Barry Callebaut and BT Cocoa, the latter of which has opened up‐country buying station in 
Mamuju district of West Sulawesi.  Figure (3.1) shows the geographical distribution of Nestlé’s Cocoa 
Plan (NCP) and Mars’ Cocoa Sustainability Initiative across their supply chain partners, in West and 
South Sulawesi.   
Figure 3.1 Case study locations according to Nestlé and Mars sustainability initiatives based on 
geographical location and supply chain actors 
Source: Author’ own work  
South Sulawesi province has become the dominant focus of MCSI, particularly the three districts of 
Luwu, North Luwu and East Luwu. In West Sulawesi (Polewali Mandar), Mars is supported by the 
contracted suppliers, PT Ecom subsidiary (TMCI) and by a local NGO ‐ Wasiat. In Southeast Sulawesi, 
it is supported by PT Olam. By establishing a field research station and buying units with 
fermentation facilities in East Luwu, Mars has confirmed Luwu, East and North Luwu as the major 
areas of their sustainability program. As well, it is working in close coordination with contracted 
suppliers who are implementing their own initiatives in other areas including West and Southeast 
Sulawesi. This study acknowledges the fact that contract suppliers play an important role in 
supporting the firms’ commitment as well as scaling up the initiative. Accordingly, the study also 
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includes one of Mars’ contract suppliers, i.e., Ecom that initiated the Rainforest Alliance scheme in 
the Polewali Mandar district in 2012 and Olam, with its Rainforest Alliance scheme in North Luwu.  
The Nestlé Cocoa Plan (NCP) has been implemented primarily in West Sulawesi. A pilot program was 
introduced into Polewali Mandar in 2011 in collaboration with PT Petrafood’s cocoa ingredient 
division. However, the initiative was temporarily paused during the acquisition of the division by 
Barry Callebaut in 2012. By 2014, the region has become one of Barry Callebaut’s Cocoa Horizon 
program.  In collaboration with the West Sulawesi government, Indonesian processor BT Cocoa and 
Swiss‐based NGO, Swisscontact, NCP has invested in an experimental cocoa farm in Mamuju, a 
showcase model of recently adopted technology alongside the Sustainable cocoa production 
program (SCPP), which is implemented by Swisscontact.   
Figure 3.2 Map of the research locations visited during data collection    
 
Field research covered six cocoa‐producing Districts across two provinces. Figure 3.2 shows the 
locations of sites for interviews, questionnaire survey, and group discussions in West Sulawesi 
(districts of Mamuju, Majene, and Polewali Mandar) and in South Sulawesi (districts of Luwu, North 
and East Luwu). The research field work was adjusted to the farming circumstances because of the 
nature of crop, and was conducted in two stages. Cocoa farming generally remains conventional 
where the farmer has limited maintenance of the farm, and the farmer sometimes seeks alternative 
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casual jobs during the off season. As a result, the harvest season is the best time to engage with the 
farmers, collectors, local traders and other local stakeholders. Although the harvest season may be 
different due to geographical and topography characteristics of the farm, but the harvest season 
generally takes two stages, the peak season which contributes about 60‐70% of total farm 
production between March to August, with a smaller harvest coming by the end of the year.  The 
first period of field work was conducted from April to July 2014, and the second period was during 
February to April, 2015. The first field work period focused on all actors involved in the private 
sustainability initiatives, while the second period focused on the specific case‐study actors.   
Mars and Nestlé have significant global market share and a strong presence in the Indonesian cocoa 
sector. They were selected based on the differences in the nature of firm’ characteristics and 
historical value, organisational structure, and upstream challenges to sustain their investment in 
Indonesia’s cocoa industry.   
3. 2 Research methodologies 
The study focuses on how the selected lead firms are extending their roles beyond supply chain 
actors and the implications of this for cocoa production networks and rural development. Using each 
firms’ production network as the unit of analysis, information was gathered from interviews of 
supply chain actors and members of affiliated organisations, content analysis of firms’ publications, 
media releases and online news, and by participating in a range of multi‐stakeholder meetings, 
workshops and conference.  
3.2.1 Interviews  
Interviewing, a common method used in the social sciences, involves verbal interchanges arranged 
to obtain information from informants by asking questions. Longhurst (2009) refers to two types of 
interviews commonly applied in human geography based on the formality and the structure of the 
questions: (1) in‐depth interviews, and (2) unstructured, semi‐structured and structured interviews. 
The selection of respondents was based on their power to influence and contribute to the (re) 
structure of global and local production networks. This study opted for in‐depth interviews of key 
informants who have currently exercising their economic and political power to influence the way 
the farmer integrating into the global production networks and the assisted group of farmers who 
were changing farming practices and adapting to the global market demand. Semi‐structured 
interviews mainly applied to the key stakeholders who were either directly or indirectly involved in 
the firms’ cocoa sustainability initiatives.  After first seeking the permission of the interviewees, 
most of the interviews were audio recorded.  The exceptions included transnational firm 
representatives and ministry representatives who preferred not to be recorded and suggested taking 
notes instead.  
a. In-depth interviews with key informants  
The term ‘key informant’ refers to a person who is considered to have experience, broad networks 
and extensive knowledge of their specific position (Marshal, 1996) in society. Her/his personal skills 
and position offer reliable insights and understanding of the more pertinent issues, in addition to 
certain degree to influence the design‐implementation of sustainability initiatives and public policy 
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related to national development of cocoa sector. The groups are the cocoa supply chain actors 
including the major chocolate‐cocoa industries who have presence in Indonesia and the assisted 
farmers, particularly the ‘cocoa doctors’13 as well as the government institutions.  At the village 
level, key informants include farmers and local traders who have intermediate positions that 
facilitate their connection to farmers, government representatives such as the Village/Hamlet Head, 
and other organisations. Many of these actors can be considered local elites due to their wealth 
accumulation, social position, and broader network connections.  On a larger scale, other key 
informants include significant actors within the chain who influence the dynamic of the chain. For 
the purposes of this research, they include transnational cocoa traders and grinders, chocolate 
manufactures, and government officials as the individuals involved in (private and public) policy 
design and implementation.  During my field work, interviews with key informants generally lasted 
between one to two hours. This was mainly because open‐ended questions often lead to ‘off topic’ 
conversations. Table 3.1 shows the list of types of key informants, each of whom remains 
anonymous.  
Table 3.1 List of the key informants who participated in in‐depth interviews  
Key informants 
Number of 
respondents 
Information generated 
1. Villages and districts 
 
‐Farmer group leaders and Mars’ cocoa 
doctors 
 
‐ Local traders/collectors 
 
‐ Local government representatives from the 
estate crops department (Dinas perkebunan) 
and agricultural extension agency (Balai 
penyuluhan pertanian)   
 
 
14 
 
 
11 
 
4 
 
‐ Their relationships with other actors and how 
they are connected to each other 
‐ Their perceptions regarding private 
sustainability initiatives 
‐ Who initiated market linking and through 
what process? 
‐ Any economic or social changes resulting 
from the new market linkage 
‐ Any employment generated through 
sustainability initiatives and potential for 
livelihood diversification strategies  
2. National and provincial 
 
‐  Chocolate manufacturers 
 
‐  Cocoa grinders‐traders   
 
‐ Ministries: Coordination of Ministry of 
Economy and Industry for estate crops, 
Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Ministry of Trade 
 
‐ Local government officials  
 
 
 
4 
 
8 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
‐ Why they are participating in sustainability 
initiatives? 
‐ What are their relationships with non‐firm 
actors and how are they connected? 
‐ What are the coordination system and 
arrangement with a sustainable market? 
‐ Has this initiative changed their relationship 
with firms and non‐firm actors? 
‐ How and why is the government participating 
in sustainability initiatives? 
‐ What are their concerns over the initiatives 
and how are they responding to them?  
                                                          
13 Cocoa Doctor refers to individual farmer who directly under Mars assistances within the context of Mars Cocoa 
Sustainability Initiatives. The assisted farmers are purposely selected by Mars according to their individual capability and 
capacity to become an extension agent as well as developing their cocoa farming business.   
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The arrangement of key informant interviews at both the village and district levels was primarily 
achieved by making appointments and/or meeting at specific events.  Working closely with the 
existing Swisscontact sustainability team in Mamuju and North Luwu for a few weeks, and following 
their actual schedule offered opportunities to meet key informants in routine circumstances. As 
well, it allowed observation of the relationships and power dynamics that shaped their engagement.  
While in Polewali Mandar, the government estate crop officials facilitated the interviews as they 
maintained close relationship with group leaders and local traders. The focus of questions was 
mainly upon exploring the sustainable farm practices initiated by transnational actors, whether their 
initiatives have been adopted, and if they have changed the farmers’ livelihoods (see Table 3.1 for 
detail).  As well, their relationships with local traders and/or collectors were explored, along with 
their attitudes towards the sustainability initiatives.  Within the six districts, in‐depth interviews 
were conducted during the second field work period, between February and March 2015 in different 
locations.  
Most of the in‐depth interviews conducted in both East and North Luwu were assisted by MSI field 
coordinators and were undertaken within two days. This combination of spontaneous and arranged 
interviews was conducted by visiting individual households and following similar questions and 
approach. Four East Luwu farmers, who were also known as ‘cocoa doctors’, represented Mars’ 
direct intervention under the firm’s decentralised initiative. These interviews were undertaken 
between the 3rd and 4th of March, 2015. The respondents were selected by Mars’ field coordinator. 
To minimise any bias, the selected respondents were recruited from different topographies and 
were of diverse age ranges.   
The in‐depth interviews conducted in North Luwu (between the 5th and 7th of March 2015) were 
facilitated by Swisscontact’s field coordinator who had finished the training sessions four months 
earlier in five villages, thus gathering the farmers was relatively challenging. Four interviews were 
conducted, the first interview was conducted with two key informants from different villages who 
were friends and had casual acquaintance, and the last three interviews were conducted 
individually. All the key‐farmers had been exposed to government programs and private 
sustainability initiatives. Although none of them had been certified, they frequently accessed 
transnational firm buying units such as Ecom and Comextra Majora (a joint venture of Barry 
Callebaut).  They were of diverse ages but tended to be slightly better off financially than the 
average farmers, as they had multiple cocoa farms and (or) in combination with owned rice fields 
and other business (re. seedling and grocery shops).  
The key informants from the Indonesian government were representatives of four related ministries. 
As well as asking questions about cocoa‐related policies and programs, areas in which the actors 
were mainly engaged and coordinated, questions also focused on their responses and opinions 
regarding the ongoing corporate sustainability initiatives. The representatives of four ministries were 
interviewed: Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of Industry; Ministry of Trade, and the Coordination 
Ministry of Economy (see Appendix B.1 for details). These interviews were conducted in their office 
in Jakarta, except for the respondent from the Ministry of Industry who preferred to be interviewed 
outside the office (re. coffee shop) because of less private shared office.  
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The next in‐depth interviews were conducted with key actors who had directly designed and 
implemented the cocoa sustainability programs. They worked for transnational firms based in 
Makassar and Jakarta. Some key informants from the firms held managerial positions with their own 
sustainability initiatives for more than a year. Thus, they had a better understanding of how each of 
the initiatives was implemented, from the technical process stage to coordination and building 
relationships with the other key stakeholders. As well as exploring the different positions of the 
firms in the cocoa value chain, for example Olam and Ecom were major suppliers for Mars and Barry 
Callebaut was a major supplier for Nestlé, technical questions were asked how they were delivering 
sustainability initiatives.  
The interviews also explored their relationships beyond the market sphere. All the interviews were 
conducted on an individual basis, some at different times in different circumstances. Interviews with 
MSI certification manager and coordinator were conducted during the acquaintance of two separate 
CSP meetings. Separate interviews were also conducted with one member of the Olam sustainability 
team after the CSP meeting in 2014 and one phone interview with the sustainability manager in 
2015. Interviews with Ecom‐TMCI sustainability manager were conducted twice in 2014 and 2015. 
An interview with the Director of Sustainability Agriculture Development Procurement, Nestlé 
Indonesia, was held in his Jakarta office in 2015. Following the CSP meeting in 2015, an interview 
with Barry Callebaut’ Sustainability manager was held in in Makassar, and an interview with BT Care 
manager was held earlier during the field visit in Mamuju, April 2014.  
The main challenge faced when arranging the interviews with both transnational firms and 
government key informants was the amount of time spent on making appointments. Some of the 
respondents found that they initially had to cancel or postpone appointments few times, even 
though the interviews were often undertaken at their own premises.  
b. Semi structured interviews 
Longhurst (2009) describes semi‐structured interviews as self‐conscious, orderly, partially structured 
conversations that fall between prescribed structured and unstructured interviews.  In this study, 
the semi‐structured interviews involved actors connected with the cocoa sector. Selection was 
based on organisation participation in the cocoa sector; and, occasionally representation tended to 
overlap with key informant interviews. But different individuals participated, particularly from the 
transnational firms with less influence on design, but more focus on technical aspect of delivering 
sustainability initiatives. The proportion of semi‐structure interviews was aim to proportionally 
based on the level of current interventions and engagements in Indonesian sustainability discourses. 
The higher proportion with NGO background who has concern over the social and environmental 
problems, certification bodies, and management team of cocoa related partnership platforms (e.g. 
CSP, PISAgro, and Dekaindo). 
To differentiate from the in‐depth interviews described above, the format of the semi‐structured 
interviews was somewhat spontaneous and informal. For example, interviews were sometimes 
conducted on the sidelines of specific events, e.g., at International cocoa conferences, several CSP 
multi‐stakeholder meetings, and when visiting the ongoing implementation of the Rainforest 
Alliance program. Generally, the interviews lasted for between 30 minutes to more than an hour. 
43 
 
Interviewees were assured of the confidentiality of the information provided and that anonymity of 
their responses would be strictly observed.    
Table 3.2 List of respondents and focus of questions for semi‐structured interviews 
Respondent groups 
Number of 
respondent  
Focus of questions 
1. Firms  
‐ Mars 
‐ Mondelēz  
‐ BT Cocoa 
‐ PT Olam Indonesia 
 
 
6 
 
Why have they engaged with sustainability initiatives? 
How are their relationships with other firms and their suppliers? 
How do they ensure that the initiative contributes to livelihoods? 
In what ways are they engaged with the government? 
2. Certification bodies 
‐ Rainforest Alliance  
‐ UTZcertified  
‐ Control Union 
‐ Bio‐Cert 
 
 
6 
 
How are they connected to the private firms? 
How do their opinions work with private firms and the challenges? 
Which codes/standards have proven difficult for farmers to comply 
with? 
What are their opinions about the firm responsible for sourcing 
standards? 
3. International and local NGOs 
‐ VECO 
‐ WASIAT 
‐ Swisscontact 
 
8 
 
What are the challenges facing farmers participating in the value 
chain? 
Who drives the sustainability initiative? 
What are their opinion about working with private firms and the 
challenges? 
4. Development agencies  
‐ IDH 
‐ IFC 
 
2 
 
Why are they supporting sustainability? 
What are their opinions regarding the challenges of working with 
private enterprise and the government? 
5. Forums  
‐ CSP 
‐ PISAgro 
‐Dekaindo 
 
 
5 
Who defines the incentives and design activities? 
To what extent do forums shape relationships with the government 
and other stakeholders?  
How does the forum connect with other stakeholders? And the 
challenges?  
6. Industry Associations  
‐ASKINDO  
 
 
1 
 
What are their major concerns on the cocoa sector? And why? 
To what extent does the association have a relationship with the 
government and other stakeholders? 
7. National and local politicians 
closely related to the policy 
makers 
 
3 
How do they engage with the farmers to maintain this relationship? 
What kind of policies and/or support have been delivered to the 
farmers? 
 
8. Research Institute 
‐ ICCRI 
3 Who drives the research themes or focus? 
How does ICCRI engage with other actors? 
The interviews were conducted with industry associations, development agencies and certification‐
associated bodies, such as UTZ Certified and Control Union (see Appendix B.2). Table 3.2 presents 
informants for semi‐structured interviews and the key focus of questioning.  Most of the semi‐
structured interviews were conducted during and after the CSP multi‐stakeholder meetings, 
including the first general assembly meeting, which was convened on 26 March 2014. The focus of 
the discussion was upon updating the status of CSP and how to a deliver the CSP roadmap. Some 
firm representatives (Olam Indonesia, Mars and BT Cocoa), who held positions as farmer trainers 
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and coordinators, participated in the interviews, along with local NGOs like Wasiat (which has 
currently partnered with Veco to deliver the cocoa chain development program).  
During the second period of field work, on 4 February 2015, CSP hosted a coordination meeting of 
task forces. Discussion centred on how to harmonise the various sustainability initiatives with the 
CSP roadmap.  This coordination meeting was attended by major actors who had implemented 
sustainability programs along with a few new members of the partnership. Some interviews were 
conducted during the breaks with firm representatives (Mondelēz and Barry Callebaut) and 
Swisscontact and CSP representatives.  During the following two months, another general assembly 
meeting was held in Jakarta. It was hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture on 15 April 2015.  The 
meeting was attended by representatives from other ministries, industry associations, forums and 
the Indonesian cocoa research institute. I attended these meetings as an observer and used these 
opportunities to conduct interviews during lunch breaks and in between the meetings (with the 
head of Dekaindo, an ICCRI researcher, and a representative of IFC and PISAgro). 
The interviews with the certification body were achieved by visiting the Rainforest Alliance branch 
office in May 2014. Interviews were conducted with the current project manager and the training 
coordinator at the office, continued over lunch, and when visiting some of the project areas. An 
interview with one of the Rainforest Alliance auditing partner who responsible for assessing the 
certification process was held with one of Bio‐Cert auditor through phone interview in May 2014, he 
had been assessing the certification areas of Mars and its suppliers. 
The interviews with politicians were conducted during the second period of field work. It was rather 
difficult to link the study with their participation because they had an indirect relationship with the 
design and implementation of the government’s program and policy, particularly with the Gernas 
kakao and trading policy.  However, as party members sitting on the House of Representative, they 
understood the political process regarding the program and/or policy negotiations in the national 
and local level. At the national level, interviews (13 and 17 April 2015) were undertaken with two 
assistants of a West Sulawesi politician14 who candidly revealed how politicians can interfere with 
and negotiate the selection of the program’s preferred areas.  At the local level, interviews were 
conducted on 13 February and 10 March 2015 with two Golkar Party politicians who explained the 
rent‐seeking relationships between politicians and bureaucrats.  
3.2.2 Content analysis  
Content analysis is useful for examining the trends and shifting opinions evident in different 
documents including reports, media releases, public statements, and news media.  The method has 
been utilised widely by the social sciences. This study focuses on a qualitative analysis of such 
content, where the analysis extracted from different sources aim to be complementary to other 
                                                          
14 This politician sat on Komisi 4 of national house representative who cover the issue of agriculture, food security, forestry 
and maritime affairs.   
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methods such as interviews and secondary data analysis. Table 3.3 shows the sources and type of 
information gathering from the affiliated actors and media. 
Table 3.3 Different sources of information for content analysis  
Published by Form of publication  
1. Chocolate – cocoa firm websites 
‐ http://www.Nestlé .com/investors  
‐ http://www.mars.com/global/about‐us/policies‐and‐
practices/cocoa‐policy  
‐ https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/about‐us/media  
‐ Reports  
‐ Media releases and public statements 
‐ Other publications (e.g., training module, 
presentations, supplier code of conduct) 
2. Government websites 
‐ Ministry of Agriculture  http://www.pertanian.go.id/  
‐ Ministry of Industry http://www.kemenperin.go.id/  
‐ Policy and technical reports 
‐ Media releases (re. media perkebunan, media 
industri) 
‐ Policy outputs (e.g., regulations, program guidelines) 
3. Multi‐stakeholder websites  
‐ Cocoa Sustainability Partnership, http://www.csp.or.id/  
‐ Partnership for Sustainable Agriculture, http://pisagro.org/  
‐ Newsletters 
‐ Roadmaps 
‐ Other publications (e.g., module, presentation) 
4. Independent (online) news media (2011‐2016) 
‐ International online news 
(www.confectionerynews.com  ; www.foodnavigator.com;), 
confectionarynews is online news focus on global chocolate, 
cocoa, sugar confectionary gum, and biscuit.  
‐ Mainstream online news (www.theguardian.com ; 
www.wjs.com ; www.cnbc.com) 
‐ Domestic industry news (www.kontan.co.id; 
www.industri.bisnis.com)   
 
‐ Update news on the state activity of the industries  
‐ Updated news linking to agro‐industries including 
policies, programs, events, critiques, and perceptions.  
The application of content analysis in this study aims to find a similar pattern in messages gathered 
by other research methods, particularly the interviews. To minimise the ambiguity of context 
analysis and enhance the validity, the context analyses were sourced from specific respondent 
publication websites and independent online news media regarding sustainability initiatives and the 
broad development of the cocoa sector.    
3.2.1 Participation in stakeholder meetings 
Participation in different stakeholder meetings during fieldwork provided visual information and 
interaction between the stakeholders during the meetings. This approach partially adopted the 
participant observation method as frequently applied in human geography (Walsh, 2009), and could 
be considered as a kind of event ethnography. The aim is to observe the discussion process 
regarding the meeting agenda, what are the main debates and who has dominant voice during this 
process.  During this process the industrial actors had strongest voice over emphasizing the 
productivity aspect within the context of sustainability, the NGOs representatives were more 
focusing on enabling environment to ensure the adoption of good farming practices rather than 
challenges the concept and emphasising the environmental and social issues. Like participant 
observation, this approach positions the researcher as both a participant and an observer. Exclusion 
from the in‐situ context is necessary to maintain naturalness and minimise disruption by the 
presence (Walsh, 2009). Both periods of fieldwork in 2014 and 2015 included participation at 
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different scales of stakeholder meetings, from international conferences to local farmer training, 
national CSP general assembly meetings and regional certification workshops.   
Important participant observation during the first period of fieldwork occurred at the sixth 
International cocoa conference and dinner on 15‐16 May 2014, an event jointly funded by the World 
Cocoa Foundation (WCF) and Indonesian Cocoa Association (ASKINDO). The theme was empowering 
smallholders in the interests of a sustainable cocoa industry. The speakers were mainly from the 
major cocoa and chocolate firms and their affiliations. Since the membership of WCF and ASKINDO 
are dominated by the industrial actors, this conference certainly accommodating the industrial 
actors’ agenda to ensure the supply security and effectively integrating the smallholder farmers into 
the global cocoa value chains.  Some showcased success stories directly from assisted farmers. The 
onsite implementation of sustainability initiatives and programs was observed in one‐day workshops 
that introduced certification schemes. These were followed by the establishing of a farmer 
organisation structure to accommodate administrative compliance with the certification process in 
Luwu (31 May 2014). The workshop was attended by a Mars field representative, leaders of assisted 
farmer groups from different villages across Luwu, and Swisscontact staff. Observation continued in 
Mamuju where several activities conducted by different actors included separate farmer training 
and coordination of the updating of the setting up of a cocoa forum in Malunda, Majene. This was 
part of a Sustainable Cocoa Production Program (SCPP). As well, it followed the progress of a BT 
Cocoa‐introduced fermentation market scheme among a few farmer groups.   
The other main observation was undertaken when attending several partnership meetings convened 
by the executive office of the Cocoa Sustainability Partnership (CSP).  During the first period of field 
work, the office hosted quarterly general assembly meetings attended by a range of cocoa 
stakeholders. The focus was on the change of status and organisation structure of the CSP on 26 
March 2014. Following the updating of the CSP structure, during the second period of field work, the 
coordination meeting of different task force members pursuing the CSP roadmap (4 February 2015) 
was observed, as was another general assembly meeting hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture (15 
April 2015). By attending these meetings as an observer, the former served as a dynamic space of 
interaction among different actors. From these observations, I identified who the dominant actors 
were during the discussions: what agenda and issues under intense discussion; who raised the 
issues; and, how different actors imposed and negotiated their ideas. To optimise both time and 
accessibility, some of this participant observation of different activities was followed by interviews 
and separate discussions, sometimes during a break or at the end of the activities.     
3.2.2 Questionnaire survey 
The term ‘questionnaire survey’ generally applies to descriptive research that provides measurable 
information regarding the different nature of spatial and social variation of individual or household 
attributes, attitudes and actions. This study derives its information from an earlier questionnaire 
survey I conducted in 2012 as part of an ACIAR Pilot study (HORT/2010/011 ACIAR project). This 
focused upon developing sustainability indicators for assessing the impact of emerging certification 
schemes in West Sulawesi (Hafid et al., 2013). The survey covered broader questions regarding 
sustainability at the household level. They provide an understanding of the household structure of 
Sulawesi small cocoa producers, and the livelihood variables regarding the risks and competitiveness 
involved in managing cocoa farms. The survey recruited 158 farmers from West Sulawesi provinces, 
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76 respondents were participating in a certification scheme, and 82 were not participating or also 
knows as ‘control’ group.  The respondents were randomly sampled based on the list of farmer 
groups provided by local NGO who responsible for delivering certification schemes and district 
estate crops extension services (see Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 Information collected using a questionnaire survey in 2012 (see Appendix E) 
Information Question number 
1. Livelihood 
‐ Household structure 
‐ Source 
‐ Competitiveness 
 
 
B.1 
B.2/ B.2/ B.8/B.9/  
C.8/C.9/C.10/ 
 
2. Livelihood risk    
‐  Revenue spending 
‐  Micro‐finance accessibility  
 
C.13/C.14/ 
 
 
3.2.3 Focus groups 
West Sulawesi has become the target sustainability intervention area for Nestlé and its suppliers 
(Barry Callebaut and BT Cocoa). To date, their sustainability initiatives have been mainly supported 
and implemented by Swisscontact and at arms’ length by the suppliers.  The initiatives were mainly 
implemented on a group basis with affirmed support from the local government. For this reason, 
information about this region, particularly at the farmer level, was collected at focus group 
discussions. Secor (2009) suggested that the strength of this method stems from the interaction 
among those participating in the discussion, commonly followed by disagreement and debate 
surrounding particular issues.  For the researcher, this interaction can prove beneficial. It requires 
observing the social interaction, discerning who has the dominant voice, recognising the actors’ 
relationships to each other, and becoming cognisant of the statement being argued. 
I organised a total of eleven focus groups in Mamuju and Polewali Mandar District, the first four 
focus group were conducted during the first field work in 2014 and the rest were conducted in 2015 
(see Appendix B.3). The male farmers were dominated most of the group discussion, partially 
because these discussions were arranged by the actors who currently providing technical 
assistances. Although the Sustainable Cocoa Production Program (SCPP) encouraged female farmer 
participation, but it remains common norms that the male farmers who mainly responsible for 
managing cocoa farmers, while the spouse tended to assist type of activities that not necessarily 
leaving the domestic works such as drying‐sorting cocoa, and occasionally harvesting. Also, the 
assistances were emphasising the improvement of cocoa farm production that was closely related to 
the male farmer responsibilities.  
Generally, the group discussions lasted an hour or more. Farmers were informed that they were free 
to interrupt the discussion whenever they disagreed with other farmers’ opinions. The first question 
asked whether the farmers were involved in any sustainability programs: how they started and 
carried out a program; what they had learned; any changes in farming practices and if not why not; 
any changes in marketing practices; were they still in debt to collectors or local traders (if yes, why), 
were other family members involved in farming practices; if they saw direct access to transnational 
48 
 
firms and if so, will these initiatives open up opportunities for diversifying their livelihoods; any 
increased demand for casual farming jobs; and, if they were involved in government recruitment and 
participation programs.  Because the interviews were conducted in rather small numbers with 
combination of age groups, most of the farmers became actively engaged in the discussion, albeit 
some elderly farmers seemed a little tired. Some middle‐aged farmers were suspicious of the 
interviews and rather sensitive when asked financial questions such as the status of their debt with 
the collector, and how many government incentives (that had been promised) had been transferred 
to the group account.  
The first period of field work in Mamuju was undertaken on April 2014. This was during the ongoing 
implementation of SCPP and BT Cocoa as the major partners actively promoting a fermentation 
market scheme among the farmer groups and collectors. The two group discussions were held after 
BT Cocoa’s promotion of a fermentation market scheme in Pamulukkang village and during farmer 
training affiliated to the SCPP program in Mamuju. Another two group discussions were conducted 
with the certified farmers from Polewali Mandar District on May 2014. These group discussions were 
arranged by local officials. The farmer groups, who had a close relationship with the local 
government, had been participating in Gernas kakao and PPHP programs, and had been certified 
through the PT Ecom‐TMCI certification scheme.   
The second period of field work was undertaken also in Mamuju and Polewali Mandar District during 
February 2015 with different farmer groups who also engaged with different sustainability 
programs. Like the previous year, these discussions were also supported by the same organisations 
and institutions. The aim of these second group discussions was to strengthen the information 
previously gathered and update the ongoing implementation of sustainability programs. Few in the 
groups were sensitive about financial accessibility. They were open to explaining the relevant details, 
and how they became involved in both private sustainability and government programs.  
3.2.4 Quantitative data analysis  
This secondary information tends to be provided by the legitimate institution and organisation that 
could not be obtained from the qualitative approach, but will complement the findings from other 
methods. For example, the information on declining national cocoa production but increasing areas 
of cocoa farming have raised the concern over the supply from the industrial actors since increasing 
the harvesting areas are not necessarily followed by increasing supply, while the actors have 
invested on processing facilities. Also, coherent information provided by the industrial actors linking 
to increasing investment in domestic cocoa industry is following by increasing export revenue from 
cocoa bean to cocoa products that can be generated from international organisation such as FAO.   
The secondary data was generated from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics (BPS), United Nations 
global data base systems including faostat (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TP), ICCO annual 
reports, Nestlé  annual reports, Cocoa Barometer report (2015), and certified cocoa data published 
by certification bodies (e.g Rainforest Alliance and UTZcertified). Detailed information about 
different spatial scales of cocoa production, consumption and trading was extracted from the 
Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, while historical trading data overview of processed cocoa and 
chocolate in the Asia Pacific region was extracted from FAO statistic database, and global cocoa 
production and consumption data was compiled from ICCO annual reports. Secondary data of the 
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state of certified cocoa market operations published by certification body was extracted 
longitudinally every year from respective website, for example Rainforest Alliance.  This secondary 
information aimed at supporting and complementing the primary qualitative information gathered 
from interviews and focus group discussion.  
3. 3 Data triangulation  
Adopting a case study approach, this study employs multiple methods to gather information. And, 
because each method has its strengths and weaknesses, triangulation is introduced for convergence 
and validation.  Triangulation is an analytical technique that offers a combination of different 
methods for study of the same phenomenon (Jick, 1979; Nightingale, 2009). In other words, it 
enables cross checking of information gathered using different methods.  When comparing different 
data‐sets generated by each method, Nightingale (2009) proposes three aspects of data‐set 
comparison: convergence, complementarity and divergence.  In this study, triangulation’s primary 
purpose is to analyse the consistency and relevance of the data‐sets. Convergence and 
complementarity are triangulation’s primary strategy for understanding the overall situation.   
Convergence is used to determine the consistency of information elicited by qualitative methods 
(i.e., interviews, content analysis, and focus groups) or by quantitative information. Interview 
responses reflect individual opinions and can be subjective vis‐à‐vis the professional integrity of a 
specific organisation. On occasion, responses can be over‐emphasized. The reality can be confirmed 
by observation and supported by quantitative data.  For example, a firm expounded on the different 
forms of technical assistance that had been provided to several thousand smallholder farmers. But, 
the smallholder farmers confirmed that this assistance was training and was only delivered to the 
leaders of the farmer groups, not to each individual member of a group. Complementarity involves 
seeking a fuller picture of the data produced by combining information from different methods. For 
example, according to an interview with a government official, farmers will benefit from a 
combination of support for fermentation facilities and a differential price for fermentation. But, 
limited adoption of bean fermentation has been observed due to lack of commitment by the 
involved parties. From the perspective of farmers, a combination of reasons included farm 
productivity, fewer significant price incentives, and additional labouring work.  
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4. The Global Production Networks for cocoa-chocolate 
This chapter provides an overview of the dynamics of global cocoa‐chocolate production networks. It 
begins with an overview of recent developments pertinent to cocoa, partially configured by 
transnational cocoa‐chocolate firms seeking to retain (and improve) their global competitiveness 
within a concentrated market structure.  This chapter applies the framework of GPN 2.0 to 
demonstrate how leading industrial actors respond to the competitive capitalist dynamics within 
their networks to devise new strategies that reconfigure their production networks across space. 
This encompasses the extent of engagement of lead firms with non‐economic actors in delivering 
the emerging firm sustainability initiatives. 
4.1 Overview of cocoa development (in Asia Pacific)  
Before the global cocoa production networks characterised by a fragmented production of cocoa in 
the South while the consumption of cocoa bean in the North, but the recent development shows 
growing cocoa industries investment in cocoa producing regions and less cocoa bean trading 
globally. Until recently, Ivory Coast becomes the largest cocoa processor and replaced the 
Netherlands, in Asia with the growing of foreign direct investment in cocoa industry, Indonesia has 
replaced Malaysia and Singapore.  
However, the industrial development in cocoa producing countries are dominated by few numbers 
of transnational chocolate‐cocoa industries while the domestic processors facing both vertical and 
horizontal challenges to remain competitive.  The increasing concentration amongst intermediate 
actors (cocoa processors) has resulted in vertically integrated processing and trading segments, 
through mergers and acquisitions (see section 4.1). While global traders are becoming bulk 
processors, the well‐established cocoa processors are also diversifying their processing activities into 
the production of couverture (industrial) chocolate. The latter involves the production of a wide 
range of chocolate products in addition to the intermediate cocoa products of cocoa butter, powder 
and paste (see Figure 4.5). By establishing vertically integrated processing facilities, global 
processing‐trading firms are putting competitive pressure on small‐scale domestic processors from 
cocoa origin countries such as Indonesia.    
In the Asia‐Pacific region, for more than a decade there has been increasing value of trading in cocoa 
based products following the strategic expansion of global industrial actors. For example, Mars, 
which has become the market leader in China, and now controls approximately fifty per cent of the 
market there (Allen, 2010). Mondelēz, which is slowly becoming the dominant chocolate maker in 
Malaysia, has also increased its investment in India and China. Nestlé, the leading chocolate maker in 
Japan and Thailand, recently acquired the Chinese confectionary firm, Hsu Fu Chi (see Table 4.1). In 
parallel with such expansion, chocolate exports (and indeed imports) from these countries have also 
expanded since 1990 (see Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4.1 A comparison of the growing export‐import value (US$) of chocolate and confectionary in 
the Asia‐Pacific region 
 
Figure 4.2 A comparison of the growing export‐import value (US$) of processed cocoa in the Asia‐
Pacific region 
 
Concomitant with the significantly growing markets in the region, Malaysia and Singapore, and later 
followed by Indonesia, have strengthened their position in the cocoa processing chain segment. 
They aimed to feed the growing regional market (including China) based primarily on cocoa bean 
supply from Indonesia. In seeking to capture value from market expansion and increasing demand of 
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processed cocoa, in 2010 the Indonesian government introduced an export tariff on unprocessed 
cocoa beans and fiscal incentives for new investment to drive industrialisation of cocoa sector. By 
2013, the export value of Indonesia’s cocoa products had increased significantly (see Figure 4.2), 
slowly replacing Malaysia as the major Asian cocoa processing hub. However, Singapore too has 
shown a remarkable capacity to become an export leader and capture export value from both the 
cocoa processing and chocolate manufacturing sections, despite relying on imported beans and a 
relatively small market.  
Recent new investments, acquisition by leading firms and their partners, followed by increasing trade 
within the Asia‐Pacific region is progressively creating alternative cocoa‐chocolate production 
networks. Branded manufacturers are looking towards the populous countries of China and India as 
favourable regions to establish new manufacturing facilities and research‐development centres. New 
investments in Indonesia‐based grinding meanwhile has meant processing capacity now exceeds the 
country’s supply capability of raw cocoa beans. Because of limited capability of smallholder farmers 
to keep pace with increasing downstream demand, securing supply has become one of the primary 
goals of the North‐based cocoa‐chocolate firm investment in sustainability initiatives, specifically in 
the main cocoa producing countries in Asia like Indonesia.      
4.2 Stages in Cocoa-Chocolate production networks 
The GPN approach foregrounds the key economic actors involved in the process of development. 
Yeung and Coe (2015:29) define GPNs as “organisational platforms through which actors in different 
regional economies compete and cooperate for a greater share of value creation, transformation 
and capture through geographically dispersed economic activity.” Indeed, the historical perspective 
of cocoa‐chocolate production networks shows distinct regional patterns, especially between the 
North American markets and Europe.  
Most of the early chocolate manufacturers started small‐scale as family‐owned businesses, e.g., 
Cadbury and Rowntree in England, and Mars and Hershey in the US in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. Overtime, these family owned businesses have grown into mixed‐portfolio companies and 
global market leaders, leading to considerable market concentration.  For example, only Hershey 
and Mars are estimated to contribute to more than 70% of the US chocolate market share (Hershey, 
2016). European chocolate production has a much stronger culture of smaller chocolatiers and tends 
to be somewhat less concentrated (Caobisco, 2016). In terms of upstream development, colonialism 
contributed historically to the introduction and distribution of cocoa growing outside of 
Mesoamerica, across Africa and Asia. Following the emerging firm sustainability initiatives, the stage 
of upstream cocoa production has added inputs in terms of farming management assistance, while 
the consumption segment has become increasingly lean as the intermediate actors performing two 
function, trading and processing. Figure 4.3 sets out the basic stages and actors involved in the 
cocoa‐chocolate network. 
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Figure 4.3 Cocoa‐chocolate production networks 
 
Source: author’ own work  
Within the last five years, there has been significant reconfiguration of industrial segments of the 
network through global acquisitions and joint ventures entered into by dominant firms (see Table 
4.1). This period has witnessed the branding chocolate manufacturers’ expansion into various 
populous and emerging countries (see table 4.2). With market expansion, the branding 
manufacturers (i.e. Nestlé, Hershey, Mondelēz and Petra Foods) attempted to strengthen their core 
competence by outsourcing cocoa processing facilities via long term contracts with competent 
suppliers. Responding to this changing strategic environment and the emerging demand for 
sustainable cocoa, global cocoa trading firms functionally upgraded their position into cocoa 
processing‐trading firms. This vertical integration along with recent network configurations has 
eliminated the international trading function through acquisition and joint ventures (a trend 
identified earlier by Fold, 2002). For example, Cargill acquired ADM’s couverture production and 
Olam International acquired ADM’s cocoa processing facility. Barry Callebaut expanded 
geographically through the acquisition of Petra Foods cocoa grinding facilities and has continued 
construction of new facilities within emerging markets and cocoa‐producing countries.  
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Table 4.1 Major acquisitions of cocoa‐chocolate companies after 2010 
Acquisitions Original function Current function Type of firms 
January 2010, Kraft acquired 
Cadbury. 
 
October 2012, Kraft renamed 
chocolate and confectionary 
divisions Mondelēz 
Incorporation. 
Food and snack 
manufacturing  
   
Confectionary and 
chocolate 
manufacturing 
 
 
 
Branded chocolate 
manufacturing 
Lead firm, 
focus on high end‐product 
and market definition 
July 2013, Barry Callebaut 
acquired Petrafood cocoa 
division. 
 
September 2013, Barry 
Callebaut opened cocoa grinding 
factories in Indonesia through a 
joint venture with PT Comextra 
majora.  
Cocoa and chocolate 
producers  
Cocoa processing and 
chocolate couverture, 
chocolate beverages 
Strategic partner15, 
Focus on development of 
chocolate products and 
generic cocoa products. 
November 2013, Ecom trading 
acquired Armajaro cocoa trading. 
Multi‐commodities 
global trading  
Cocoa trading and 
processing 
Specialised supplier16 (Agro‐
industries) 
September 2014, Cargill 
acquired ADM Global chocolate 
division. 
Multi‐commodities 
global trading  
Cocoa trading, 
processing and 
chocolate couverture 
Strategic partner, 
focus on development of 
chocolate products and 
generic cocoa products 
October 2015, Olam acquired 
ADM cocoa grinding.  
Multi‐commodities 
global trading 
Cocoa trading and 
processing  
Specialised supplier (Agro‐
industries) 
Source: multiple online news media and firm reports  
4.2.1 Branded Chocolate-confectionary manufacturers 
Due to their roles in controlling and coordinating production networks, and engaging in high‐value 
production activities, chocolate confectionary manufacturers are generally considered lead firms. 
The downstream segments of the cocoa‐chocolate GPN are generally characterised by the 
oligopolistic structure of branded manufacturers and cocoa processing firms. However, today these 
networks are becoming more complex geographically. For example, the mature European market is 
a combination of global branded manufacturers and medium‐scale homemade artisanal chocolate 
makers (Caobisco, 2016), while the aging population of the Japanese market is showing increased 
concern regarding the health aspects of cocoa‐based products (Doi, 2013). In response to diverse 
market demands and characteristics, the distribution of end products has also diversified from food 
                                                          
15 Strategic partner refers to the supplier who become partial or complete solution for the lead firm, for example Barry 
Callebaut whose entered strategic partnership for not only supplying, but also shared investment in downstream research 
and development for premium products, published 26 April 2007, [Retrieved, January 2017] https://www.barry‐
callebaut.com/news/2007/04/hershey‐and‐barry‐callebaut‐announce‐strategic‐supply‐and‐innovation‐partnership  
16 Specialised supplier refers to the supplier who has significant role in supplying for not only primary product, but also 
complementary products (e.g. sugar and edible nuts). 
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chain retailers to vending machines and some manufacturer‐owned shops (eg. Lindt, and to a lesser 
extent, Mars and Cadbury). Following the recent trends of online markets, the major branded 
manufacturers have also signed partnership contracts with e‐commerce giant, Alibaba. For example, 
the Chinese consumer may be sourcing Nestlé or customised packing of Mondelēz brands produced 
in Europe and the US rather than simply consumed domestic products 17,18.   
Despite brand being a prominent feature, chocolate and confectionary manufacturers have 
established industrial market development by investing in product‐process innovation and consumer 
engagement to capture value from the differentiated market. Among the six largest global 
manufacturers (i.e., Mondelēz, Nestlé, Mars, Hershey, Ferrero and Lindt&Sprüngli), only Mars and 
Ferrero have remained family‐owned enterprises for more than a century. The others have grown 
into corporations with less private control and more complex ownership structures.      
Mars, which was originally established as a chocolate‐confectionary firm, has grown into a more 
diversified food and pet food company. The firm established a global presence and market 
dominance after it acquired Masterfoods (in 1967) and Aquarium pharmaceuticals (API) in 2007, in 
addition to following the geographic market expansion by establishing new factories and developing 
product portfolios.  Mars extended its proprietary investment into scientific experimentation on 
seeking novelty and functional compounds, which it later developed under the Symbioscience and 
Life Science division. Utilising a combination of end‐product innovation and grounded research, 
Mars applied exclusive sourcing strategies as they maintained in‐house cocoa processing capacity 
nearby field research centre, such as in Sulawesi19. Mars cocoa processing presence in Indonesia was 
integrated with the Mars Symbioscience division, whereas vertical integration of sourcing and 
processing cocoa to supply the mainstream brands of Chinese factories (Respondent CC1, pers. 
comm, 2014; Respondent SS1, 2014).       
Allegedly motivated by his concern over high infant mortality numbers, Henri Nestlé invented dairy‐
based infant foods such as condensed milk and infant cereals. As well, he collaborated with his 
business partners, Peter&Kohler to develop chocolate milk20. Primarily focusing on the innovation of 
dairy‐based products, the firm diversified its product portfolios as a growth strategy to increase 
global competitiveness through different strategies from acquisitions, mergers, and geographical 
                                                          
17 Nestlé offers oversea products to Chinese consumers through new partnership with Alibaba, published on 09 June 2016 
http://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Nestlé‐announced‐partnership‐with‐Alibaba  
18 Mondelēz partners with China’ Alibaba to support 1bn global e‐commerce goal, published on 11 April 2016 
http://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Mondelez‐partners‐with‐China‐s‐Alibaba  
19 Indonesia is a vast and beautiful 17,000‐ island country in Southeast Asia. It is the heart of the CocoVia brand because it 
has source of the cocoa beans used in our patented Cocoapro process.  [Retrieved, February 2017]  
https://www.cocoavia.com/how‐we‐make‐it/investing‐in‐indonesia?___SID=U  
20 Nestlé the company history, the pioneer years 1866‐1904, [Retrieved, January 2017] 
http://www.Nestlé.com/aboutus/history/Nestlé‐company‐history#tab‐1866  
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expansion of existing industries. Although today Nestlé has a significant global market share of 
chocolate confectionary, internally this segment contributes less than 10% of total revenue, behind 
dairy‐based products, beverages, nutritional and health care, and pet care segments (Nestlé, 2016). 
Nestlé employs a long‐term outsourcing contract strategy with its multiple supplier partners rather 
than maintaining an integrated production network.  In Indonesia, Nestlé focuses its production on 
chocolate flavoured dairy products and beverages, and does not have any investments in chocolate 
confectionary manufacturing.   
4.2.2 Cocoa processing and chocolate couverture 
Within the last fifteen years, this segment has undergone major restructuring following the 
outsourcing strategies of branded manufacturers, who shifted to long‐term supply contracts with 
strategic partners and (or) specialised suppliers. Cognisant of the intense global market competition, 
the branded manufacturers switched their focus to their core competencies (branding and product 
innovation). Nestlé for example outsourced its processing facilities to Petrafood and ADM (Oxfam, 
2008). In 2016, Barry Callebaut acquired a Mondelēz chocolate factory in Halle, Belgium21. The 
acquisition expands the production capacity of Belgian chocolates and filling, and involves a long‐
term agreement with Mondelēz for supplying liquid chocolate for Côte D’Or and Milka brands. With 
increasing market demand for mainstream chocolate brands, Nestlé and Mondelēz have 
disintegrated their chocolate and cocoa processing facilities to their supply partners and entered 
into long‐term supply agreements. Following this trend, the dominant trading firms seized the 
opportunity to functionally upgrade and strengthen their intermediate position in the fragmented 
industrial segments through acquisition of the cocoa processors (see Table 4.1).     
Initially, this segment’s focus was upon processing cocoa bean into cocoa products, with pure cocoa 
mass or liquor further pressed (and alkalised) into cocoa butter, cake and powder (see Figure 4.4). In 
the process of optimising the value of cocoa products, on‐farm fermentation of the cocoa beans 
plays a crucial role in developing the distinct flavour of these cocoa products. The fermentation 
process is highly crucial for those firms who produce couverture chocolate, as the product is 
preferred and sourced by artisanal chocolatiers and chocolate makers. Due to the wide range of 
cocoa‐based (or simply flavoured) products, this segment was divided into high‐end processed cocoa 
produced by the chocolate producer ‐ also called couverture ‐ and low‐end processed cocoa that is 
currently integrated into the firms’ trading activities. The high‐end processors like Barry Callebaut, 
Cargill and Blommer are vertically integrated cocoa‐chocolate industries, which add value to 
industrial chocolate through additional processes (e.g. reducing calories, sugar, and fat), purposes 
(e.g. filling, coating, and decoration), and functional attributes (e.g. polyphenols and probiotic). Also, 
although Barry Callebaut is considered a strategic supplier for manufacturing firms, it has also 
                                                          
21 Barry Callebaut plans to acquire a chocolate plant of Mondelez International in Halle, Belgium, under an agreement to 
supply Milka maker of 30,000 tons of liquid chocolate annually, published on 15 September 2016,      
http://www.confectionerynews.com/Ingredients/Barry‐Callebaut‐acquires‐Mondelez‐Belgium‐Cote‐D‐Or‐chocolate‐
factory. Barry Callebaut completes acquisition of chocolate production facility in Halle, Belgium, published on 31 December 
2016, [Retrieved, January 2017], https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/news/2016/12/barry‐callebaut‐completes‐acquisition‐
chocolate‐production‐facility‐halle‐belgium 
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developed various innovations from improving cocoa fermentation processes to exploring the value 
added from intrinsic novel attributes of cocoa.    
Figure 4.4 Industrial cocoa‐chocolate production process   
 
Globally, couverture production is dominated by three major firms: Barry Callebaut, Cargill and 
Blommer. Although headquartered in Switzerland, Barry Callebaut was established in 1996 from the 
merger of Belgian chocolate maker Callebaut and French chocolate maker Cacao Barry. Following 
the merger, Barry Callebaut expanded its economic scale through the acquisition of chocolate 
brands from Switzerland (Carma), Germany (Stollwerck group) to Malaysia (KLK cocoa). Further 
expanding the scope of production, it acquired the Danish vending machine firm Eurogran A/S and 
began distributing beverage brands (i.e. Van Houten, Caprimo and LeRoyal) primarily in the 
European market22. At the same time, the firm also invested in new processing facilities in emerging 
markets. The firm also acquired the Tanzanian cocoa trading firm, Biolands International, to supply 
organic and sustainable certified cocoa, and established a joint venture with local trading firm PT 
Comextra Majora to establish a new cocoa processing factory in Sulawesi, Indonesia. 
After protracted negotiations, the American‐based agro‐industries firm, Cargill extended its 
chocolate‐producing functions by acquiring ADM Chocolate.  The firm is now vertically integrated 
from direct sourcing of cocoa beans through to industrial chocolate production. It is also investing in 
high‐end products through research and development, exploring the ingredients application and 
innovating to follow the dynamic consumer demand23. Initially, Cargill was established in Indonesia 
                                                          
22 Important milestones of Barry Callebaut Group, [Retrieved, January 2017] https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/about‐
us/company‐overview/company‐history‐0  
23Application centre focus on the exploring and assessing variation of new and combination ingredients, while the 
innovation focus on the consumer demand regarding the existing products.  [Retrieved, January 2017] 
https://www.cargill.com/food‐beverage/innovation/application‐centers  
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simply as a multi‐crops trading firm, but by 2014 it had commissioned a cocoa‐processing facility in 
East Java.  
The emergence of sustainability programs, as demanded by lead firms, has increased the supply 
chain management capacities required of cocoa grinders and traders. This has further increased 
concentration within this segment. Market demand for sustainable cocoa has required additional 
investment for establishing upstream outreach assistance, while the imposition of progressive 
export taxes (for example in Indonesia) has rendered exporting bean less profitable for the firms. 
Meanwhile, cocoa processors were facing volatile global cocoa prices after various external risks 
(e.g. political turmoil and Ebola outbreak) in Ivory Coast, as the largest cocoa producing country. 
These vertical and horizontal challenges have pressured the trading firms to strengthen their 
position in the network, but have also opened opportunities to add value from functional upgrading. 
The Indonesian government’s attempt to industrialise the cocoa sector successfully attracted new 
foreign and domestic investments.  For example, BT Cocoa, already the largest nationally‐owned 
cocoa processor, began opening upcountry buying units to support increased processing capacity. 
Olam established a cocoa plantation in the abundant land and low labour cost Island of Seram, in 
Maluku Province. But, as international firms expanded their geographical scale and scope, the 
smaller domestic processors struggled to remain competitive. It is ironic, therefore, that the same 
domestic firms who lobbied the Indonesian government for industrial policy are now being squeezed 
out by larger, more competitive foreign firms.      
4.2.3 Cocoa collecting 
Despite the ongoing restructuring of transnational trading firms towards integration upstream with 
farmers and downstream into processing, agricultural production remains dominated by smallholder 
farmers. Recognising the limitations appertaining to the development of inclusive farmer‐based 
organisation, the collecting actors (i.e., cooperatives, collectors and assisted farmer groups) perform 
local intermediary roles connecting the dispersed farmers and supporting the large cocoa 
processors. Since this role is generally performed by local actors, the structure tends to be 
geographically diverse in term of economic scale and scope, thus this role depends on social 
structure of the cocoa communities to the extent of dominant state interventions.   
West African domestic market for cocoa beans was subjected to different degree of state 
intervention before the liberalisation, for example, monopoly‐monopsony state market boards 
(Ghana and Nigeria) or caisses de stabilisation24 (Ivory Coast and Cameroon). Although, the state 
role in Ivory Coast has dismantled in 1999 and leave the price setting to the private actors, but 
Ghana market system remained partially liberalised after 1986. The Ghanaian farmers continue to 
supply the privatised marketing board, Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC) through licensed local 
buying companies and assisted farmer associations. However, the liberalisation also contributed to 
emerging non‐licensed individual buyers and smuggling to neighbouring countries like Ivory Coast 
                                                          
24 The francophone resembles to marketing board and replicates the functions of the board in certain degree of 
governance, but not directly involving in the production process.  
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who offered a higher farm gate price (Mohammed et al., 2011).  Meanwhile in Ivory Coast, 
liberalisation contributed to the increasingly dominant role of transnational trading firms (Kaplinsky, 
2004) who sourced cocoa under market contracts with assisted cooperatives (many participating in 
firm sustainability programs) and existing local traders (re. traitant-pisteur). The downside of state 
monopoly system was the absence of competition, and a lack of transparency and efficiency, despite 
farmers receiving technical assistances and being protected from global price volatility.  While within 
the Ivorian context, the liberal market led to slightly competitive market despite the lack of farm 
gate price transparency at the farmer level, uncertain technical assistance from the government, and 
increasing tax.    
Meanwhile, in the fine‐cocoa producer country, Ecuador, state intervention was absent from the 
market system, but was focused on product upgrading through farming inputs and technical support 
(Ahmed and Hemrick, 2015). As the biggest cocoa producing country in Latin America that followed 
by Brazil, the Ecuadorian cocoa value chain is dominated by collectors and traders of various scales, 
who are vertically linked to national exporters and producer associations with little industrial 
development (Ahmed and Hemrick, 2015). Exporters must ensure quality requirements are met 
before directly exporting to global cocoa processors like Blommer chocolate, Transmar commodity 
group, Barry Callebaut, and General Cocoa Company (Ahmed and Hemrick, 2015).   
As a bulk unfermented producer country, cocoa collecting in Indonesia was previously dominated by 
collectors and local traders who earnt profits through volume and small incentives for quality, with 
limited transparency. As more actors participated in this segment, including transnational trading 
firms encouraged by value chain assistance programs (funded by the US government, as will be 
discussed later) to facilitate smallholder integration into the chain, quality and price transparency 
increased and the node became more competitive. However, the relationships between collectors 
and farmers were not easily severed because the relationship was not only about cocoa exchange. 
They often included additional roles, as financial service providers, merchandiser and input 
suppliers, and knowledge exchange agents, which elsewhere might be performed by separate actors 
outside of the supply chain. As beneficiaries of this combination of supportive functions and informal 
market contracts, farmers who obtained financial or agro‐input services from the collector were 
morally obligated to sell their crops exclusively to the particular collector, resulting in a captive 
market. This captive relationship also extended between collectors and traders, although often 
shorter‐term and limited to financial support especially during the peak harvest season. The 
collectors found accessing the formal financial institutions too complicated and less flexible, not 
reflecting to the nature of estate crops and farming communities.   
4.2.4 Cocoa Bean production  
While chocolate manufacturing and cocoa grinding is concentrated among a small number of 
transnational firms, cocoa production is concentrated among a few cocoa producing countries. 
Cocoa production in West African countries and Indonesia are performed by millions of smallholder 
farmers who generally own less than ten hectares of cocoa farms, while the production in Latin 
America was performed by small and medium cocoa producers, some of whom own almost fifty 
hectares of cocoa farms (Ahmed and Hemrick, 2015). Cocoa farming is laborious work. Pruning, 
fertilizing, agrochemical spraying, weeding, harvesting, fermentation, drying and quality sortation 
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are among the routine farm‐level practices. For less than two‐hectare size of cocoa farm, these 
practices remain manageable by four to five family members, but for the farmers who own larger 
areas, hired labour is required for at least part of the activities.  
Declining farm productivity when farms exceed twenty years of age, combined with the complexities 
of environmental and social issues, have contributed to declining farm revenues. Gilbert (2008) 
demonstrated declining farmer revenues as a share of (the UK) retail chocolate price, with the 
lowest share (over the period 1976‐2005) received by Ivory Coast, Ghana and Cameroon. Despite the 
combination of these issues burdening smallholder farmers, there has been a 30% increase in world 
production over the last fifteen years (see Figure 4.5). Remarkably, most West African countries 
showed consistently increasing annual production, in contrast to Asia Pacific countries and Brazil, 
where production has been stable or declining, lagging behind the growth in processing segment.   
Figure 4.5 Changing annual cocoa bean production in major producing countries 
 
Indonesian farmers continue to struggle to overcome challenges such as pest and disease 
infestation, and old non‐productive trees that resulted in low yields. The uncertainty of farm 
household regeneration and the spatial complexity of rural livelihoods, have added to the ongoing 
social issues that threaten supply from Indonesia, thereby raising concerns amongst lead branded 
chocolate manufacturers. Following these upstream issues, the industrial actors are investing in 
sustainability initiatives with the primary goal to ensure a stable supply of cocoa bean within this 
region.   
Sustainability initiatives are being implementing globally in most producing countries, through 
different forms and arrangements. The north‐based market demand for ‘sustainable cocoa’ has led 
to firm‐based upstream interventions in the form of voluntary certification schemes (e.g. Rainforest 
Alliance‐RA and UTZcertified) and various technical assistances to improve farm productivity and 
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subsequently smallholder livelihoods. The participation of certification bodies within production 
networks has been an important development in terms of extra‐firms’ actor engagement, widening 
upstream coordination horizontally beyond direct economic activities. Financial support from north‐
based development agencies has also extended to other intermediaries such as agro‐input 
companies, micro‐finance institutions, and research and extension agencies. While sustainability 
initiatives have focused on restoring smallholder farming productivity, an accessible and stable agro‐
input supply was also required to bring back farm profitability. Funding the shift from conventional 
farming to ‘good’ (or intensified) agricultural practices requires financial investment that is beyond 
the reach of many smallholder farmers.  
4.3 Competitive dynamics 
Rather than seeking the dynamic drivers of value activity in the global production networks, the GPN 
approach of Coe and Yeung (2015) focuses first on independent capitalist dynamics that prompt the 
actor‐specific strategies of lead firms in different regional and national economies. This GPN 
approach recognises three competitive dynamics, i.e., cost‐capability ratios, market imperatives and 
financial discipline as the necessary causal conditions underpinning the actor‐specific strategies 
employed when configuring production networks, eventually resulting in diverse empirical 
outcomes. With respect to the cocoa‐chocolate industries, the manufacturing lead firms have 
attempted to strengthen and upgrade: (1) their position within the production networks; and, (1) 
their capability to manage the risks imposed by the external environment. The following sections 
discuss how these underlying competitive dynamics are shaping lead firm strategies in the 
contemporary cocoa‐chocolate GPN. 
4.3.1 Cost capability ratios 
The early cocoa‐chocolate industries were highly vertically integrated where branded chocolate 
manufacturers were engaged directly with sourcing, storing and processing the cocoa beans through 
to distribution and marketing. As the industries developed, they experienced increasing mainstream 
market demand and more competitive pressure to lower the end‐product price. This required the 
branded manufacturers to restructure the cost of the different stages of production. The dynamic of 
optimising the cost capability ratios facilitated an understanding of why a lead firm would either 
outsource certain value activities to their supplier partners or maintain an integrated production 
network, and why the mix of these activities could change over time in specific global production 
networks (Yeung and Coe, 2015).  With more diverse product portfolios and economic scales of 
production networks, a firm could gain optimal cost‐capability ratio through cost reductions. It could 
externalise the low value activities to supply partners, and internationalise value activities to low 
cost production countries, while investing in new capabilities, such as innovation in production and 
management.  
These cost‐capability ratios are aptly demonstrated in the locational strategies of Mars and Nestlé. 
Overcoming earlier constraints, such as poor infrastructure, Mars successfully produced the Milky 
Way chocolate bar in 1923. The firm relocated to Chicago, a decision based on the recent 
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construction of a railway system that facilitated distribution and marketing across the country25. 
Among the few family businesses remaining, Mars’ reputation for secrecy was legendary. In 1932, 
the firm expanded into the UK after Forrest Mars acquired a small factory in the town of Slough. The 
company introduced the family recipe for Milky Way, and invented the Mars Bar. Over time, Mars 
established two factories in Slough, but after almost a century of serving the UK market, the 2007‐
2008 global financial crisis forced the firm to relocate to the Czech Republic for Starbust 
production26. Twix chocolate finger similarly relocated to the largest factory in Veghel (in the 
Netherlands) in 2007.  Due to the 2008 financial crisis, which was followed by slow market growth, 
the company was no longer able to meet the UK’s high production costs.  
The emerging Eastern European market opened the opportunity to capture value from the growing 
regional market, and relocating production to the Netherlands increased the company’s cost 
efficiency through the economic scale of large production. Given that the Netherlands applied a low 
industrial tax, and was also the largest grinding country, this combined with improved technology 
leading to reduced labour costs of the recently established factories. In addition to this geographic 
position, the company had access to the larger European market from the well‐established 
transportation infrastructure around the continent. Within the last five years, Mars has expanded its 
production facilities in the emerging markets and established R&D centres in significant markets 
(e.g., China) to capture value from the economic scale.  
In 1905, Nestlé entered chocolate production after merging with a Swiss chocolatier owned by 
Daniel Peter and Charles‐Amédée Kohler to produce milk chocolate under the brand Cailler and 
Fémina. Then in 1988, Nestlé acquired UK confectionary firm Rowntree Mackintosh, and aimed to 
strengthen its position in the confectionary segment27. The firm has a significant global market share 
for mainstream brands (i.e., Kit-Kat, Smarties, Milkybar, Milo and Aero). The firm’s strategic decision 
to outsource cocoa processing in 1999 was followed by a series of long‐term contracts with the 
strategic partner Barry Callebaut in 1999 and Cargill in 2004, along with a few self‐selected 
competent specialised suppliers28. This strategic partnership with Barry Callebaut ‐which was also 
investing in the R&D of chocolate processing and technology‐ allowed Nestlé to eliminate the 
innovation costs while at the same time focusing on promoting premium brands (Cailler and 
Fémina).  
Focusing on the extraction of the financial value of proprietary assets (e.g., brands and technology), 
Nestlé has: (1) externalised high‐cost production to suppliers; and (2) contributed to increased rates 
                                                          
25 Our history since 1883. [Retrieved, January 2017]  http://www.mars.com/global/about‐us/history     
26 History of Mars.  [Retrieved, January 2017] http://www.englishteastore.com/mars‐history.html 
27 The Nestlé company history since 1866. [Retrieved, January 2017]   http://www.Nestlé.com/aboutus/history/Nestlé‐
company‐history 
28 Important milestones of Barry Callebaut Group. [Retrieved, January 2017]  https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/about‐
us/company‐overview/company‐history‐0     
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of profit despite declining total sales in the recent years (see Figure 4.6). Before outsourcing, only 
10% (in average) of profit generated from the total sales, but steadily increased to 15% few years 
after Nestlé disintegrated the cocoa‐chocolate processing facilities to Barry Callebaut29 and Cargill30. 
Nestlé strategic approach of outsourcing and focusing production on core‐competence has increased 
profit shareholder value while slowly increased investment in new capabilities to ensure food safety 
after establishing quality assurance centres (in the US and Ireland) to minimise losses linked to 
pathogen and allergen contamination of susceptible products.  
Figure 4.6 Comparing Nestlé annual profit31 of confectionary segment before and after outsourcing  
 
4.3.2 Sustaining market development 
Moving away from the earlier GCC focus on buyer driven chains that conceptualised the lead firms 
as key drivers in market development, Yeung and Coe (2015) suggest the dynamic interaction of 
customers and lead firms in market creation. They further argue that the market imperatives 
confronting firms are negotiated outcomes of market creation that actively involve both interaction 
between the customer (who is likely to demand better product/services at low cost) and the 
producer (who is seeking greater market revenue and profit from expansion). Slow growth in 
                                                          
29 Successful closing of transaction with Nestlé, published on 2 July 2007. [Retrieved, December 2016]  https://www.barry‐
callebaut.com/news/2007/07/barry‐callebaut‐takes‐over‐dijon‐factory‐san‐sisto‐production‐line 
30 Following Nestlé policy to concentrate in branded value‐added products, divesting of cocoa processing units was 
following by a long‐term agreement with Cargill, published on 30 June 2004. [Retrieved, December 2016] 
http://www.Nestlé.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/sellcocoaactivitiesyorknhamburg2cargill‐30jun04  
31  Profit referring to operating profit or earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT= revenue‐expanses  
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developed country markets has compelled global lead firms to extend their market reach into 
emerging markets. This would increase their market accessibility and reap the benefit of the less 
competitive and developed markets.  
Chocolate manufactures have actively expanded their production networks across the emerging 
countries in Asia, the Middle Eastern countries and South America.  Focusing on the Asian region, 
Mars and Nestlé established an early geographical presence recently, followed by Mondelēz, 
Hershey and Ferrero’s establishing of new production facilities in China and India (see Table 4.2). 
Nestlé and Hershey each employed an acquisition strategy to gain market accessibility in China, 
following Mars established market domination (Allen, 2011). Thus, the lead branded manufacturers’ 
investments seemed to be followed by investment of their strategic supply partners. For example, 
after Barry Callebaut signed the long‐term outsourcing contract with Nestlé, Hershey and Cadbury in 
2007, they opening factories in China (2008), Japan (2008), and Indonesia (2013), and acquired 
Malaysian KLK cocoa processor (2008)8.   
Table 4.2 Mapping the growing cocoa‐chocolate industries in Asia 
 
Despite its dominance in mass market brands, Nestlé has criticised for not have a premium 
chocolate brand in the global market, for example to compromise the slow growth of mass market 
brands.  In attempt to sustain market development in developed market, the firm reintroduced the 
Swiss Alps Cailler brand in 2006 and, a few years later, Nestlé opened Maison Cailler– La 
Chocolaterie Suisse in Switzerland as a centre of innovation and consumer engagement32. This 
premium market development also expanded in Britain and Ireland, by 2012, as Nestlé restarted the 
historical Rowntree chocolate factory in York and revived the production of dark chocolate brands33. 
                                                          
32 Nestlé’s new Maison Cailler brand creates chocolate haute couture, published on 20 October 2011. [Retrieved, 
December 2016] http://www.Nestlé.com/media/newsandfeatures/maison_cailler  
33 Nestlé UK and Ireland has revived dark chocolate production at its factory in York after ending a third party outsourcing 
deal, published on 19 October 2012.  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Processing‐Packaging/Nestlé‐UK‐restarts‐dark‐
chocolate‐production‐at‐York‐site  
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As Nestlé maintains indulgence element of the premium product to sustain market development, 
Mars become a pioneer to introduce cocoa as functional products by emphasising the 
pharmaceutical element of cocoa flavanol.  These cocoa flavanol‐based food supplements were 
introduced in the form of capsule and powdered stick pack for the UK and Ireland market in early 
201734, after the US.  This innovation seeks to expand sales of cocoa‐based products, from the 
mainstream chocolate‐candy confectionaries to the pharmaceutical industry. Concomitant with 
geographical market expansion, followed by more diverse consumer preferences concerning their 
ethical, quality, safety and health claims, the branded manufacturers are competing to maintain 
their dominant position and continue product innovation development to sustain their market 
leadership.   
4.3.3 Financial discipline 
Among the dominant branding chocolate manufacturers, only Mars and Ferrero remain family 
(group) businesses. The various other dominant manufacturers (re. Mondelēz, Nestlé, Hershey, and 
Lindt&Sprüngli) became publicly listed to minimise their dependence on financial institutions. Yeung 
and Coe (2015) argue that the pressure and opportunities associated with imperative financialisation 
have propelled the lead firms’ strategy shift from developing and expanding their production 
networks to combining with the cost‐capability ratio and sustaining market development. The form 
of financial discipline under consideration is that market valuation on stock markets has forced the 
lead firms into doing one thing well (Davis, 2009 cited in Yeung and Coe, 2015). Once subjected to 
this continuous pressure, the firm tends to perform well on the financial markets. Having continuous 
financial pressure, the lead firms are subjected to generate higher revenue (and please their 
shareholders who tend to be interested in short‐term gains) from their core‐competencies and cost‐
capability ratio. This leads to the externalisation of low revenue‐high cost production (such as cocoa 
processing) activities and using customer power to drive competitive pressure among the suppliers 
eventually leading to low outsourcing cost and better quality‐services.  
Nestlé, one of the earliest companies to register on the Zurich stock exchange (on 17 March 1873, 
now SIX Swiss exchange), later merged with Anglo‐Swiss condensed milk in 1905. Although early 
financialisation resulted in financial loss due to falling prices and the Wall Street crash in the 1920s, 
the firm recovered and continued investment in the economic scale and scope of the production 
networks, thus making Nestlé a powerful global company with a diversified product portfolio. After 
acquiring Rowntree Mackintosh in 1988, Nestlé added mainstream brands into its confectionary 
portfolio, slowly replacing the vertically integrated production networks with long‐term outsourcing 
contracts in exchange for more demanding and stringent private regulations.  
The ability to recover and be resilient towards the market shock and financial crisis has strengthened 
Nestlé’s dominant position in the production networks and allows them to capture the economic rent 
from its core‐competence. Based on the annual financial statement, the company shows declining 
                                                          
34 After granted approval from EFSA, Mars launched pill‐based food supplement contains cocoa flavanol, published on 16 
February 2017. http://www.nutraingredients.com/Markets‐and‐Trends/Mars‐to‐enter‐UK‐supplement‐space‐with‐cocoa‐
flavanol‐pills  
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sales values by around 10 percent over ten years (see Table 4.3). Combined with a low‐cost capability 
ratio and global market dominance, Nestlé is still able to increase the percentage of net margin (re. 
EBIT), despite increased interest linking to the financial crisis of 2008.  The capability to maintain stable 
profit margins defines the firm profitability and operation efficiency. In addition, the debt/EBIT ratio 
shows an ability to comply with financial obligations, despite the external influence such as tax and 
interest.   
Table 4.3 Nestlé 10‐year summary of financial statement (Nestlé annual reports)35  
 
4.4 The risk environments  
Risk minimising and management involves a range of extra firm actors who directly and indirectly 
affect the global production networks, thus firms may adopt different strategies across geographical 
boundaries and risk domains. The risks related to downstream activities tends to be manageable 
(see Table 4.4) since production is internally organised within the control of the lead firm, as 
opposed to upstream risks that are beyond these geographic and economic domains. However, 
sustaining competitive capitalist dynamics within the oligopolistic global market is challenging with 
unpredictable external pressures. For example, Cadbury’s loss of profitability in the confectionary 
segment was due to fierce market competition, slow growth, and the high cost of domestic 
production36 (relocating its factories to Poland, just as Mars relocated to the Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic). In addition to external pressures where Cadbury faced a consumer backlash (in New 
Zealand) after replacing cocoa butter with palm oil37 and Salmonella poisoning outbreak in the UK 
                                                          
35 Nestlé annual reports for 2007 to 2016, [Retrieved on February 2017]. http://www.Nestlé.com/investors/publications   
36 Cadbury announced for closing the factory in Somerset, as 500 employees losing the jobs by 2010, but opening new 
factory in Poland, published on 3 October 2007. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2816921/Cadbury‐to‐move‐
jobs‐to‐Poland.html  
37 Cadbury caves‐no more palm oil in its chocolate. Cadbury is to get rid of palm oil from its chocolates after a public 
outcry, published on 17 August 2009. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10591340  
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market38.  These series of pressures and financial underperformance became the economic rationale 
for shareholders (primarily hedge funds and investors) to approve the acquisition by Kraft foods.   
Table 4.4 Different forms of emerging risks identified in cocoa‐chocolate production networks 
Form Nature Casual effects on actors Examples 
Economic risk  Systemic shift in markets 
(i.e., new technology for 
premium products, 
internal‐external 
financial disruption, and 
significant fluctuation in 
exchange rates) 
Loss of competitive 
position, reduction of 
revenue and profitability, 
structural volatility in 
particular regions  
‐ Rowntree acquired by Nestlé after losing 
its stock shares price and weak operating 
performance in 1988.  
‐ Cadbury acquisition by Kraft in 2010 
following sluggish growth of confectionary 
segment in 1990‐2000. 
Product risk  Quality, safety, health 
and branding 
considerations 
Negative perception of 
goods: consumer 
concerns. 
‐ Hershey recalls most of chocolate products 
in Canada because of Salmonella 
contamination in November 2006 and close 
the Smith Falls plantation in February 2007. 
‐ Cadbury suspected of halal concerns in 
Malaysian market, June 2014. 
‐ Mars recalls chocolate from 55 countries, 
February 2016 due to plastic contamination.  
Regulatory risk Political, public to 
private governance and 
changing policies 
Disruption or termination 
of global production, 
existing industrial 
practices and 
organisational 
arrangements. 
‐ Political turmoil in Ivory Coast results in the 
banning of the export of cocoa bean in 2011.   
‐ Subsidiary of Continaf B.V closed cocoa 
trading operation in 2013 after Indonesian 
government introduced progressive export 
tax.    
Labour risk Struggle over working 
conditions and 
employment practices  
Disruption of global 
production and 
employment prospects 
and potential for greater 
reputational risk 
‐ Six month‐ long strike in 1975, as Kraft 
planned to sell its US factory in Fogelsville 
after only three years of establishment.  
‐ Nestlé, ADM and Cargill US lawsuit for 
sourcing cocoa from child slavery practices 
in the Ivory Coast, September 2014. 
Environmental 
risk 
Natural hazards or 
human‐made disaster  
Accentuating the other 
forms of risks and their 
casual effects. 
‐ The persistent cocoa pod borer outbreak in 
the 1990s contributed to a significant 
decline in Malaysian cocoa production. 
‐ The long‐persistent pest‐disease 
infestation since early 2000s have prevented 
the Indonesian cocoa production 
improvement, despite increased cocoa 
farms areas.  
‐ Ebola outbreak in West Africa impacted on 
the cocoa price and resulted in the closing 
down of the subsidiaries’ operations, 2014. 
Source: multiple online news media and firm reports  
                                                          
38 Cadbury fined £1m for salmonella offences, published on 17 July 2007. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jul/17/uk.business  
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Following the lead firms’ outsourcing strategy, consumer‐related risks (e.g product and labour risks) 
required a coordinated production process with supplier partners. For example, the case of 
Salmonella contamination in most of Hershey chocolate brands was identified from soy‐lecithin39, an 
emulsifying agent used by a Hershey’ supplier. Despite the resulting consumer poisoning being 
linked to supply chain issues, the firm decided to close the factory after 44 years’ operation in 
Ontario (Canada). Another supply chain risk is rooted in the declining of cocoa farms yield linking to 
deteriorated of forest rent and unresolved pest‐disease infestations that contributed to the collapse 
of Malaysian cocoa plantation in 1990s.  Within Indonesia context, unresolved declining cocoa farm 
yield will treat the recent investment in cocoa processing segment, since low supply and high 
demand leads to high farm gate prices and further contributes to high domestic production cost.   
Meanwhile, the complexities of upstream state intervention in regulatory regimes, and ongoing 
political risks, leads to uncertain conditions beyond the direct influence of lead firms.  For example, 
despite persistent pest and disease issues leading to declining farm productivity, the Indonesian 
government encouraged new investments in cocoa processing through tax policy. This was not 
anticipated by the trading actors who had benefited from the liberal market and higher global 
market demand. Consequently, increasing domestic demand beyond the annual production and high 
cost of exporting put immense pressure on cocoa trading firms. For example, the subsidiary of 
Continaf B.V trading firm (re. Nedcommodities Makmur Jaya) closed their cocoa operations in 2013 
whilst Olam Indonesia strategically expanded the scope of production to cocoa processing and 
plantation to remain competitive.      
4.5 Strategies for reconfiguring the production network 
Focusing exclusively on interfirm relationships as modes of industrial governance, the GVC approach 
‐ as an analytical tool ‐ has been criticised for subsuming power dynamics and economic actor 
practices under different modes of chain governance (Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014; Yeung and Coe, 
2015; Henderson et al., 2002). This renders the underlying competitive dynamics and actor‐specific 
practices invisible and (or) assumed (Yeung and Coe, 2015).  Linking the actor specific competitive 
dynamics to overcoming the causal challenges, the GPN approach introduces four types of firm‐level 
strategies to explain the specific GPN configurations in different historical and geographical contexts. 
This opens‐up the possibility for an actor from the same production networks to exercise diverse 
strategies rather than being generalised.  A combination of the specific actors’ competitive dynamics 
and the strategies they employ defines the empirical economic development outcomes from 
individual firm growth, vertical integration and outsourcing to sectoral transformation and spatial 
development.    
The confectionary lead firms can be divided into: (1) those firms primarily concerned with chocolate 
manufacturing with smaller segments of candies (e.g., Mars, Lindt&Sprüngli, Ferrero, Hershey, 
Petrafoods); and, (2) multi‐portfolio firms whose confectionary segment are not their major source 
                                                          
39 Soy source of chocolate contamination, Hershey says.  A variety of popular chocolate bars and candies were voluntarily 
recalled on Nov. 9 because of fears of salmonella contamination at Hershey’ Smiths Falls, Ontario factory, published on 16 
November 2006.  http://www.cbc.ca/news/soy‐source‐of‐chocolate‐contamination‐hershey‐says‐1.582869  
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of revenue (e.g., Nestlé, Mondelēz, Yildiz holding and Meiji holding).  For all branded manufacturers, 
innovation and product development are core competencies to sustain their market dominance. 
Mars has invested significantly in manufacturing upgrading (re. increasing production volume and 
modernising factories) and internationalisation of production over the last decade40. After upgrading 
27 existing manufacturing plants, Mars has also invested in new manufacturing plants in Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China and India41. On the other hand, Nestlé has focussed on strengthening its 
core competences through outsourcing. These different strategies, in combination with other 
competitive dynamics and geographic‐based risks, have resulted in a variety of organisational 
outcomes (Table 4.5).   
Despite different business development strategies, most branded manufacturers are maintaining the 
small scale of cocoa and industrial chocolate processing units. For example, Nestlé in 2012 restarted 
the production of industrial dark chocolate in York to support the UK and Ireland market42 (after 
selling the York’ cocoa processing unit to Cargill in 200443), while Mars recently increased the 
production capacity in its vertically integrated cocoa processing facilities in Indonesia. In 2016, Mars 
extended its investment in upstream cocoa research after acquired the Ecuadorian Hacienda La 
Chola cocoa plantation44 as a third plant science research station following the previous research 
centre in Bahia (Brazil) and Sulawesi (Indonesia). Meanwhile, escaping from the mass‐market and 
focusing on value added product, Nestlé entered the premium market after re‐introduced Swiss‐
Callier brands for the European market, diversification of Kit-kat dark chocolate for UK and Ireland 
market, also Alpino brand for emerging India market45.   
                                                          
40 Analysis of the newly build factories and major foreign direct investment over the past five years, published on 22 
August 2013 http://www.confectionerynews.com/Markets/Analysis‐Where‐is‐confectionery‐production‐moving  
41Analysis of recent new investments and factory upgrading of top five chocolate manufacturers in the past five years, 
published 22 August 2013,  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Markets/Analysis‐Where‐is‐confectionery‐production‐
moving  
42 Nestlé UK and Ireland revived dark chocolate production in York after ending third party outsourcing deal, published on 
19 October 2012 http://www.confectionerynews.com/Processing‐Packaging/Nestlé‐UK‐restarts‐dark‐chocolate‐
production‐at‐York‐site  
43 Concentrating to activities on branded value‐added products, Nestlé has reached an agreement by which the Group will 
sell its cocoa bean processing activities in York (UK) and in Hamburg (Germany) to Cargill Incorporated, published on 30 
June 2004. [Retrieved, December 2016]  
http://www.Nestlé.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/sellcocoaactivitiesyorknhamburg2cargill‐30jun04  
44 Mars chocolate acquired Hacienda La Chola, 485‐hectare cocoa plantation in Guayaquil, Ecuador, published on 14 April 
2016.  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Mars‐buys‐Ecuador‐cocoa‐farm‐Hacienda‐La‐Chola  
45 Nestlé India has launched a series of advertisements for its Alpino brand as part of its greater competitive foray into 
India’s premium chocolate market, published on 13 August 2014. [Retrieved, December 2016]   
http://www.Nestlé.com/media/news/alpino‐india‐to‐love‐is‐to‐share‐ads  
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Table 4.5 Firm‐specific strategies and organisational outcomes in the cocoa‐chocolate GPN 
Business 
development 
strategy 
Firm practices Characteristics Structure as organizational 
outcomes 
Mars  
International 
expansion 
1.  Interfirm 
control (generic 
and specialized 
supplier) 
Certain degree of control over the production 
process‐vertical coordinated supply chain; 
apply cost‐capability; attempt to build similar 
competence for collective benefits; have (or 
establish) facilities nearby lead firms. 
Outsourcing and dependent 
integration of suppliers, 
locking into contractual 
arrangement.   
2. Extra‐firm 
bargaining 
Support business long‐term development 
strategy‐market and proprietary capabilities; 
social and political legitimacy. 
Differentiated integration 
through horizontal 
partnerships into GPN. 
Nestlé 
Development of 
core 
competencies 
1. Interfirm 
partnership 
(strategic and 
specialized 
supplier)  
Dependence on the supplier compatible 
capability to respond on market change‐
product design; apply cost capability; seeking 
for mutual prospect to benefit each other’s; 
demands new facility nearby the lead firms 
Outsourcing, joint research‐
development to support 
lead firm’ strategic 
development platform. 
2. Extra‐firm 
bargaining  
Social and political legitimacy. Differentiated integration 
through horizontal 
partnerships into GPN. 
Adapted from Yeung and Coe (2015)   
Following its manufacturing investments in emerging markets, Mars has adopted long‐term (five‐
year) supply contracts that emphasize the importance of collective participation to boost cocoa 
production across the supply chain. For example, long term supply contracts (i.e. Barry Callebaut and 
Ecom) are contingent on signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that ensures alignment 
with the Mars commitment on sourcing fully sustainable products by 2020, adopting the Mars’ 
extension business model, and implementing third party certification46. Consequently, this collective 
commitment to a sustainable supply chain increases vertical coordination, responds to low‐cost 
capability ratio, and shares supply related risks with contracted suppliers. 
As a diversified food firm with significant global market scale, Nestlé has grown into a powerful firm 
by building dynamic relationships with partner suppliers. This is indicative of the complexities 
surrounding Nestlé’s confectionary production networks, as cocoa products are also used in a range 
of food and beverage products. Nestlé also selectively builds commercial relationships with 
specialised suppliers who are also subjected to a stringent sourcing policies. For example, in the 
Indonesia context, Nestlé has exercised control over defining product definitions for local specialised 
suppliers for low‐end products (e.g. BT Cocoa and Kalla Kakao). Overall, Nestlé applies different 
                                                          
46 Our cocoa policy‐working with cocoa farmers for a sustainable cocoa future, [retrieved on 19, February 2017] 
http://www.mars.com/global/about‐us/policies‐and‐practices/cocoa‐policy  
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outsourcing strategies depending on product type, while at the same time strengthening core 
competence by building strategic partnerships with fewer competent suppliers. 
4.6 Implementing sustainability (in the Indonesia context) 
Increasing upstream intervention in the form of firm sustainability initiatives was initially supported 
by governments from major consumer countries like the US and European countries, with a primary 
focus on improving farm productivity through value chain interventions. For example, the importer 
countries development agencies (i.e USAID, Swisscontact and GTZ) established partnerships and 
knowledge sharing platforms between industrial actors and farmer organisations in West African 
countries (via the Sustainable Tree Crops Program) and Southeast Asia (via Sustainable Cocoa 
Enterprise Solutions ‐Success Alliance program and Agribusiness Market and Support Activity‐
AMARTA program).  However, due to the limited scale of outreach across the millions of smallholder 
farmers, the scope of intervention seemed inadequate to satisfy lead firm interests. In addition to 
the intense pressure exerted among the peers and oligopolistic structure of supply partners, the 
emerging new global rulers (Büthe and Mattli, 2011, in Yeung and Coe, 2015) attempted to influence 
the production networks by integrating social and environmental issues into private label standards 
and conventions. These vertical and horizontal forces challenged the lead firms’ attempt to sustain 
their economic growth while minimising emerging environmental risks.   
In the Indonesian cocoa sector, the initial problem‐driven sustainability initiative had received long‐
standing support from the US government since the early 2000s. Under the Success Alliance and 
AMARTA program, the smallholder farmers not only obtained technical assistances on good farming 
practices, but were also directly linked to the export market through assisted product and process 
upgrading. Alongside the program, grinder‐traders strengthened their upstream domination and 
geographic expansion by establishing up‐country buying units across the cocoa producing region. 
This vertical integration and expansion strategy challenges the intricate informal socio‐economic 
relationship between the smallholder farmers and collectors (or local traders). The dispersed 
distribution of more than a thousand local traders, who had limited global market networks and 
economic scale, became an obstacle hindering the capability of lead firms to capture greater value in 
the network.     
The complexities – which are often context‐based ‐ of the upstream challenge extends beyond the 
singular commercial and public domains. The failure to meet these upstream challenges may result 
in a bullwhip effect of supply chain risks and may intensify into a race to the bottom. Therefore, over 
the last five years, industrial actors have been actively engaging in a sustainability discourses and 
participating in different forms of sustainability initiatives with supply chain and extra‐firm actors 
(see Table 4.5).  Reflecting the different arrangements of inter‐extra firm actors and goals within the 
Indonesia context, the firm initiatives are categorised as follows: (1) project‐based interventions; (2) 
market‐based interventions; and, (3) multi‐stakeholder partnerships. 
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Table 4.5 Evolution of cocoa value chain ‘sustainability’ interventions 
Form of 
Sustainability 
initiative  
Approach Goals Funding 
Primary 
implementer 
Local 
implementin
g partners 
Example of initiative in 
Indonesia 
1. Project based 
intervention  
‐ Capacity building 
based on technical 
assistance 
‐ Modernising 
farming system 
‐ Linking to global 
market 
‐ Improving 
productivity and 
quality  
‐ Capturing value 
added from the 
sustainable bean 
market  
‐ Improving market 
transparency and 
accessibility 
Often single 
(fewer) 
donor 
agency 
Contracted 
implement
er 
Depending on 
the specific 
goals 
* SUCCESS Alliance 
(2000‐05) 
*AMARTA 1‐2 (2003‐
13) 
* READ Program (2006‐
11) 
* Gernas Kakao (2009‐
present) 
* Improving value 
added and 
downstream industry‐
P2HP (2011‐14) 
2. Market ‐based 
intervention  
Introduce 
traceability system 
and third party 
certification 
scheme 
‐ Capturing value 
added from the 
sustainable bean 
market 
‐ Obtaining long 
market contract 
Single firm initiative Certification 
bodies 
* Armajaro (2010‐12) 
* Ecom (2010‐present) 
* Olam (2010‐present) 
3. Multi‐
stakeholder 
partnership  
(program 
platform) 
‐ Capacity building 
based on 
intervention  
‐ Adopting 
certification 
schemes 
‐ Strengthening 
local organisation 
‐ Sharing tangible 
and intangible 
resources 
‐ Scale up the 
sustainability 
initiatives 
‐ Establish Social 
and political 
legitimacy  
Matching 
fund 
between 
funding 
agencies 
and 
interested 
organisatio
ns 
Contracted 
implement
er also 
funding the 
initiative  
Diverse 
partners 
including 
supportive 
organisations 
* CPQP‐SCPP (2009‐
2015) 
* Green prosperity‐
SCPP (2015‐18) 
* Green Prosperity‐
EQSI (2015‐18) 
4. Multi‐
stakeholder 
partnership  
(communication 
platform) 
‐ Private based 
inclusive forum  
‐ Shared knowledge 
and resources  
‐ Outreach public 
spheres and 
community groups 
‐ Coordinated and 
measurable 
initiatives 
‐ Promoting 
member initiative 
Categorising into different level of 
membership and voluntary commitment 
to participate 
* Cocoa Sustainability 
Partnership (2006‐
present) 
* Partnership for 
Sustainable Agriculture 
(2011‐present) 
4.6.1 Project based interventions  
The early sustainability initiatives were funded by the US development agency (USDA/USAID) into 
two separate yet parallel ten‐year projects: Sustainable cocoa enterprise solutions for smallholder 
alliance (SUCCESS Alliance from 2000 to 2005) and Agribusiness market support activity (AMARTA‐
ASKA from 2006 to 2011). Both projects focused upon how to restore Indonesian farmer 
competitiveness through addressing basic agronomic practices and improving productivity. Although 
their primary funding came from the government agency, both projects were developed and 
implemented in partnership with industry groups including the American Cocoa Research Institute 
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(ACRI) and the World Cocoa Foundation (WCF), in addition to major manufacturers, e.g., Mars and 
Blommer.  
Following the implementation of the projects, increasing numbers of transnational cocoa‐chocolate 
manufacturer subsidiaries and general suppliers established an upcountry presence, changing the 
farm level market structure that was previously dominated by local traders and collectors. The 
presence of the global firms rendered integration of the smallholders into the global cocoa 
production networks inevitable as the firms slowly introduced standardised quality assessment that 
led to the improvement of market transparency at the farm level. Although this altered farm level 
market system may have offered opportunities for farmers to capture gain from increasing 
competition amongst buyers, the primary goal of the alliance of transnational firms and 
development agencies favoured the downstream actors. For example, the emphasis on improving 
the quantity and quality of cocoa produced by the smallholder farmers (ACDI/VOCA, 2005; USAID, 
2011) suggested that improving farm yield was a key factor behind the sustainability initiatives. In 
addition to assisting the upgrading of the farming process and product quality, the projects also 
aimed to strengthen their partnerships with cocoa stakeholders. The projects regarded partnerships 
as an instrument to achieve project sustainability by considering transnational firms and 
governments as key actors who may contribute to sustaining and scaling up the projects (USAID, 
2011).  
4.6.2 Market based interventions 
The market‐based sustainability interventions were primarily implemented by transnational firms’ 
usage of a traceability system as they attempted to increase the vertical coordination between 
downstream and the upstream actors (further discuss in the following chapter). Driven by leading 
manufacturer demand, the recommended voluntary certification schemes were adopted by 
international trading firms as the initial step towards vertically integrating the smallholder farmer 
into the global production networks. Although Mars’ grinding subsidiary in Indonesia was a 
pioneering adopter of the Rainforest Alliance certification scheme in 2010, before long this step was 
emulated by its supply trading partners, Olam and Ecom subsidiary (TMCI).  Meanwhile, Nestlé 
Indonesia was slowly achieving vertical coordination in the form of a traceability scheme 
implemented by its supply partners, e.g., Armajaro, Petrafood ingredient division (now Barry 
Callebaut) and BT Cocoa.  
4.6.3 Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
Downstream actors were concerned about the endurance of a project‐based approach, and the 
inadequacy of market interventions using voluntary traceable‐certification schemes to overcome 
supply risks.  Multi‐stakeholder partnerships became a voluntary platform from which to 
disseminate and leverage a broader outreach program. The Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (or 
Initiatief Duurzame Handel, IDH) aims to mainstream sustainability initiatives across the supply chain 
amongst more diverse stakeholders, while the ex‐officio Millennium Challenges Agency’s (MCA) 
focuses upon catalysing sustainable development programs across spatial scales. These partnerships 
attempt to amalgamate the North‐based public‐private forces and interests, allowing them to drive 
and accelerate the mainstreaming of sustainability across selected cash crop value chains.  
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Both platforms argue in favour of contributing to sustainable development goals (i.e., poverty 
alleviation, decent work conditions/opportunities and economic growth, responsible consumption 
and production, and partnerships for the goals). More explicit objective as stated in the partnership 
website and document is as follows: ‘[T]he main objective of the sustainable cocoa partnerships 
initiative is to support the development of a sustainable cocoa industry in Indonesia and improved 
smallholder incomes where both smallholders and processors benefit equitably’. Also, ‘IDH aimed 
for a transformation to sustainable commodity markets by bringing public funding and private 
financial commitments together in large‐scale projects for improving production methods and 
boosting certification of primary producers’ (IOB, 2014: 3).  This combination of market enforcement 
of sustainable‐traceable systems and multi‐stakeholder partnerships has structurally enrolled the 
smallholder farmers more intensely into the global cocoa production networks.      
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is an independent US‐based foreign aid agency who 
delivers US assistance in the form of bilateral corporation with the eligible country. The country 
based agency or Millennium Challenge Agency (MCA) in Indonesia has adopted a program aimed at 
achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. Funding requirements include a 
partnership, or a consortium, consisting of registered entities of international and national 
organisations and (or) corporations financially committed to implementing sustainability initiatives. 
Governments and political parties are excluded. Unlike the IDH governance structure, where the 
headquarters define the strategic policies without the consent of the targeted countries, the scope 
of the MCC‐Compact was signed by the Indonesian government and the MCA office is managed by a 
board of trustees (Majelis wali Amanat). The latter were democratically elected and represents the 
affiliated government ministries, business associations, academics and civil society groups. As part of 
the central government’s compliance with the Compact, local government participation was 
identified in the form of abolishing local taxes. For example, abolishing local tax regulations 
subjected to MCA associated programs include West Sulawesi Governor Regulation No.30/2012 that 
structurally extended to Regent Regulation No. 2/2013 (Mamasa district) and No. 17/2012 (Mamuju 
district).   
Summary 
The dynamic development of cocoa‐chocolate industries shows a distinct reconfiguration of global 
production networks towards more oligopolistic and concentrated downstream production. 
Following the emerging lead firm sustainability initiatives and functional upgrading of cocoa origin 
countries has led to structural industrial changes. The functional upgrading has eliminated the 
trading function (in Indonesia) and the sustainability initiatives have demanded an extended role of 
supply partners as intermediaries to delivering extension services to smallholder cocoa farmers. 
Subsequently, the previous transnational trading firms have transformed their function into 
vertically integrated cocoa processing firms with a key role in implementing sustainability 
interventions. Meanwhile, the growth in emerging markets is leading to increasing foreign direct 
investment by cocoa‐chocolate transnational firms in Asian countries, as the firms are trying to 
sustain their market dominance from this regional development.  Following this investment and 
attempt to manage risk environments, lead firms are also seeking negotiating spaces and platforms 
to influence the public policy in the form of various extra‐firm bargaining strategies. 
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5. Sustainability initiatives and governance 
Incorporation of the sustainability concept into the cocoa production network has given rise to the 
question of governance, specifically regarding the integration of the concept into industrial actor 
sourcing policies. The cocoa production network is dominated by North‐based transnational firms, 
and there is a power asymmetry between these firms and upstream smallholders. Unlike some other 
cash crops, chocolate‐cocoa industries involve a wide range of product portfolios, and this has led to 
multiple sourcing strategies and a complicated governance structure. This chapter presents the 
major empirical findings of my thesis, by unpacking the way sustainability discourses have been 
adopted and applied in my two corporate case studies: Mars and Nestlé. I explore the ways in which 
industrial actors are imposing sustainability across the cocoa production network, from the supply 
chain actors to the extra‐firm actors.  Foremost, I commence with an introduction to the emergence 
of sustainable cocoa programs at the industry scale. 
5.1 The market-driven sustainable cocoa 
The major chocolate firms’ public commitment to sourcing sustainable cocoa and creating a 
sustainable supply chain by 2020 was followed by the emergence of a sustainable cocoa market 
since around 2010. This commitment has attracted the financial support from cocoa consuming 
countries, e.g., the Netherlands and Germany, both of which have actively encouraged sourcing of 
third party certified sustainable cocoa. Without necessarily adhering to sustainability practices via 
industrial trading regulations and policies, the governments in the North‐based consumer countries 
demonstrated their subtle support via public private partnership (PPP) platforms (i.e., IDH and WCF) 
and commitment towards multi‐stakeholder forums and research programs.  
For the Dutch government, the historical importance of the Netherlands as the home of the largest 
chocolate‐cocoa industry in Europe was a factor. Recently, the Netherlands’ government has 
intervened in the cocoa production network by establishing national multi‐stakeholder sustainable 
commodity platforms (through IDH) for promoting and supporting sustainable production. Particular 
focus has been placed upon impact measurement, supporting gene bank research in Tobago and 
Trinidad, and on establishing knowledge exchange portals (i.e., cocoaconnect.org). Conversely, a 
sustainable market support from the USA government was a significant factor in Indonesia from 
around 2000 until 2010, although this has become somewhat subdued in recent years. While there 
has been some support from Northern governments, this has not been sufficient to drive large‐scale 
change towards sustainable cocoa sourcing. 
Having received only partial support from the North‐based countries for a sustainable cocoa market, 
the leading cocoa‐chocolate firms are now enforcing their own sustainability sourcing policy47 along 
their supply chains. The sustainable cocoa market has been enhanced by the voluntary commitment 
of the transnational branded chocolate manufacturers. For example, in 2010 Mars publicly 
announced their commitment to 100% sourcing of certified cocoa beans by 2020. This was followed 
a few years later by Hershey, Ferrero and Lindt&Sprüngli, with similar commitments. However, 
                                                          
47These policies have mostly adopted ILO conventions on forced labor and human rights, along with environmental laws 
such as prohibiting sourcing from recently deforested farms, biodiversity protection and conservation policies. 
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Nestlé’ stance was more aimed at specific market demand for sustainable cocoa market (e.g. UK, 
Ireland48, and Australia), while Mondelēz aimed to source 81% of certified cocoa by 2020 (see Figure 
5.1). The commitment of the leading chocolate manufacturers was followed by their suppliers (see 
Figure 5.2), who were however not necessarily as fully committed as the manufacturers. Driven by 
the market demand of the major chocolate manufacturers, there has been a significant increase in 
global certified cocoa bean production (see Figure 5.3) among the major voluntary certification 
schemes (i.e., Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZcertifed). Over the period 2009‐2014, the 
production of certified bean has increased five‐fold. And, there has been a significant shift towards 
UTZcertified (hereafter referred to as UTZ) and Rainforest Alliance (hereafter referred to as RA) 
schemes49 instead of Fairtrade.  Despite the ongoing merger process of the two leading certification 
bodies in cocoa sector, the new certification scheme maintains the Rainforest Alliance logo to retain 
consumer trust and the established market engagement.  
Figure 5.1.  Chocolate and confectionary firms’ commitment to sourcing sustainable certified cocoa‐
chocolate products by 2020 
 
Strong commitment on sourcing sustainable certified cocoa was especially evident from those 
manufacturers whose revenue was highly dependent on the chocolate and confectionery brands 
portfolio, except for Mars. As a pioneer on such sustainability commitments, Mars also has extensive 
                                                          
48 Nestlé committed to source sustainable cocoa on particular market, published on 1 August 2014 
http://www.confectionerynews.com/Manufacturers/Nestle‐100‐sustainable‐cocoa‐for‐UK‐and‐Ireland‐by‐2015; published 
26 March 2016  http://www.confectionerynews.com/Markets/Australia‐s‐top‐chocolate‐makers‐commit‐to‐sustainable‐
cocoa  
49 RA and UTZ‐certified are ongoing merger after announced the plan on 6 June 2017, the new organisation will create a 
single agricultural standard and simplify the certification process to build more responsible supply chains. Published on 6 
June, 2017 http://www.rainforest‐alliance.org/article/rainforest‐alliance‐utz‐merger;   
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investment in cocoa plantation research and had been actively engaging in cocoa sustainability 
programs from before 201050. Mars long‐term sustainability commitment aimed for long‐term 
strategic development to sustain the industry, from a breeding‐genome sequencing program with 
IBM, Sustainable Tree Crops Program (STCP) in West African countries and SUCCESS Alliance in 
Indonesia. While Nestlé’s engagement with third party certification was linking to positive brand 
association, considering that chocolate and confectionary contributed less than 10% to its total 
revenue (Nestlé, 2016).  Accordingly, Mars has demonstrated a long‐term interest to preserving the 
cocoa‐chocolate industry (not only brand management) as they are actively engaging with the 
upstream cocoa development, while Nestlé’s engagement was more oriented towards short‐term 
gains linked to consumer attitudes towards their brands.  
Figure 5.2 Major processed cocoa‐chocolate producers’ commitment to sourcing sustainable 
certified cocoa bean by 2021  
 
Unlike the branded manufacturers, where the brand reputation is paramount to win the market, the 
contracted suppliers’ engagement with sustainability was driven by market demand rather than 
strategically supporting upstream cocoa development. As they are not exposed to end market 
reputation, yet their reputation was defined by the dominant customers (re. the branded 
manufactures) who recently integrated social responsibility51 and environmental commitments52 
into a responsible sourcing policy. Compliance with this policy required the establishment of a 
traceability system, from smallholder farmers through to the contracted cocoa processors. With the 
                                                          
50 Mars presentation by Jeff Morgan during Roundtable for sustainable cocoa economy, 24‐27 March 2009, [Retrieved 
January 2017] http://www.icco.org/sites/www.roundtablecocoa.org/documents/Mars%20‐%20Jeff%20Morgan.pdf  
51 Integrating ILO convention C182 about the worst form of child labour practices.  
52 Commitment to not sourcing the materials from IUCN protected areas, UNESCO world heritage sites and Ramsar 
wetland lists.  
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dominant customers committed to sourcing sustainable cocoa, the supply partners have had to 
accordingly adopt this certification schemes and engage with sustainability initiatives in order to 
secure market contracts and continue participation in the networks. 
The cocoa‐grinding segment of the production network is not committed to fully adopting 
certification schemes, as they are not subjected to the intense pressure of maintaining brand 
reputation. Subsequently, they have simply tried to adjust and enhance their competence in 
sustainable sourcing to serve the interests of their primary customers. Both the cocoa processors 
and chocolate couverture makers are globally more concentrated than the chocolate manufacturers. 
Their capability to perform more than one function reinforces and enhances their position within the 
supply chain. Many of the smaller European‐based cocoa processors (e.g., Ecom, Touton, and 
Continaf) seem more committed to sourcing certified bean than the largest processors ‐ Barry 
Callebaut and Cargill (see Figure 5.2).  As the demand of sustainably certified cocoa bean driven by 
the market leader of branded chocolate firms has responded by the contract suppliers, hence 
increase the production of certified cocoa bean within the last six years (see Figure 5.3).   
Figure 5.3 Global certified cocoa production of three major voluntary schemes   
 
Despite an intermediate position within the production networks, diversified business activities, and 
enhanced competitiveness, the cocoa processing segment poses less market risk from the end 
market and the certification scheme engagement simply rests upon market demand.  As a result of 
the growing certified cocoa market, branded manufacturers have sought to share responsibility with 
their main suppliers, resulting in a slow shift from short term future and physical market towards a 
‘long term contract’ agreements (Respondent CC6, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent CC8, pers. comm, 
2015). Following the historical records of cocoa price volatility, the emergence of long term 
contracts has meant that demand for certified cocoa has become a key negotiating instrument that 
could reduce the hedging cost and opportunistic behaviour of the free market system, and may 
intensify the relationship into competent specialised or strategic partners.   
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The industrial actors have (long) concerned over the fluctuated global price and dominancy of 
intermediate actors (re. international‐local traders and institutions) on managing the supply. 
However, the new challenge is how to maintain control over the current restructure of global cocoa 
production network development whereas growing concentration and integrating functional 
capacities of chocolate‐cocoa manufacturers are not only fuel the competition, but also increasing 
control power over the upstream cocoa production.  With, the previous physical and future market 
contract were based on the limited knowledge on the actual supply capacity of upstream 
production, and the lack of accuracy of national production was released by the producing country 
government, thus created opportunistic behaviours from the trading actors.  To overcome this issue, 
the traceability system facilitates supply capacity of farmer groups records, accessible farm gate 
price, create more transparency market by (properly) quality assessment, shorten the supply chain 
thus remove the trading cost and opportunistic margin, and manageable volume of transaction 
(only) based on the contract terms and not beyond the estimated supply capacity.   
The main differences between these certification schemes are the guaranteed minimum price and 
fixed premium within the Fairtrade standard. But, the premiums of the UTZ and RA schemes are 
voluntarily determined (or negotiated) by the market. In addition to the uncertainty (often tense 
negotiating) surrounding the premium price, the adoption of certification schemes was accompanied 
by significant costs (i.e., the setting up of an internal control system, farmer training, investment in 
safe agrochemical facilities, annual auditing, and adopting chain of custody reporting) that were 
initially covered by the contracted cocoa processors and chocolate couverture suppliers.  
Firm participation in certification schemes is frequently supported by partnership programs, such as 
the multi‐stakeholder platforms of IDH‐CPQP and MCA‐GPP. A KPMG study of the cost and 
advantage of certification (KPMG, 2012), revealed that small‐scale farmers (with less than one‐
hectare farm size) were generally unable to meet the high cost of certification in the first year. Also, 
the forming of groups and maintaining the internal control systems (ICS) for collectively obtaining 
certification proved the main barriers impeding the farmers’ participation in the schemes. While the 
inclusive farmer cooperative and (or) organisation often project based and struggles to sustain. In 
the other cocoa producing countries like Ivory Coast and Ghana, the momentum of emerging 
demand of sustainable cocoa was not only following by interest of adopting certification schemes, 
but also emerging farmers based organisations (e.g. cooperative, union, and association). For 
example, for RA certification case, more than 140 farmers based organisations were registered and 
qualified for RA certification, while only 9 groups in Indonesia were qualified and four of them 
registered by the transnational firms53.  Although Indonesian farmer organisation remains far behind 
from institutionally embedding to cocoa global production network, yet the rise of certification 
networks offers an opportunity for slowly reconfiguring institutional development at the local level.  
Focus in Indonesia context, as the transnational firms were closely engaging with the smallholder 
farmers with multiple form of horizontal coordination (e.g. transfer knowledge, research, 
infrastructure, farmer group development, and building partnership with national stakeholders) and 
                                                          
53SAN public certificate search database to conduct inquiries about valid farm, group and chain of custody operation 
certificates, [Retrieved on 10 September, 2017]  http://san.ag/web/public‐certificate‐search/  
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vertical coordination (e.g. price mechanism, quality definition, and establish traceability system). The 
complexities and interrelated provision of essential services from technical assistance of sustainable 
farming, marketing and management services, household loans, credit services for agro‐inputs, 
administrative records to social investment are quite challenging and overwhelming to obtain at the 
farmer level. Such complexities combined with competitive pressures to serve the sustainable 
market while building local institution seems a long‐road to go. Subsequently, the contracted cocoa 
processors and chocolate couverture suppliers and (or) the arm lengths traders have directly 
engaged with the smallholder farmers, delivering such services and covering the certification costs of 
becoming certificate holders on behalf of the farmers. As regards the position as certificate holders, 
it is clear that the enhanced bargaining power allowed these firms to capture voluntary premiums 
for certified cocoa. However, the distribution of the premium among the farmers was highly 
dependent upon the efficiency and willingness of the certificate holders to share the premium.  
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government attempted to establish a rival certification scheme (as 
further discuss in the next chapter), rather than supporting the schemes by filling the gaps in the 
standards.  For example, strengthen development of farmer based organisations, collaboratively 
produce accurate information on cocoa farm potential, and improving the local actor capacity to 
better integrating into the global production networks.    
Despite the above challenges to mainstreaming the certification schemes and the differences in the 
schemes, the nature of the third‐party schemes allows for a credible assurance supported by 
auditing by an independent third party. Furthermore, the selection of which schemes to adopt is 
dictated by the leading chocolate manufacturers. As repeatedly stated by the contracted suppliers: 
‘[I]t depends on the market, if there is a market, we will provide it’ or ‘[W]e just follow the market 
demand, so we can get the long‐term market contract’, (RespondentCC6, pers. comm, 2014; 
Respondent CC5, pers. comm, 2015). Given that the lead customers are playing the lead role in 
dictating which scheme to pursue that will fit their particular markets, it seems fair to acknowledge 
them as the main drivers of the schemes.  Among the six‐major chocolate manufacturer, Figure 5.1 
suggests stronger commitments from those firms whose chocolate brands represent their main 
source of revenue (e.g., Mars, Ferrero, Hershey and Lindt&Sprüngli). Commitment to adopting third 
party certification schemes are not only signal a social acknowledgement of the legitimacy of 
verification by independent parties, but also reflect an attempt to minimise the risk of a backlash 
against key brands.  
5.2 Governing sustainability in Indonesia: Mars case study 
Mars Incorporation, a US based corporation, established a subsidiary that became known as PT 
Effem in Sulawesi in 1996. The firm was later renamed Mars Symbioscience Indonesia (MSI) after the 
launch of s global health and life sciences division in 2005.  Under this division, MSI acts as an 
incubator for business ideas that combine evidence‐based product development and innovative 
scientific research. For example, Mars published the first scientific paper on cocoa flavanol54 
measurement in 1999 (Lazarus, et al., 1999). These could be extracted from cocoa beans and used as 
                                                          
54 A chemical compound extracted naturally from the fresh cocoa bean, which appears to have health benefits such as 
preventing cardiovascular disease and supporting healthy blood flow, [Retrieved on February 2017]  
http://www.marssymbioscience.com/about‐us 
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a health supplement. In Indonesia, MSI was sourcing directly unprocessed wet beans from 
smallholder farmers and directly implementing an onsite fermentation process.  Generating value 
added from the flavonoids required grounded research55 from seeking the high content of 
flavonoids varieties to learning how to optimise the flavonoids extraction from the cocoa bean.   
Given the limited market development for chocolate and confectionary products in Indonesia, 
initially the processed cocoa products produced by PT Effem (Masterfoods) were exported to the US. 
Within the last decade, however, Mars has become a market leader for the emerging Chinese 
market with two chocolate factories in Huairou (Beijing) and Jiaxing (Zhejiang province)56 supplying 
the domestic market and generating export revenue from nearby countries including Indonesia57 
(Respondent CC1, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent SS1, 2014).  As a result, MSI recently expanded 
their processing facilities in Sulawesi to supply this growing market. At the same time, Mars 
expanded their cocoa field research stations, a Mars Cocoa Development Centre (CDC) in North 
Luwu and the on‐going establishment in Pare‐Pare and Pankep district. Mars investment in this 
region was significant, as the only transnational firm who has invested in upstream cocoa 
development to the extent of introducing a private business extension service (re. CVC). This 
investment has become a crucial element in sustaining Mars’ chocolate production networks, 
particularly since cocoa production in Indonesia is dominated by smallholder producers. 
MSI’s engagement with the upstream extension services has spanned more than fifteen years in 
Indonesian. Initially a partner in the USDA‐funded SUCCESS project (2000), this was followed by the 
opening of up‐country buying stations with enhanced market transparency for quality assessment 
and public announcement of daily price information. By January 2003, collaboration with the 
Netherlands government and PT Effem resulted in the launching of the PRIMA Project with the aim 
of developing an integrated management system to control pest infestation (re. Cocoa Pod Borer) 
and to improve PT Effem’s access to higher quality beans (Neilson et al., 2005). From both projects, 
MSI engages with a range of collaborations and partnerships committed to sustainability. These 
involve local and global cocoa stakeholders committed to advancing the upstream development of 
the cocoa sector.  
 
                                                          
55 The genomics, genetics and breeding resources for cocoa improvement was a collaboration between Mars, USDA‐ARS, 
IBM, NCGR, Clemson University, Hudson Alpha Institute of biotechnology, Indiana University and Washington State 
University. The collaboration established a cocoa gene database that identified and mapped the physical properties of 
cocoa that are responsible for pest disease resistance, high yield, heat resistance, flavour, colour, and flavanol.  [Retrieved, 
October 2016]  http://www.cacaogenomedb.org/ 
56 Mars’ factories in China, [Retrieved, February 2017]   http://www.mars.com/global/about‐
us/locations#?continent=Asia&country=China  
57 Sourcing cocoa to the booming Chinese market is more challenging than it seems, published on 24 January 2013,   
http://www.confectionerynews.com/Commodities/Scaling‐up‐cocoa‐origins‐closer‐to‐China‐easier‐said‐than‐done‐says‐
Mars  
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5.2.1 Mars Sustainable Cocoa Initiative (MCSI) 
As Porter and Kramer (2006) introduced the notion of ‘strategic CSR’, moving beyond the generic 
and value chain social impact towards shared social value, this appeared to coalesce with corporate 
concepts of sustainability. Strategic CSR was part of the corporation’s long‐term strategy to preserve 
the pool of economic and social value. Yet, shared social value was not necessarily Mars’s primary 
reason for engaging with sustainability. During an interview with ISEAL, Jeff Morgan, Director of 
global programs for Mars chocolate, explicitly outlined why the firm was engaging with 
sustainability:  
…‘Sustainability’ was not a term that we typically used in the late 1980s/early 1990s but we 
talked about the long term outlook for cocoa production. So, we spent a good three years 
looking at how cocoa was grown in Asia, Latin America and Africa as well as looking closely 
at what happened in Brazil and why cocoa, which was primarily grown in Latin America in 
the late 1800s, early 1900s had mostly shifted to Africa? That was an in-depth evaluation that 
led us to the conclusion that long-term production of cocoa was really at risk – a risk for our 
business but also a risk for the whole industry (ISEALalliance, 2010). 
From Morgan’s perspective, the long‐term outlook for cocoa production has been the primary interest 
driving Mars’ participation in upstream cocoa development, specifically to prevent unprecedented 
supply risks that could affect the long‐term future of the industry. This risk‐driven upstream 
intervention was framed in terms of sustainable programs or initiatives designed to address the 
challenges faced by the majority of cocoa producing countries. But, this sectoral development 
program has been unable to create significant impact and to keep up with the growing market.  The 
recent emergence of certification schemes attempts to address the combined core aspects of 
sustainability, economic, environmental and social issues. Mars considered the schemes as an 
alternative tool, one that required strengthening. For example, they believed that low yields 
constitute the main problem impeding the generation of higher incomes and therefore interest in 
cocoa farming. It was suggested that adoption of certification schemes would strengthen and pursue 
this goal further. In the words of Jeff Morgan: 
We view certification as the tool - and we are getting started on it. We have agreements that 
we will look at how to strengthen the standards, the code of conduct, so that they really help 
the farmers to achieve greater productivity whilst being environmentally responsible-as well 
as being socially responsible in labour practices. 
…As we continue to invest in the farmer training that may or may not lead to certification, we 
want those farmers to achieve what we internally call ‘productivity plus’, which is higher 
yield based on using better germ plasm and having the availability of fertilisers so that soil 
can be replenished…one objective is to get farmers into a ‘productivity plus’ type of 
environment, while the other is then to take farmers towards what we call the ‘certification 
plus’…when we talk about ‘certification plus’ we want to move the yields of these farmers 
from where they are now, which is often 300 kilos per hectare or less, into a minimum of 
perhaps 1.2 tons per hectare, (ISEALalliance, 2010). 
Mars has emphasized the importance of improving farm yield, and suggests the limitation of 
certification schemes to ensure this outcome. The company further suggested that compliance with 
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fair labour practices and preventing deforestation may not linearly lead to gaining yield.  
Furthermore, Mars suggested strengthening the certification scheme by inserting the concept of 
‘productivity plus and certification plus’, clearly referring to improving the cocoa farming yield. In 
pursuit of this intention, Mars invested in upstream value adding activities in the plant genome and 
farm level research centres in Brazil and Indonesia, while also acquiring the Hacienda La Chola cocoa 
farm in Guayaquil, Ecuador. This investment not only promotes Mars understanding of productivity 
and higher yield farming practices through adaptive field research and trials, it also ensures benefits 
for short‐term brand image through the adoption of certification schemes.  
As a North‐based lead firm, Mars recognised participation in the upstream development of the 
Southern cocoa‐producing countries may have political limitations in terms of policy consistency and 
a supportive institutional environment. Accordingly, achieving productivity and certification within 
smallholder farming communities would not prove as simple as exercising market control over 
selected global, competent and efficient suppliers by exerting more rigorous sourcing policies. In the 
next section, I focus upon the notion of sustainability in the forms of shared social interest and 
environmental concern, expressed by (and supported by) extra‐firm actors. Also, further discussion 
centres on how MCSI became a strategic tool to reach out to extra‐firm actors; that is, to mutually 
partner to minimise upstream economic risk and enhance their capitalist competitive dynamics.  
Figure 5.4 MSI project collaboration and partnership with extra‐firms since 2000 
 
Exploration of Indonesia’s upstream cocoa development reveals that MSI has played a significant 
role to involve the supply chain partners and local and global extra‐firm actors since early 2000.  
Figure 5.4 shows MSI’s participation in a range of project collaborations with diverse actors, while 
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developing its own initiative towards meeting global commitments and introducing a small business 
model of compost and private extension services.  The scope of these sustainability engagements 
ranged from market interventions (e.g., introducing a transparent, quality‐based farm market in 
2000) to opening a certified bean market in 2010. In this way, Mars combined research and farming 
management extension services, including the PRIMA project in 2003, establishing the Mars Cocoa 
Development Centre (MCDC) in 2008, and joining IFAD‐READ program in 2011 and CPQP‐SCPP 
program in 2012.   
Among these sustainability engagements, developing a small business model approach to upstream 
sustainable cocoa development was innovative (Neilson and McKenzie, 2016) considering that most 
of the extension services in Indonesia’s agrofood sectors were often taken for granted (1) as the 
government’s responsibility; or, (2) as development projects of the developed North‐based countries 
aiming to support rural development and poverty alleviation. Neilson and McKenzie (2016: 26) 
describe the CDC‐CVC model in this way:  
The business-oriented farmer outreach programme is essentially an institutional innovation, 
through which knowledge and skills are being shared within farm communities. An important 
aspect of sustainability in this model involves the financial viability of the CVC business 
units, and training is being provided in business administration (including basic accounting), 
planning, monitoring, documentation and marketing. 
Before introducing an integrated business‐extension service, MSI introduced their Cocoa 
Development Centre‐Cocoa and Village Centre (CDC‐CVC) model. Under the early development of 
this extension‐business model, MSI included individual and group‐based approaches to compare the 
effectiveness of both approaches on compost and cocoa nursery businesses. For example, the 
group‐based composting business was highly dependent upon good leadership and 
entrepreneurship, not only for managing the business, but also to overcome the geographical 
challenges of compost availability and accessibility for distant cocoa farms. As ‘an assisted farmer 
stated that ‘group composting business is not only laborious work, but also less efficient as our farms 
mostly in the highlands and often inaccessible by v (Respondent GL7, pers. comm, 2015; 
Respondent, LT8, 2014).  While an accessible nursery business promised to gain significant short‐
term economic rent for the local market, once the business was imitated by other producers the 
local market could become over competitive leading to market failure, because of higher supply than 
demand.  
Learning from these failures whereby local actors had tangible and intangible limitations on 
sustaining small businesses, MSI developed an integrated business‐extension service model. This 
involved enrolling a few competent, specialised supply partners who were already competitive (due 
to economic scale, scope of functions, and capital imperatives) to replicate CDC‐CVC’s business 
model across their generic suppliers. This business model was used as a strategic tool for upscaling 
the business model of extension services, and used the market contract to enforce adoption of the 
model by supply partners. Based on their experience of the high cost of self‐adoption of certification 
schemes, instead MSI externalised the certification scheme by using market incentives and 
assurances of long‐term market contracts. Currently in the Sulawesi region, at least five CDCs have 
been established: Mars self‐funded CDCs in East Luwu, Parigi Moutong and North Kolaka; and, by 
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two of Mars’ prominent suppliers in Ecom (through their subsidiary TMCI in Polewali Mandar) and 
Olam Indonesia (in Kolaka). Despite Mars’ plan to scale up the two CDCs in Luwu and North Luwu, a 
partnership including a Belgian NGO (VECO) and a local NGO koperasi Amanah agreed to establish a 
CDC‐CVC in Polewali Mandar, West Sulawesi, and Olam has agreed to establish another CDC‐CVC in 
North Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi.  
The slogan ‘triple the yield of cocoa farms’, is used to promote the standardised CDC‐CVC business 
extension model, and this reflects Mars’ commitment to long term development of the cocoa sector 
based on higher rates of production, rather than simply acknowledging conformity to sustainability, 
as offered by the certification schemes. According to a Mars supplier who supplies RA certified cocoa 
bean, the distinctive feature of the CDC‐CVC concept is shifting from the traditional low inputs of the 
farming system towards an intensified farming system (Respondent SS13, 2014; Respondent CC5, 
pers. comm, 2015). This business model appears to contradict the RA concept of sustainable cocoa 
farming that promotes agroforestry, highly restricted agrochemical usage, and biodiversity 
conservation. 
5.2.2 Governing a sustainable market  
Using market‐based incentives to encourage the adoption of a sustainability concept into the cocoa 
GPNs supports the argument for the limitation of linear industrial governance and the vertical 
metaphor of the GCC‐GVC approach. This is despite the fact that both concepts highlight the leading 
roles of specific economic actors in exerting their power and authority over the networks, or chains. 
Focussing on Mars’ production networks and their roles in Indonesia’s upstream cocoa 
development, MSI cocoa grinding supplies two end market segments: conventional chocolate 
brands; and the functional brand (CocoaVia) that requires a far more integrated production network. 
The emergence and importance of the Chinese mainstream market tends to encourage the 
externalisation of non‐core value activities (upcountry trading) to specialised and independent 
suppliers. With respect to the different market segments, MSI ensures intra‐firm coordination for 
high‐end products58 through direct purchasing of wet bean from small producers and local collectors 
(see Figure 5.5). At the same time, the firm is building inter‐firm partnerships with specialised and 
independent suppliers by sourcing dried bean for the mainstream market.  
Coe and Yeung (2015: 129) define intra‐firm coordination as: 
‘the internalisation and consolidation of value activity within the lead firm, the strategic 
partner, and/or the supplier firm in order to achieve greater firm-specific system efficiencies 
such as lower inventories and better cost control, greater market responsiveness and higher 
quality products or services’.  
                                                          
58 Mars high end supplement product from cocoa flavanol extraction. The combined commitment on high quality scientific 
research and Indonesian people, Mars creates CocoaVia® supplement and patent the Cocoapro® process. Mars 
commitment to the cocoa farmers of Indonesia allow us to get the freshest, highest‐quality cocoa beans available while 
helping to stabilize and strengthen the cocoa industry in that country, [Retrieved, March 2017] 
https://www.cocoavia.com/how‐we‐make‐it/investing‐in‐indonesia  
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When configuring these high‐ end production networks, the core value of the Mars activity rests 
upon the upstream research, and the development of how to produce and extract higher flavonoids 
from the cocoa bean. Motivated by these requirements, Mars is fully investing in an integrated 
network, and strictly monitoring both the quality and standards of the production outcomes.  With 
high investment in proprietary credentials that will define the value of the high‐end product, 
externalising this value activity invites high risk of leaking the economic rent. As a result, this 
intrafirm coordination has also been applied by Mars to other cocoa producing regions including 
Bahia, Brazil and recently the Hacienda La Chola cocoa farm. While these direct investments in 
production are relatively insignificant in terms of Mars’ total cocoa needs, the foray into plantations 
suggests the firms’ increasing concerns, and perceived risks of supply. 
Figure 5.5 Mars’ production network governance of certified cocoa in Indonesia  
 
In an attempt to configure these production networks, from the early establishment in the Sulawesi 
region, MSI has designed and developed a selective wet market system that competes with the local 
mainstream market for unfermented dry bulk bean.  Through collaboration with other actors and 
local governments that are also implementing value chain interventions in different forms of 
upstream services, MSI has gained local market access by building vertical coordination with farm‐ 
based actors. This has involved consolidating and disseminating the upgrading of farm management, 
with close additional support and technical assistance, lower market barriers and accessibility to 
updated information on farming innovation. In tandem with their investment in upstream research 
and development, MSI have extended their horizontal coordination with extra‐firm actors in the 
form of joint research collaborations with government‐affiliated research institutes (e.g., ICCRI and 
BRIEC), international research groups (e.g., ACIAR and IFAD), and local universities. Not only is MSI 
seeking desirable varieties and (or) applicable small‐scale farming management, but is also 
undertaking in‐house research into the fermentation and flavonoids extraction process.   
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Coe and Yeung (2015: 142) define inter‐firm partnerships as:  
‘collaboration, co-evolution and joint development of a lead firm and its strategic partners or 
key suppliers in the same GPN in order to compete against their network partners’.  
This strategy creates mutual relationships based on complementariness and capabilities (production 
assets, compatible technology, and local market expertise) and open transparent standards 
(sourcing policies) that enhance trust sufficiently to pursue the substantial resource commitment 
between the lead firms and their supply partners. Within this production network, MSI exercises 
control over inter‐firm partnerships with multiple suppliers and creates a competitive market 
environment, allowing the local market (see Figure 5.5) to supply mainstream cocoa ‐related 
products. The volume based trade of sun‐dried cocoa beans has involved specialised transnational 
firms (e.g., Olam and Ecom subsidiaries) and independent suppliers (cooperatives and local traders). 
MSI has further externalised certification costs to these partner suppliers in exchange for certified 
market assurance and negotiated premiums.   
As well as being alternative instruments allowing the transnationals to independently verify their 
participation in addressing ethical and environmental issues, the certification schemes also assist 
with information about market imperfections in the producing countries that were previously 
controlled by transnational trading firms and opportunist national exporters. In addition, the scheme 
provides ex‐ante passage allowing a guarantee of supply while minimising incidents of supply 
production fraud, as the estimation of farm productivity was a key source of information about 
supply capacity. In their attempts to stabilise the market by understanding how the ex‐ante supply 
capacity was followed by the desired quality, most of the transnational firms entered into market 
contract agreements.  This was followed by the establishment of collecting hubs that receive 
technical assistance and support from supply partners. Collecting hubs, which serve as an internal 
control system, connect unorganised farmers with different services that will ensure good farm 
management and encourage a shift to more sustainably sound (and potentially higher‐yielding) 
farming practices.  
Currently, farmers participating in certification schemes are privileged to receive free technical 
assistance without any market restrictions, yet the market incentive transferred to the groups 
remained unclear. As one group leader criticised the scheme, ‘we are not the certificate holder, so 
we don’t know how much the incentives while we are overwhelming with administrative works and 
bear the coordination cost’ (Respondent GL4, pers. comm, 2014).  While the certificate holder who 
also suppliers claimed that the incentive can be in different forms, since they also cover the other 
cost linking to sustainability initiatives (Respondent LT5, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent CC3,, 2015).  
The volume based incentive for the (voluntary) certification market emphasizes supply capability, as 
the higher incentive comes with a high volume of market contracts. Thus, the supply capacity 
defines the suppliers’ competitiveness. But, this capability does not necessarily extend to individual 
smallholder farmers because the schemes are unable to guarantee enhanced farm productivity for 
the individual farmer. Therefore, to complement the adoption of certification scheme, the 
competent suppliers are also required to adopt and establish a CDC‐CVC extension service system 
with primarily focused on assisting individual farmers to improve their farm productivity.  
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However, the adoption of certification schemes for market access and value added was 
accompanied by certification costs which included the annual compliance verification, promotion 
and training services, the operational cost of the ICS (or certificate group holders), and the 
certification fee. Although there was no limitation of farm size or farmer participation in the scheme, 
the general initial certification cost was estimated to be between approximately US$40,000 – 
US$80,000 per certificate holder (Respondent CC5, pers. comm, 2015; Respondent SS13, 2014; 
Respondent SS17, 2016). Delivering training services was the biggest cost for maintaining the 
certificate holder status, for the assisted cooperatives and farmer groups, the cost was supported by 
the external actors’ including donor agencies, government and non‐government organisations. To 
minimise the training cost, the transnational firm who also certificate holder was more selective to 
enrol the smallholder farmers, as often targeting more experienced and previously assisted farmers.  
These costs tended to reduce for the second, third, and fourth years following the less intensive 
training program, shifting to strengthening coordination with the ICSs and annual auditing, to as low 
as US$ 10,000 per certificate holder. 
Table 5.1 Distribution of RA certified suppliers and production in Indonesia  
Year Suppliers 
Number of certificate 
holder groups 
Market operation 
(tonnes) 
2011 
PT Olam 10 17,189 
PT TMCI‐Ecom 4 5,659 
PT MSI 3 4,109 
Cooperatives 2 1,303 
Total  19 28,260 
2013 
PT Olam 8 25,560 
PT TMCI‐Ecom 3 5,770 
PT MSI 1 3,570 
Cooperatives 3 6,548 
Total  15 41,448 
2015 
PT Olam 5 22,058 
PT TMCI‐Ecom 5 7,274 
PT MSI 1 3,570 
Cooperatives 2 4,082 
Total  13 36,984 
Source: Sustainable agricultural network, SAN. [Retrieved, July 2016, 2015, 2014] http://san.ag/web/ 
The high cost of the certification scheme appears to have been the main factor underpinning the 
collapse of many smaller suppliers and the significant reduction in the number of Olam certificate 
holders (see Table 5.1). The financial dependence on external supports (e.g. IDH, WCF, and MCA 
under the multi‐stakeholder partnership platform) and the small volume supply to the certification 
market have become major obstacles for small‐scale suppliers to continue accessing this market. 
This cost efficiency also affected the MSI decision to only maintain one certificate holder in Luwu. 
Focussing on the development of their CDC‐CVC extension model, MSI attempts to strengthen the 
firm’s long‐term business strategy by externalising the short‐term commitment of sourcing certified 
from competent suppliers.   
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Table 5.1 shows how the small suppliers (at least one cooperative) struggled to maintain their 
capability to access the RA certified market between 2011 and 2015. At the same time, MSI’s major 
supply partners, e.g., PT Olam and PT TMCI‐Ecom, were able to continue to serve this market with a 
significant increase in supplying volume over the same period. Both suppliers developed their own 
models of intrafirm coordination through upcountry buying units. PT Olam has at least five buying 
stations in the Sulawesi region (Palopo, North Luwu, Pinrang, Kolaka, and North Kolaka) and two 
outside of Sulawesi (Lampung and Seram Island). While the subsidiary of Ecom, PT TMCI have at 
least six buying stations operating in West, Southeast, Central and South Sulawesi, and an additional 
four buying stations outside of Sulawesi. In 2013, Ecom Agricultural Corp Ltd acquired London‐based 
commodity trading Armajaro Holdings Ltd, and continued to operate some of their buying stations 
that had been certificate holders since 2011, whilst other less efficient stations were closed down. 
Olam has halved their number of certificate holders since 2011, following the establishment of two 
CDC‐CVCs in Kolaka and North Kolaka. The firm has integrated production networks by diversifying 
the upstream functional roles, including the establishment of cocoa plantations and fermentation 
facilities on Seram Island. While Ecom’s subsidiary has slowly increased certificate holder numbers to 
Polewali Mandar and North Kolaka, in addition to ongoing geographic expansion of UTZ’ certification 
scheme in the new region.   
In 2015, MSI opened a market for UTZ certified cocoa in response to European market demand in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. Shortly after, Olam and TMCI‐Ecom responded 
to this market. However, the UTZ scheme only publicly shares the list of cocoa certificate holders in 
Indonesia (dominated by Olam and Ecom), without detailed information regarding metric tonnes of 
production.  According to an UTZ impact report (UTZcertified, 2014), however, the certified cocoa 
trade in Indonesia increased significantly from 3,238 tonnes in 2011/12 to 33,768 tonnes in 2014. 
The non‐disclosure of this information was requested by the certificate holder members who 
preferred to keep the supply information confidential (Respondent SS8, pers. comm, 2015). As such, 
it is difficult to identify which certificate holders are capable and incapable of serving the market, 
and to identify any clear trends.  
The adoption of both certification schemes by the Indonesian cocoa sector evinced the dominant 
participation of two suppliers, e.g., Olam and TMCI‐Ecom.  The external supports from the North 
based development agencies (under multi‐stakeholder partnership platform), NGOs and local 
cooperative also showed growing interest in introducing these schemes as a means of improving the 
livelihoods of the cocoa producers; e.g., the collaboration of Veco and koperasi Amanah, and 
Swisscontact. Within these emerging schemes, the collecting hub became a key farm level institution 
that slowly reformed the imperfections in the farm market structure, which had previously been the 
least developed and informal segment of the chain. The main feature of the schemes was a 
traceability system that allowed the buyer to trace back cocoa origins and to exert any necessary 
measures on producers. The contract market system served as a self‐enforcement instrument, as 
the terms were negotiated and adapted to specific requests as well as externalised the supply risks.  
Despite the potential global market accessibility and exchange of tacit knowledge, eventually the 
supplier become the subject of market demand shift and facing multiple risks:  disruption causing 
uncertain supply related to environmental challenges or other unprecedented issues; rapid changes 
in technology and price volatility. Although the last two risks may have been influenced by the lead 
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firm, the unprecedented issues ‐ in addition to asymmetrical competition of economic scale and 
scope ‐ were more complex and widely dispersed across the geographical locations, particularly 
affecting the less competent local actors.    
5.2.3 Extra-firm bargaining strategies  
MSI has criticised the inadequacy of the voluntary certification schemes to drive upstream farm 
productivity increases, while the KPMG (2012) study showed the high (first year) costs for 
smallholder farmers to obtain certification. The shared interest in achieving sustainable agriculture 
and rural development by both Mars and several extra‐firm actors manifested in different forms of 
partnerships, extending the scope of collaborations and creating a coordination platform for the 
local stakeholders (see Figure 5.4). The firm’s sustainability concept was extended and embedded in 
the partnerships following intense negotiation, and compromised any prospects of opting out of the 
partnership, depending on the value activities of each extra‐firm actor. Coe and Yeung (2015: 151) 
argue that this strategy applies in a two‐way process of negotiation and accommodation between 
the firms and extra‐firm actors in the interests of mutually satisfactory outcomes based on the 
creation, enhancement and capture of value within the GPN.   
From the national and local perspectives, the supply threat in the early 2000s was followed by a 
series of US‐funded support programs for Indonesian cocoa farmers. While direct access to the 
export market contributed to the tighter enrolment of the smallholder farmers in the global 
production network, the subsequent introduction of an export tax contributed to increased foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Indonesia’s cocoa processing factories. These changes not only upgraded 
Indonesia’s function from cocoa bean to processed cocoa exporter, but also increased the 
dominance of transnational firms over Indonesia’s emergent cocoa industry. These changes in 
territorial dynamics had a direct effect on how MSI has reconfigured its production networks. For 
example, the increased Mars (global) investment in China and factory expansion in Indonesia was 
also influenced by policy incentives and the removal of trade barriers for cocoa products (ie. a 
bilateral agreement between China and Indonesia in 200659 and implementing the export tax in 
2010).   
MSI’s interest in farm management research and rural development attracted the extra‐firm actors’ 
interest in partnering with them, and in sharing resources and expertise. This capability led to 
dominant roles in negotiating the focus of the partnership activities in their favour (see Table 5.2).  
MSI’s partnership with the rural empowerment and agricultural development (READ) program in 
West Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua (funded by IFAD) specifically aimed at improving farmer yields 
and productivity through the adoption of the Mars CDC‐CVC concept of sustainable service delivery. 
Because of MSI expertise and experience in delivery of extension services and rural community 
engagements, this partnership positioned MSI as a dominant actor in designing, supplying the 
expertise with updated technology and supervising the program’s implementation.  
                                                          
59 China has removed the import duty of Indonesian cocoa and will commence on 1 January 2007, published on23 October 
2006, http://www.foodnavigator‐asia.com/Policy/China‐to‐lift‐tariffs‐on‐Indonesian‐cocoa  
91 
 
Under MSI’s supervision, the Mars CDC‐CVC concept was scaled up outside of Sulawesi without 
necessarily making any commitment to providing a market for the assisted farmers while IFAD and 
the local government managed and implemented the program. Meanwhile, they also partnered with 
the CPQP‐SCPP program with an explicit objective to improve farm productivity and quality. While 
the program opted not to adopt the CDC‐CVC concept, MSI intervention during the implementation 
of the program included dictating the areas of intervention, and the selection of MSI‐affiliated 
collecting hubs (Respondent CC5, pers. comm, 2015; Respondent SS13, 2014; Respondent SS19, 
2014). Individual relationships with the local government were evident in the allocation of provincial 
government revenue for adopting the certification scheme parallel with the GERNAS program.  
Table 5.2 Different extra‐firm bargaining forms by MSI  
Extra-firm bargaining 
strategy 
Affiliated (partnered) 
actors 
Roles  (Expected) outcomes 
Public private partnerships  
1. READ program 
(West Sulawesi, 
Maluku, and Papua) 
IFAD and GoI (soft loan 
program); certification 
bodies 
Alternative sustainable 
market; knowledge and 
technology hub; input 
accessibility 
Geographical supply 
expansion; building trust of 
tripartite; increasing adoption 
of certification schemes; 
adequate infrastructures  
2. CPQP‐SCPP program Netherland government 
(donor); Swisscontact 
(implementer); local 
government; certification 
bodies 
Donor; alternative sustainable 
market; dictating value 
activities 
Increasing farm productivity 
and adoption of certification 
schemes 
Multi-stakeholder partnership 
1. National reference 
group (NRG kakao) 
RA; IFC; Ministry of trade; 
Business watch Indonesia 
Initiator to establish national 
reference for sustainable 
cocoa 
National platform; gain 
interest on adoption 
sustainable schemes  
2. Cocoa Sustainability 
Partnership (CSP) 
Cocoa stakeholders 
dominated by private 
sectors (global and local) 
Initiator; dominant 
management position  
Supply security; negotiated 
forum; more diverse 
members; capability to 
influence public policy 
Group (CSP) lobby  
1. Gernas kakao 
program 
National and local 
government; ICCRI  
CSP members support the 
government program; 
initiated strong relationship 
among the cocoa 
stakeholders  
Sustainable cocoa industry; 
restoring farm productivity 
As domestic industrial and exporter associations became politically established in Indonesia, they 
were frequently used as a lobbying instrument to approach the government in attempt to protect 
domestic actors’ interests. At the same time, transnational firms saw this lobbying influence as 
rivalrous as they had relatively limited negotiating space in which to engage with public policy 
debates in Indonesia. However, the establishment of the national platforms for multi‐stakeholder 
engagement, CSP and NRG, reflected a significant contribution by MSI to specifically accommodate 
and upscale their ambitious agenda of achieving sustainable cocoa industry and wide‐sale 
certification. Following the government initiation to develop a national cocoa program in 2008, 
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Gernas kakao, CSP submitted strategic recommendations that highlight the strategic roles of 
transnational firms (re. MSI and Cargill) as equal partners in designing and implementing the 
program (Neilson, 2008b). One highlight among the other recommendations was the integration of 
existing firm’s sustainability program (e.g. MSI and Cargill) and government (designed) program. For 
example, the recommendation to combine different sources of cocoa seedlings beyond exclusive 
supply from government affiliated institutions and agencies. However, these recommendations were 
not heeded by the government, who instead designed a program that highlighted the significant role 
of government agencies and affiliated organisations in delivering the Gernas kakao program.   
CSP remains as important instrument for engaging with cocoa stakeholders, particularly in 
promoting the MSI agenda of wide‐scale adoption of certification schemes. This effort is reflected on 
the kakao lestari National Reference Group (NRG) website60, in reference to its rationale for 
producing certification guidelines:  
To design national indicators as a reference for the certification bodies. The aim is a strategy 
to address the increasing number of international certification bodies. (Menyusun indikator 
nasional sebagai referensi kepada lembaga sertifikasi. Tujuannya sebagai strategi untuk 
menghadapi semakin banyaknya badan sertifikasi Internasional).  
 
Cognisant of the increasing market demand for certified cocoa and of the future of sustainable 
cocoa, through the Cocoa Sustainability Partnership (CSP) forum under the farmer 
empowerment working group, MSI initiated the design of a certification guideline (handbook) 
consisting of simple practices that could be adopted by the farmers to comply with the 
certification standards. As such, the content of these guidelines should be based on the 
national indicator for cocoa sustainability. (Melihat makin besarnya pangsa pasar produk 
sertifikasi dan untuk keberlanjutan kakao di masa mendatang, melalui Forum Cacoa 
Sustainability Partnership (CSP) di bawah bagian pemberdayaan petani(Farmer 
empowerment), MSI berinisiatif membuat suatu Buku Panduan (handbook) Sertifikasi berisi 
petunjuk sederhana yang dapat dilakukan petani di lapangan untuk memenuhi standard dari 
lembaga sertifikasi. Adapun isi buku panduan ini berdasarkan pada indicator nasional untuk 
kakao berkelanjutan, (CSP, 2012: p.iii-iv).  
Although currently the NRG remains idle, the initiative was (highly) supported by MSI, which was the 
only global branded manufacturer to open the certified cocoa market (at the time). The initiative 
was to anticipate the growing number of certification bodies that could lead to confusion among the 
local actors, particularly small producers. Following the output of NRG on the national indicator for 
sustainable cocoa, MSI incorporated the indicator into the CSP’s working group and further 
translated them into a grounded guideline for the local actors who attempted to adopt either RA or 
UTZ certification schemes. This joint endeavour resulted in the multi‐stakeholder partnership using 
as an instrument to accommodate Mars’ global commitment to fully sourcing certified cocoa by 
2020.  
 
                                                          
60 Organisation structure of the NRG, [Retrieved, October 2016] http://kakaolestari.org/organization.php  
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5.3 Governing Indonesian sustainable cocoa production networks: Nestlé case study 
The Switzerland‐based Corporation Nestlé is one of the pioneers of the dairy industry in Indonesia. 
The company has continued to diversify the dairy product portfolios in East Java, while also 
developing hot beverages ‐ coffee ‐ in Lampung, along with culinary seasoning and more recently, 
pet food.  Focused on diversifying their dairy portfolio, Nestlé Indonesia sources cocoa powder to 
primarily supply the beverages/dairy products such as the Milo brand, rather than supplying 
chocolate and confectionary consumer products. The recent expansion of the Milo factory in West 
Java in 2010 led to increased domestic demand for cocoa powder. Within the Asian region, Nestlé’s 
chocolate and confectionary factories are distributed throughout Thailand, Japan and China.   
Nestlé’s incorporation of the sustainability concept into Creating Shared Value (CSV) reflects the 
firm’s concern for sustaining the industry, also for creating value for the shareholders as well as 
society. To deliver these societal commitments, the firm placed the CSV concept at the top of the 
pyramid, with the basic compliance of international laws and codes of conduct and protecting the 
environmental sustainability for future generations as the foundation. Broadly, the CSV concept 
focused on Nestlé’s business issues, e.g., water management, promoting and producing affordable 
nutritious products, and stimulating rural development. More specifically, for the cocoa‐based and 
confectionary category, value creating refers to rural development in the forms of improving farmer 
capacity to align with market procurement (purchasing traceable or certified products), and 
compliance with Nestlé’s supplier code.  
As a global firm, Nestlé recognised this ability to influence supplier behaviour across the value chain 
and engage with rural development, which thus became the prominent focus area for sourcing 
agricultural raw materials. As Nestlé emphasises in their 2015 annual report (Nestlé, 2016, p. 91):   
Millions of farmers depend on our business for their livelihoods. More than 760,000 supply 
us directly or through co-operatives and collection centres, while others are part of longer 
supply chains. The wellbeing of these farmers, small-scale entrepreneurs and rural 
communities is intrinsic to securing global food supplies, while delivering our own growth 
strategy.  
The above statement suggests a dependent relationship with the farmers as well as the other supply 
chain actors. At the same time, Nestlé identified its key role in supporting their livelihoods and 
ensuring their wellbeing leads to securing supplies and contributes to the firm’s long term growth 
strategy. This statement also suggests that the firm’s expectations on participation in rural 
development are motivated by economic interest rather than solely driven by societal or 
environmental issues that need addressing. Within the rural development concept, Nestlé identified 
three major challenges: (1) farming as an unattractive business; (2) low farming productivity; and, (3) 
the complexity of the supply chain. Linking these issues to the Nestlé confectionary segment, cocoa 
processing has been outsourced from confectionary manufacturing. This outsourcing of cocoa 
products has positioned strategic cocoa processors (or first‐tier suppliers) as key actors connecting 
Nestlé with the smallholder farmers. As a result, traceability in rural development has become an 
important instrument to ensure the agricultural‐ based sourcing products are grown and processed 
responsibly in accordance with the supplier code, and can be traced back to their origins (Nestlé, 
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2016). Converting these issues into practice, Nestlé committed to implementing responsible 
sourcing along their supply chain, beginning to roll out Nestlé Cocoa Plans since 2011. 
5.3.1 Nestlé’s Cocoa Plan (NCP) 
Nestlé’s participation in upstream cocoa farm activities began with ‘in kind‐support’. For example, it 
introduced somatic embryogenesis (SE) propagation technology into established research institutes 
in cocoa‐producing countries, including the National Plant Institute (CRNA) in the Ivory Coast and the 
Indonesian Coffee and Cocoa Research Institute (ICCRI) in Indonesia. Nestlé’s strategic collaboration 
with ICCRI aimed to reach out to the government program without directly implementing the 
program. As a quasi‐government institution, ICCRI tends to be very accommodating of government 
interests and is directly involved in implementing various government programs. From a functional 
perspective, ICCRI expertise in the upstream research and development of the coffee and cocoa 
sectors was complementary to Nestlé’ sustainability interest.  According to the Nestlé website61: 
Based on the earlier cooperation agreement, Nestlé R&D Tours has granted the Somatic 
Embryogenesis (SE) technology to ICCRI to propagate coffee and cocoa plantlets in large 
quantity in a shorter period of time.  With the SE technology from Nestlé, since 2008 ICCRI has 
successfully produced 21.6 million cocoa plantlets. These have been planted across 10 (ten) 
provinces in Indonesia to revitalise cocoa plantations with plants that are more productive and 
resistant to diseases. This will help the competitiveness of Indonesian farmers on the 
international markets. 
In the same press release, the Legal & Corporate Affairs Director of PT Nestlé Indonesia, explained: 
What we are doing today is part of our business strategy to create shared value along our value 
chains. Creating shared value (CSV) is the key to Nestlé’s success. We believe that our long-term 
success is dependent on our ability to create value along our value chain, be it our shareholders, 
employees, consumers, society and our stakeholders. 
Through the indirect approach of participating in the upstream development of the cocoa sector, 
Nestlé referred to this support as an example of long term business strategy. Shifting to long‐term 
contracts of strategic collaboration, Nestlé has used market mechanisms to impose this strategy 
across their supply partners while extending networks though active engagement individually with 
affiliated extra‐firm actors and collectively through multi‐stakeholder partnerships.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 Nestle agreement [Retrieved, October 2016]  
http://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/agreement_iccri 
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Figure 5.6 Nestlé’ collaboration and partnership with its extra‐firm actors 
 
One of Nestlé’s first farm‐level interventions in Indonesia was undertaken as part of the Petrafood’ 
SEEDS program in West and South Sulawesi, in partnership with a local supplier, Bumi Surya, which 
maintained an arms‐length relationship with Petrafood, then a strategic supplier of intermediate 
cocoa products to the company. The early implementation of the program (in 2011) outreached 
approximately 1,000 farmers from the West Sulawesi region (see Figure 5.6).  The farmers received 
training in good farming practices, and were supplied with quality planting material from established 
nurseries for rejuvenating unproductive cocoa farms under the SEEDS program in collaboration with 
Nestlé. The firm acknowledged that the initiative aimed to not only meet the customer’s (Nestlé) 
demand for a responsible supply chain, but also expected to retain the loyalty of the cocoa farming 
community (Petrafoods, 2013). As the CEO of Petrafood stated during the launching of SEEDS in 
Lampung62: 
“By developing a fully traceable cocoa supply chain, Petrafoods’ customers can be assured 
that our beans come from farmers who are fairly rewarded for their efforts, and that our 
products are sustainable, of good quality and produced with social integrity as a high priority. 
Through SEEDS, we have better control of the supply chain-literally from seeds to mouths”. 
Because Nestlé regarded sustainability as creating shared value, this notion suggests Nestlé as a 
value creator in the form of (voluntarily) regulating sourcing policy, even though the extent of Nestlé 
engagement was also based on the economic rational. For example, the dairy and coffee sectors 
received more attention and investment in upstream development compared to the cocoa sector 
                                                          
62 News highlight of Petrafood, Petra Foods’ “SEEDS” cocoa sustainability initiative bears fruit with 7 programs in 
Indonesia, Africa, Brazil and Vietnam.  [Retrieved, October 2016]  
http://delfilimited.listedcompany.com/newsroom/20121017_173220_P34_9FADE5445E9CE03948257A9A00289553.1.pdf  
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because both sectors were major revenue sources for Nestlé. Despite the rhetoric about quantifiable 
output measures and achievements, Nestlé primarily used market mechanisms to incentivise 
strategic suppliers such as Petrafood (whose cocoa processing activities have been recently taken 
over by Barry Callebaut) to enter joint initiatives aiming to provide technical assistance to the West 
Sulawesi farmers. It has done this in addition to providing generic funding for partnership‐based 
sustainability cocoa programs, such as CPQP‐SCPP, GPP‐SCPP, and WCF‐CocoaAction.  With selective 
market commitment to producing a certified product, the early implementation of the NCP was 
combined with introducing a ‘traceable market’ as an initial platform to ensure the origins of the 
cocoa bean. This traceable platform, which was further developed by the SCPP program, was also 
known as ‘cocoa‐trace’, and provides an individual farmer database system to monitor and measure 
the state of individual farm productivity, along with market and microfinance accessibility 
particularly in the West Sulawesi region.     
5.3.2 Governing sustainable markets 
Nestlé’s broader commitment to society under the NCP program was dependent on the commercial 
relationships with strategic suppliers and specialised suppliers. Nestlé’s responsible supplier code 
and sourcing guidelines, published in 2013, required the supply chain partners to: comply with the 
specified codes, which embed aspects of international law and the Convention on Human Rights; 
comply with the relevant environmental management system (ISO 14001: 2004); also, to comply 
with the applicable ethical trade laws and regulations of the respective countries (Nestlé, 2013a).  
The codes and guidelines are embedded in Nestlé’ internal procurement procedures as a 
coordination tool not only for the upstream supply measures, but also to exercise the suppliers’ 
competitiveness and reshape the nature of the commercial relationship towards a greater degree of 
vertical coordination. This interpretation of the generic supplier code is supported by crop guidelines 
that have been identified based on each crop accordingly to the relevant issues. While Nestlé 
recommended guidelines for cocoa suppliers regarding how to improve farming practice (referring 
to the UTZcertified Good Inside code of conduct 2009), this was recommended as a voluntary 
scheme, despite the commitment to continuously increase UTZ certified cocoa’s market share 
(Nestlé, 2013b).  Framing it as responsible sourcing, Nestlé technically used the market imperative to 
impose the supply code and standards, and to address social and environmental issues across the 
supply chain that lacked enforcement (or were missing) from the public regulatory sphere, 
particularly in the cocoa producing‐countries.   
Nestlé defined the code as a non‐negotiable minimum standard for the supply chain actors to 
comply with, as part of sharing responsibility. The firm was expecting the scope of compliance to be 
extended to supplier subsidiaries and affiliates including the upstream suppliers and other third 
parties. Implementation of the code has become a pre‐requisite for every Nestlé supplying contract. 
The code, which has become the reference when making a purchase order, demonstrates the 
supplier’s shared commitment (Nestlé, 2013a). Within the Nestlé cocoa production network, the 
direct suppliers (or first tier suppliers ‐see Figure 5.6) are the intermediate actors who connect with 
the smallholder farmers. As the lead firm, Nestlé conducts audits themselves and through third‐
party certifiers, verifying supplier compliance with the codes and guidelines. The results serve as a 
reference that will assess future commercial relationships.  
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Figure 5.6 Nestlé value chain governance of responsible cocoa sourcing in Indonesia 
 
The governance strategy in Nestlé’s cocoa production network depends on the geographic market of 
the end‐product. Strategic partners are offered long‐term contracts in order to serve the high‐end 
market in the form of inter‐firm partnerships.  For example, with Barry Callebaut who owned 
advanced capability to produce a wide range of cocoa and chocolate products, its strategic 
investment in technology and research for novel functional ingredients, and the dominant economic 
scale of its couverture segment, have positioned the firm as a significant and highly strategic partner 
for Nestlé.  When serving the other product lines whereas the cocoa products serve as 
complementary ingredient, Nestlé opts in favour of casual contracts with fragmented specialised 
suppliers (e.g., BT Cocoa) to supply generic chocolate‐flavoured dairy or cereal production, for 
example to supply the recently expanded Milo factories.  
The limited engagement with the smallholder farmers have distant Nestlé from the upstream 
production and replaced by the first‐tier suppliers. As the suppliers are also cocoa processors, the 
focus on value chain intervention under the sustainability context was not limited to sustainable on‐
farm production, but also attempt to improve off‐farm production such as market incentive for 
fermented bean.  However, the small incentive was insufficient to cover the additional labour for 
fermentation process, the risk over failed fermentation, and limited market.  As a farmer from 
Polewali Mandar said ‘it is only fair if the incentive double because fermentation means delaying for 
(quick) cash and the small‐infected bean can’t be fermented’ (Respondent FG3, 2014; Respondent 
FG11, 2015). Reluctance from the smallholder farmers to carry out fermentation function thus 
performed by the local traders who also arm‐length of cocoa processor to buy wet bean and 
produce fermented bean.    
Despite the upstream challenges related to low quality bean and yield, adherence to industry self‐
regulation within the cocoa production networks over the last few years has increased market 
barriers for many suppliers. Consolidation of the network, as well as fuelling competition, has further 
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limited the number of participants to a small number of competent suppliers. The consolidation 
process, effected through a coordinated network in the form of traceability, has increased supplier 
transparency. However, this process has also ensured Nestlé’ comprehensive control over the rights 
to verify code compliance in its favour. The firm’s commitment to sourcing certified cocoa products 
was influenced by particular market demands. The sourcing of third party certification (including 
UTZ, RA and Fairtarde) of cocoa beans was in response to criticism from the civil society groups (e.g 
World Vision)63. In response, four brands (Nestlé, Mars, Mondelēz and Lindt&Sprüngli) pledged to 
produce sustainable chocolate for the Australian market64. Whereas, the Chinese market 
emphasizes traceability through the Chinese rules of origin (WTO, 2013). Such regulations are absent 
in other Southeast Asian countries.  The variations in market regulation and in supporting firms’ 
participation in addressing the social and environmental issues may dissuade Nestlé from fully 
adopting the third‐party certification scheme and simply preserve the self‐regulated supplier code.  
Traceability, a dominant feature, has become embedded in the firm’s supply policy ever since the 
firm decided to outsource and externalise sustainability costs to the strategic supplier rather than 
maintain an integrated production network.  Given this supply dependency, traceability could prove 
an effective instrument for minimising economic loss from the media backlash and to ensure spatial 
monitoring to assess the extent of environmentally and socially destructive practices, such as 
deforestation and child labour. In essence, traceability is not only assists supply management, but 
also minimising geographically‐related abusive social or environmental practices across the supply 
chain. Through CocoaTrace, Nestlé’s supplier partners are able to monitor and possibly forecast 
supply from the farm level, minimising chances of any expensive supply fraud perpetrated by the 
mainstream market, whilst better coordinating their purchase orders, and transforming into tighter 
vertically‐coordinated networks without assuming the risks of ownership. This extends to farm 
management, cocoa purchasing and processing to chocolate bar production and marketing.  
Moreover, the instrument provides administration records of source of origin as evidence to confirm 
that Nestlé sourced from responsible farming and processing practices. 
5.3.3 Extrafirm bargaining strategy  
Applying strategic outsourcing, Nestlé plays an indirect role in upstream cocoa development, with 
more focus on building relationships with affiliated stakeholders (see Table 5.3). The firm explicitly 
acknowledged the donor position under the CPQP‐SCPP and GP‐SCPP programs, and had a certain 
degree of power to direct the core activities of the program such as the establishment of a 
CocoTrace platform. Nestlé also played a dominant role in the establishment of a multi‐stakeholder 
partnership for Indonesian sustainable agriculture (PISAgro), as the leader of several working groups, 
e.g., dairy, coffee, and (previously) cocoa. According to Nestlé’ Indonesia Sustainability Agriculture 
                                                          
63 The impact of certification system, published by Stopthetraffik Australia Coalition,  [Retrieved, December 2016]   
https://www.worldvision.com.au/docs/default‐source/publications/human‐rights‐and‐trafficking/a‐matter‐of‐
taste.pdf?sfvrsn=4 
64 Australian leading chocolate companies pledged for sourcing sustainable cocoa for domestic consumption, published on 
23 March 2016, http://www.confectionerynews.com/Markets/Australia‐s‐top‐chocolate‐makers‐commit‐to‐sustainable‐
cocoa 
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Development Director (Respondent CC4, pers. comm, 2015): ‘[T]he partnership (PISAgro) is 
important for the private sector to approach the government (or other public organisations) in 
seeking for their support, because individual approach may rise negative backlash from the public’. 
From this perspective, the partnership provides access for foreign industrial actors to reach out to 
the government, or specifically to the public services and policies provided by government. The 
engagement with public policy is also reflected in the governance structure of PISAgro, which 
positioned the government (relevant ministries) as an advisor with the primarily roles of connecting 
the (working) group leaders to senior officials and key decision makers65. 
Table 5.3 Different extrafirm bargaining forms developed by Nestlé Indonesia  
Form of extra-
firm bargaining  
Affiliated (partnered) actors Roles  (Expected) outcomes 
Public private partnerships 
1. CPQP‐SCPP 
program 
Netherlands government (donor), 
Swisscontact (implementer), local 
government, certification bodies 
Donor; alternative 
sustainable market; 
dictating value activities 
Increasing farm productivity 
and adoption of certification 
schemes 
2. GP‐SCPP 
program 
MCC‐US based independent 
agency (donor), Swisscontact 
(implementer), local government, 
certification bodies 
Donor; alternative 
sustainable market; 
dictating value activities 
Increasing farm productivity 
and established traceability 
and (or) adopting certification 
schemes 
Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
1. PISAgro Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, 
Finance, Swisscontact, Cargill, 
UTZcertified 
Co‐founder Capture the value of 
partnership from the global 
and local stakeholders 
2. Cocoa 
sustainability 
initiative (CSP) 
Cocoa stakeholders (global and 
local) 
Member  Supply security, negotiated 
forum; more diverse 
members, capability to 
influence public policy 
Industrial group lobby  
1. Continue 
Gernas program, 
2015 
Ministry of agriculture, local 
government  
Lobbyist  Government funding for 
securing the cocoa supply, 
policy in favour for the 
downstream actors 
Despite widespread criticism of the effectiveness of the government’s Gernas program (2009‐14), as 
will be discussed further in the next chapter, the program was extended in 2015 as Pro‐Gernas (also 
referred to PPKB) after the new elected president (Joko Widodo) visited the assisted farmer groups 
via the CPQP‐SCPP program in Mamuju, West Sulawesi in November 2014.  Following the visit, the 
working group leader met the President after the inauguration of the Jakarta food security summit 
at the Presidential palace, in Jakarta on 14 April 2015. In the following month, the government 
announced the continuation of Pro‐Gernas Kakao funding via an amended‐national budget for 2015. 
In addition to the political promise from the President, the continuation of the program was also 
enthusiastically supported by the director of the Indonesian Cocoa Industry Association (AIKI), who 
                                                          
65 PISAgro governance structure, [Retrieved October 2016] http://pisagro.org/governance  
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was also Director of BT Cocoa and a Nestlé’ supply partner. In this case, a long‐term contract with a 
domestically‐owned cocoa processor seemed to afford an addition means of lobbying influence. 
Multi‐stakeholder partnerships have served as an instrument facilitating transnational lead firms’ 
access to public policy and services that previously tended to favour domestic firms. Domestic 
economic actors are often politically seen to be the key actors’ contributing to the national 
economic growth. On the other hand, the transnational firms are seen as business rivals by both 
domestic actors and some government officials. Regardless, they shared similar economic interests 
based on implementing a program on how to improve farm productivity and quality. Following the 
continuation of the Gernas program, the current leader of the PISAgro’ cocoa working group stated:  
The local government should be entirely involved in this program. So, there is ownership 
from the government.  What we have been trying in the next few months was to harmonise 
our program with the Gerakan nasional Pro Kakao as initiated by the government. The 
Ministry of Agriculture is currently preparing the sustainable cocoa program. The first Gernas 
kakao was considered to have failed. Now, we can’t afford another failure. The biggest 
mistake on the first Gernas kakao was that the government didn’t listen to the industry. 
(Pemerintah daerah harus sepenuhnya terlibat dalam program ini. Sehingga pemerintah 
merasa memilikinya. Apa yang kita coba lakukan dalam beberapa bulan kedepan adalah 
menyelaraskan kegiatan kami dengan Gerakan nasional Pro Kakao yang dicanangkan 
pemerintah. Kementrian Pertanian sedang mempersiapkan program kakao berkelanjutan. 
Program Gernas kakao yang pertama bisa dikatakan gagal. Sekarang, kita tidak bisa gagal 
lagi. Kesalahan besar pada Gernas kakao yang pertama adalah pemerintah tidak 
mendengarkan industry), (PISAgro news, 2015: p.20).    
Recognition of the government’s failure to deliver the first Gernas kakao program (also stated by 
Purwanto, 2016, and Rheza and Karlinda, 2013) should have been a lesson learned. The current 
cocoa‐working group members (e.g. Swisscontact, Nestlé Indonesia, Cargill and UTZcertified) urged 
the government to consider the harmonisation of public and private sector programs (PPPs), and 
using the multi‐stakeholder partnership as a horizontal coordination platform for sustainability 
programs, including that implemented by the government.  As a result, in September 2015, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, with the support of the national associations (DEKAINDO, ICCRI, ASKINDO, 
AIKI, and APIKCI), signed an MoU on a cocoa economic cluster partnership (CEPAT) with CSP in order 
to achieve the Pro‐Gernas target of increasing cocoa productivity and quality (CSP, 2016). Although 
this partnership was premature for assessing the extent of CEPAT‘s influence on public policy, the 
Indonesian government has recognised the multi‐stakeholder platform and shown interest on future 
engagement through the current multi‐stakeholder partnership such as PISAgro and CSP.    
Conclusion  
The motivation to govern sustainability emerged concomitant with the expansion of globalisation, as 
economic activities expanded beyond single state territories in tandem with the growing market 
power of the north‐based transnational firms towards the emerging south‐based countries. It has 
also emerged at the same time as the competitive pressures on lead firms who are leading them to 
coordinate globally‐dispersed production networks, characterised by high levels of outsourcing. The 
adoption of certification schemes within the frame of corporate sustainability initiatives apparently 
have facilitated compliance to international social and environment laws and consumer 
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expectations, which previously lacked enforcement (or was absent) from the states (generally) of 
cash crop producing countries (Raynolds et al, 2007; Tallontire et al., 2011; Silva‐Castaneda, 2012).   
With the growing dominance of the transnational firms in Indonesia’s cocoa production networks, 
sustainability has become an instrument for vertically and horizontally coordinating the upstream 
production activities, and for reforming farm level market structures. This upstream coordination is 
highly dependent upon the economic rationales of the lead firms and the geographical structure of 
the production networks. MSI, for example, applies more than one vertical coordination (intra‐firm 
coordination and inter‐firm partnerships) to producing and sourcing sustainable cocoa bean as the 
firm establishing cocoa processing function and actively participating on upstream cocoa 
development.  While Nestlé applies inter‐firm partnerships with different types of supply partners 
(strategic and specialised firms) and meaningful engagement with the smallholder farmers is highly 
depending on the supplier capacity, as the firm’ production is focus on the end‐product 
manufacturing. The increasing transnational firms’ upstream interventions under the banner of 
sustainability have become a vehicle for extending their interests towards horizontal coordination 
(extrafirm bargaining) that will eagerly engage with both government and broader cocoa 
stakeholders. Within the Indonesian context, cocoa sustainability partnerships also create a 
negotiating space for transnational firms to access public services and policies that previously often 
favoured the domestic firms.  
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6. State engagement with sustainability initiatives 
Lead firms’ increasing engagement with sustainability discourse and their investment in 
sustainability initiatives has attracted the interest of the state in Indonesia. This engagement indeed 
has extended the transnational firms economic activities to upstream cocoa production, delivering a 
range of (desirable) extension services, despite that such services were commonly as part of public 
services delivered by the government.  However, historically Government of Indonesia intervened in 
cocoa sector had been limited as compared to Ghana and Ivory Coast.  Akiyama and Nishio (1996) 
referred to ‘hands‐off’ approach that eventually shaped the liberal farm gate market and more 
dynamic upstream production structure, but the lack of price‐quality transparency (see more 
discussion in section 6.2.1). Because of this approach, the growing intervention of the transnational 
firms may not necessarily be weakening the government position or power within Indonesian cocoa 
production networks.  
Not until recently, the upstream participation by North‐based transnational firms in the Indonesian 
cocoa development is directly intersecting with the government’s interest in developing a national 
downstream industry. In a bid to support downstream development of the cocoa sector, several 
industrial polices and incentives have been implemented to drive the development process and 
protect the growing industry. The increased vertical coordination and upstream market 
concentration, associated with the roll‐out of sustainability initiatives, has moreover challenged the 
competitiveness of many domestic cocoa processors. The following section provides an overview of 
the Indonesian government’s role in the recent development of the Indonesian cocoa sector and 
their response to the increasing upstream involvement of transnational firms associated with their 
sustainability agenda. 
6.1 Consumer state role in upstream cocoa development 
The evolving north‐based firms’ sustainability initiatives have been supported by the Netherlands 
and US governments through public private partnership platforms. These supports have already 
been presented in previous chapters, with particular involvement from the governments of the US, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. The implication appears to be that, in practical terms, these 
governments are simultaneously supporting the upstream penetration of lead firms from their home 
countries. 
The geographical distribution of cocoa grinding and chocolate consumption has expanded, with 
strong growth in origin‐based grindings in countries such as the Ivory Coast, Ghana and Indonesia 
(see Figure 6.1). Over the last fifteen years, origin‐based grinding has almost doubled, with much 
slower growth in the major consuming countries, such as the Netherlands, Germany and the US. In 
the largest cocoa producing country, the Ivory Coast, slowly increasing the investment on processing 
industry and outpacing the Netherlands processing capacity, yet dominated by transnational cocoa 
and chocolate firms. Despite the uncertainty generated by political turmoil, the Ivory Coast’s 
significant supply capacity has attracted new investment and expansion. Currently, the Ivory Coast is 
the world’s top cocoa grinder with a capacity of 532,000 tonnes, close behind the Netherlands. Its 
significant grinding capacity is dominated by six main companies: Cargill, the Swiss firm Barry 
Callebaut, France's Cemoi, the Singapore‐based Olam International, and the Ivorian companies 
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including Choco Ivoire and Ivory Cocoa Products66. Within this structure, the Ivorian cocoa industry is 
indicative of an oligopolistic structure whereby a small number of North‐based firms dominate the 
domestic cocoa industry. 
Within a global market environment where cocoa‐producing countries are vertically integrating into 
cocoa processing, and emerging markets such as India and China are becoming key consumers, the 
lead chocolate firms are attempting to preserve their dominant position in the GPN. The Indian and 
Chinese governments have supported the removal of tariff barriers from cocoa‐based products. 
Whereas non‐tariff barriers (including certification schemes) have been applied by the private sector 
in mature European and North American markets, tariff barriers have been implemented selectively 
by consumer countries. The latter’s aim was to protect their domestic industries from global 
competition, particularly the high value‐added industries, while at the same time opening a market 
for low cost technology industries.    
Figure 6.1 Shifts in global cocoa grindings between 1997/98 and 2012/13 
 
However, the ability of north‐based countries to implement selected tariff barriers for cocoa‐
producing countries is dependent upon their bilateral and regional relationships. The trade 
agreement between Indonesia and the European Union member countries ‐ the European Union 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EU‐CEPA), signed in July 2016 ‐ lowered the 
                                                          
66 The Ivory Coast is the largest cocoa growing nation; but, only around 35% of its cocoa beans are processed within the 
country. The government is attempting to increase the processing capacity by half of total cocoa bean production, 
published, 25 July 2012, http://www.confectionerynews.com/Commodities/CEMOI‐to‐up‐cocoa‐grind‐capacity‐in‐Ivory‐
Coast  
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import tariff on cocoa beans (but not on cocoa‐based products) under the Generalised Scheme of 
Preference (GSP), subsequent to negotiations started in 201067.  Due to the low quality of 
unfermented bulk bean, the European Union introduced a lower tax (GSP), with zero import tariff on 
the fermented quality of West African cocoa bean. This zero‐import tariff incentivised a desirable 
high quality, for example Ghanaian cocoa bean supplies to the UK Cadbury factories. While the 
major industrial firms improved their capability to overcome low quality without compromising the 
quality of the end‐product (Fold, 2002).  
The significant increase in cocoa grinding in the origin countries challenged the dominant European 
grinding position in the cocoa GPN. The strategy employed by the cocoa origin countries to 
downstream their cocoa industries incentivised the cocoa processing segments and invited foreign 
direct investment (FDI) by North‐based firms. But, such investment occurred at the expense of 
mature industries in importer countries like the Netherlands and Germany, triggering the removal of 
import tariffs on cocoa bean, while maintaining the extant import tariff on cocoa‐based products.     
6.2 Cocoa sector development and the Indonesian state 
Development of Indonesian cocoa sector has different trajectories than Ghana and Ivory Coast 
whereas the (colonial and current) government have certain degree of power to shape the national‐
local production networks structure. Although cocoa was introduced to Indonesia during the colonial 
era, but the pest‐disease problems and limited market (in Manila, Philippines) discouraged the 
farmers to maintaining cocoa farming during the colonial era, and the new government has limited 
interest to develop the export crops and more focus on food crops and extractive industries.  As the 
global chocolate‐cocoa industries have developed and the global market expanded to emerging 
countries, to capture and retain specific geographical advantage from the cocoa sector, the 
Indonesian government has attempted to integrate cocoa bean production with cocoa processing, to 
retain the value added from downstream industrial development. However, declining cocoa farm 
yields and the tendency to produce unfermented cocoa beans presents challenges for cocoa grinders 
in an industry where processing capacity has now quickly outstripped the supply of raw material. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the transnational actors’ concern over the supply risk was a 
factor driving upstream sustainability initiatives in Indonesia. The increasing upstream involvement 
of transnational cocoa firms, and the poor competitiveness of domestic firms, then emerged as a 
concern for the Indonesian government, despite a commonly shared goal to improve cocoa bean 
production and quality. This in turn has prompted a national policy response. The discussion in the 
following sections introduces the role and influence of the Indonesian state in the development of 
the cocoa sector.   
6.2.1 Early role of the state in cocoa development  
Driven by a viable nearby export market in Singapore and Malaysia, the voluntary adoption of cocoa 
farming by smallholders in the 1990s delivered economic benefits at the farm‐level and boosted 
export earnings. According to Akiyama and Nishio (1996), a ‘hands‐off policy’ by the state 
                                                          
67 Indonesia currently benefits from trade preferences granted by the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences, under which 
approximately 30% of total imports from Indonesia enjoyed lower duties, [Retrieved, March 2017]  
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries‐and‐regions/countries/indonesia/  
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encouraged farm level marketing dynamism through the combination of a favourable macro policy, 
the availability of new land frontiers, and the low production costs associated with ‘forest rents’ (the 
cost advantages of growing cocoa on recently cleared land). In addition to growing demand of cocoa 
in neighbour country like Malaysia and Singapore, these combinations provided a suitable 
institutional setting for Sulawesi farmers to capitalise on conditions and integrating to the global 
cocoa production networks (Neilson, 2007).  In effect, the entrepreneurship of smallholder farmers 
and local capitalist resulted in a competitive and liberal local market system. In the other hand, the 
formal institution exercised in the form of export standard (National standard for Cocoa, SNI), 
extension services, accessible micro‐finance through formal institution did not developed (Neilson, 
2007).  
Following the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998, the intense political struggles calls for 
fundamental changes in Indonesian governance system, as the regions were asking for ‘regional 
autonomy’ (otonomi daerah) and moving towards decentralisation.  The decentralisation process 
also did not contribute to institutional development in cocoa sector, despite the rhetoric argument 
that decentralisation will bringing the public services closer to the people. In contrary, 
decentralisation weakening the extension services department, as the local governments (re. 
provincial and district level) have autonomy to (re)arrange the institutional structure including 
merged different sectors of extension services under single department (re. agriculture and estate 
crops department, or estate crops and forestry department). The other trajectory from 
decentralisation is public service departments becoming more political rather than structural, as the 
elected leaders have prerogative power to orchestrate the key positions in administrative structures.   
Despite the national government maintained the favourable policy environment for the local actor 
to integrating into the global cocoa production networks with limited interventions to establish 
formal institutions to support cocoa development, the liberal market had invited the foreign trading 
firms such as Cargill, Olam, and Ecom. The government decree68aimed to facilitate the plugging-in of 
domestic firms into the global market, hence increasing market accessibility. The participation of 
transnational trading firms contributed to improved market accessibility for local actors, dynamic 
upstream economic activity and incentivised the intermediate trading actors. At the village level, 
collectors would commonly engage with more than just cocoa bean exchange, as their functions 
include being agro‐input distributors, grocery sellers, and micro‐finance providers. After the 
devaluation of Indonesia’s currency in the wake of the 1998 monetary crisis, it was far more 
profitable for traders to supply the global market rather than domestic processors. 
The major importers of bulk‐unfermented cocoa were Malaysia, Singapore and the US. The 
European countries absorbed a smaller volume of trade due to stricter quality measures (which the 
poorer quality Indonesian cocoa frequently failed to comply with) and high import tariffs. For the 
Malaysian and US markets, however, the lower quality of Indonesia’s unfermented beans was simply 
discounted rather than entirely rejected as a combined result of geographical factors and lower 
                                                          
68 Specific regulations of foreign direct investment (FDI) to involve in export‐import, Kemenperin no. 11/MPP/SK/I/1996 
106 
 
transport and logistic costs, and tariff reductions in line with the AFTA agreement within Southeast 
Asia.  
From above discussion, development of Indonesian cocoa sector before 2010 is relatively different 
from Ghana and Ivory Coast, as the sector had not been subjected to the state dominance (or 
sovereignty) in the form of upstream cocoa development and market intervention.  However, the 
state used the administrative power to accommodate a liberal market for the local actors to better 
integration into the global production networks.  
6.2.2 Downstream industrialisation policies 
The government’s hands‐off policy contributed to the maturity of a competitive upstream market 
and incentivised the participation of diverse intermediate trading actors in capturing economic gain 
from the liberal market, particularly in Sulawesi.  By maintaining effective administrative roles in 
trading regulation, the government was also interested to capture the value‐added of downstream 
industry and to become the Asian cocoa hub. Driven by this goal, regulatory incentives (VAT removal 
and zero import tax) aimed to compensate for the low‐quality cocoa bean, which had hitherto 
limited the competitiveness of the downstream cocoa processing segment. A series of policy and 
regulatory shifts occurred from around 2010, with the explicit aim of nurturing downstream 
industrial development, as presented in Table 6.1. 
   Table 6.1 Policy shifts to support the downstream cocoa sector and associated structural change 
Period Cocoa bean  Cocoa products 
Early 
development 
(before 2010) 
‐ UU no 11/1994, application of 0% Export tax  
‐ Kemenperin no. 11/MPP/SK/I/1996, about 
procedures of FDI in export‐import  
‐ UU no 18/2000 applies VAT 10% for primary 
commodity, PP no 7/2007 removes VAT 10%, 
‐ PP no 31/2007, 0% Import tax 
 
Farmers  
(n>106)   
‐ Collectors (n > 9,000)  
‐ Traders (n >1,000)  
‐ Regional/international exporters (n >5) National ‐ 
‐ Exporters (n < 10) 
Cocoa processors 
‐ National‐less than 50k tons (n >30) 
‐ TNCs (n=2)  
Downstream 
Industrialisation 
(2010-present) 
‐ PMK no 75/PMK 011/2012, application of 
progressive export tax (5‐15%) 
‐ MA RI no 70P/HUM/2013, apply VAT 10%  
‐ PMK no. 132/PMK. 010/2015, apply import tariff 
for cocoa bean (5%)  
‐ PMK 224/PMK.011/2012, Income tax (PPh) from 
importing article 22 (2.5%) 
‐ Permentan no. 67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014 on 
mandatory fermentation (not effective yet) 
‐ PP no. 94/2010 apply tax holiday for 
pioneer industries 
‐ PP no 31/2007 and PMK 76/2011 apply 0% 
Import tax on manufacture machineries  
‐ PP no 52/2011 apply tax allowance for 
strategic industries and areas  
‐ PMK no 132/PMK.010/2015, apply import 
tax 15‐20% (except for ASEAN members) 
‐ Permenperin, No. 157/M‐IND/PER/11/ 
2009 for Mandatory SNI cocoa powder. 
Farmers  
(n>106) 
‐ Collectors (n > 1,000) 
‐ Traders (n >500) 
Cocoa processors 
‐ National (n=17 of recent established, 1) 
‐ International (n=3) 
Integrated cocoa trading and processing: Mars Symbioscience Indonesia, Cargill, JV Barry 
Callebaut‐Comextra Majora, BTCocoa, and Olam Indonesia 
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The process of ‘downstreaming’ the cocoa sector was especially supported by the imposition of the 
export‐tax (PMK no 75/PMK 011/2012), which invited contradictory arguments from different 
members of Indonesia’s cocoa association (ASKINDO). Domestic processors argued that maintaining 
cocoa bean exports meant that the value added was repatriated offshore since the trading segment 
was dominated by transnational firms, who were unlikely to support regional development. Ideally, 
it was argued that revenue from the export tax could fund national programs to support cocoa 
development programs (such as the Gernas program discussed below). In response, the head of 
ASKINDO ‐ who was also a Director of a transnational trading subsidiary – argued: ‘It [does] not make 
sense, the government is seeking funds from the farmer through depressing prices since a drop‐in 
farm gate price may encourage the farmer to shift to other commodities 69. The imposition of an 
export barrier, as well as shifting the government incentives from the intermediate trading actors to 
downstream processing, eventually challenged the dominant trading segments. The tariff barrier 
eroded the intermediate actors’ margin, particularly that of the transnational traders.   
Pursuant to the above argument, Neilson et al.’s (2014) empirical study of the export tax does not 
show that the policy had a negative effect on the farm gate price. The export tax has not linearly led 
to a decline in the farmers’ returns. This neutral effect of the restrictive export tax was combined 
with other industrial incentives, e.g., zero import tax on manufacturer machinery, tax holidays70 for 
pioneer industries, and tax allowances71 for high labour intensive and (or) highly acquired local 
resources industries. Supplying Indonesia‐based processors promised to ensure higher margins for 
traders who escapes payment of the export tax. A combination of these industrial incentives has 
encouraged downstream investment and temporarily strengthened the domestic processors’ 
competitiveness. As the domestic market became more viable, it also increased farm price 
transparency, and the upstream market remained competitive. The export tax increased costs for 
exporting traders, but incentivised the downstream industry, shifting buying power to the cocoa 
processors. For the competitive collectors, they escaped this policy by establishing alternative 
markets with established processors, and could offer the same farm gate price as the previously 
dominant international traders (see Appendix F).  
While the competitive position of domestic (nationally‐owned) grinding was challenged by the 
increasing presence and scale of new investment by transnational firms, it significantly increased the 
domestic processing capacity within less than a decade (see Figure 6.2). The pressure of the tariff 
barrier caused transnational firms such as Cargill and Olam to expand their business strategies 
towards a combination of economic scale and scope for value capturing. As well, it put pressure on 
smaller scale processors and limited the scope of value adding by local processors. Thus, to remain 
                                                          
69 Fajar online news, Pengusaha beda sikap soal Permenkeu 67 tahun 2010, published on 07 April 2010, [Retrieved, 
December 2016]  http://news.fajar.co.id/read/88227/45/index.php  
70 Tax holidays: government incentives for significant investment (minimum five million $US), sufficient to drive national 
economic growth for at least five years, to extend maximum after commercially operating for ten years. The firm may claim 
50% discount on income tax.   
71 Tax allowance:  tax discounts for 30% of total investment and compensation for less than ten years. 
108 
 
competitive among the vertically‐integrated and large capacity of transnational firms, the domestic 
processors have no choice, but to obtain different forms of upgrading (re. product, process, 
functional, and inter‐sectoral) or downgrading (function) according to the firm capacity.   
Despite the increased investment in the cocoa processing, existing processors struggled to operate 
at maximum capacity. Investment in this segment was well beyond the supply capacity, resulting in 
strong competition to access beans at the farm level. With annual national cocoa production 
estimated by the government to be 700,000 metric tonnes72 of cocoa bean, the full capacity of the 
cocoa industry instalments is already more than 800,000 metric tonnes (see Figure 6.2). This 
imbalance in supply and demand has impacted mostly on the small‐scale domestic cocoa processors 
who restrict their operations. They can only afford to operate during the harvest season and often 
close‐down temporarily when the global market maintains a high price.  
Figure 6.2 Shifting patterns of cocoa grinding capacity by geography and ownership (2006‐14)   
 
Figure 6.2 shows that in 2006, the cocoa processing structure was primarily located outside of 
Sulawesi, especially on Java with its better infrastructure – although the scale was relatively small (less 
than 20,000 metric tonnes per firm annually). Subsequent to the Indonesian industrial policy 
intervention and the slow improvement of infrastructure outside of Java after 2010, new investments 
in the cocoa industry shifted to strategic locations, and this was dominated by foreign firms. Two new 
processors were established in South Sulawesi (Barry Callebaut and the Transmar group) and three 
companies invested in the business‐friendly region of Surabaya (JB Cocoa and Cargill) and Batam (Asia 
Cocoa Indonesia). The trading firm Olam employed a vertically integrated strategy by establishing a 
cocoa processing facility after first establishing a cocoa plantation in the low labour cost and abundant 
frontier land of Seram Island, Maluku province. The geographic distribution of foreign investment was 
                                                          
72 It is widely felt that government statistics of cocoa production are an over‐estimate and remains debateable among 
cocoa stakeholders. Many industrial actors argue that actual country production was approximately 400,000 metric 
tonnes, a level consistent with International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) estimates.  
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based on each firm’s concern regarding a combination of specific regional assets, including reliable 
access to a supply‐base, a business‐friendly environment (free from multiple taxes), adequate 
infrastructure, and abundant land and low labour costs.    
The application of an export tax strongly contributed to the industrialisation of the cocoa sector. Both 
domestic and transnational processing firms are contributing to the upgrading of Indonesia’s position 
as a significant supply country for processed cocoa products (at least) in the Asian region. However, 
the transnational firms continue to dominate the current growth of downstream production, leaving 
the small‐scale domestic firms continuously struggling to maintain their competitiveness and with 
limited capability to capture long‐term gains. While the government incentive policy has failed to 
improve the competitiveness of most domestic processors, on the other hand it has attracted FDI 
through new investment and capacity expansion. The competitive transnational processors, who are 
now the strategic actors, are currently reshaping the oligopolistic structure of Indonesia’s domestic 
cocoa processing networks. 
The two stages of Indonesian cocoa development show limited role of the state to exercise the roles 
as a development agent, but more emphasised administrative role on creating enabling environment 
for the local actors to remain competitive and better integration into the global cocoa production 
networks. Although the policy supports were not necessarily benefited the local actors, but both 
hands‐off and downstream policy partially has contributed to development of Indonesian cocoa sector 
where the (local and transnational) economic actors were actively (re) shaping the upstream cocoa 
production networks.    
6.3 State engagement with sustainability initiatives 
After decades of limited intervention, the growing cocoa processing industry increased domestic 
demand, and was a driving factor for the government to continue implementing its Gernas kakao 
program, which had been initiated in 2008. However, cocoa processing activities were soon 
dominated by a few transnational firms. This combined with government concerns that supply chain 
sustainability programs were limiting supply accessibility for domestic processors. The growing 
dominance of transnational firms in Indonesia, via both sustainability programs and integrated 
supply chains, raised concerns that the government’s power to retain control over upstream sites of 
production was weakening. This was interpreted by some in the government to be a threat to 
sovereignty. In addition to the market demand for sustainable cocoa, the government attempted to 
establish an Indonesian version of a sustainable Cocoa Certification scheme (ISCocoa). However, it 
was more concerned with improving quality standards for cocoa beans and intervening in upstream 
market structures. 
6.3.1 Ensuring supply to promote industrial investment: the Gernas Kakao program 
Fold and Neilson (2016) claim that initially the government’s interest in upstream development was 
primarily politically driven. The national movement in the form of the Gernas kakao program was 
initiated during the final year of the Vice President’s tenure. Born in South Sulawesi, Jusuf Kalla was 
a candidate for the next presidential election; that is, for the period 2009‐14. The program was used 
to solicit the votes of Sulawesi farmers, whose livelihoods depended on cocoa farming. The 
inauguration of the program reified an agreement with all the Sulawesi government leaders and 
cocoa stakeholders for shared funding, with the largest share of funding allocated to the South, 
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West, Southeast, and Central Sulawesi provinces (Manggabarani, 2011). Gernas Kakao was 
essentially a large‐scale farmer support program that disseminated planting material, fertilisers, 
equipment and payments to farmers to rehabilitate their farms and boost production. 
Sharing similar goals to improve the nation’s cocoa production and quality, the Gernas kakao 
program designing process attracted the attention of the cocoa stakeholders who were also 
members of the CSP forum (dominated by the interests of global lead firms). They had expressed 
their concern over sustaining Indonesian cocoa development, as stated in warta penelitian dan 
pengembangan pertanian (2010)73.   
Gernas is a breakthrough with strong potential to improve the well-being of cocoa farmers, 
especially those from Eastern Indonesia. Because of that, CSP shared ample interest to 
support a successful Gernas kakao program, in the form of sharing opinions through a 
workshop in Bali, on 31 October to 1 November 2008, and through subsequent consultations. 
(Gernas adalah terobosan and berpontesi besar meningkatkan kesejateraan patani kakao, 
khususnya di kawasan timur Indonesia. Berdasarkan tersebut, CSP sangat berkepentingan 
untuk menyukseskan pelaksanaan Program Gernas Kakao, antara lain dengan memberikan 
sumbangan pikiran melalui lokakarya di Bali pada tanggal 31 Oktober - 1 November 2008, 
dan dilanjutkan dengan beberapa pertemuan berikutnya).  
Their statement implied that the CSP members were trying to approach the government to 
participate in the design of the Gernas program. However, the government officials who designed 
the program excluded the CSP as a program partner, emphasizing instead the significant roles of the 
local governments (at the provincial and district levels) and ICCRI in delivering technical assistance.  
Despite their shared interest in improving cocoa farm productivity, the government saw the CSP as 
dominated by transnational firms, with limited participation by domestic firms (Respondent MI1, 
pers. Comm., 2015; Respondent MI2, pers. Comm., 2015). In addition to the previous and existing 
sustainability programs (SUCCESS Alliance, AMARTA, and IFC‐SADI) that had accepted transnational 
firms (MSI, subsidiaries of Olam and Armajaro) as partners, the participation of the CSP members in 
the Gernas program threatened to strengthen the transnationals’ position in the upstream cocoa 
production, putting increased competitive pressure on the domestic firms.  The government’s 
response to the attempt by the CSP members (e.g., Mars processing subsidiary and Cargill trading 
subsidiary) to participate in the national cocoa program was that it saw them as a potential 
competitive threat to domestic actors who were also participating in both cocoa trading and 
processing networks.  
Regarding the Gernas kakao program, although the government showed little interest in entering a 
PPP (public private partnership) with CSP members, the Ministry of Agriculture (specifically the 
Directorate General of Estate Crops) agreed to adopt a mass propagation technology, i.e., Somatic‐
Embryogenesis (SE) that was developed through a partnership between Nestlé and ICCRI. This 
support for the program came in the form of strengthening the quasi‐government Research 
                                                          
73 Lebih fokus dengan Gernas kakao, [Retrieved on April, 2017] 
http://pustaka.litbang.pertanian.go.id/publikasi/wr322105.pdf 
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Institute’s (ICCRI) capacity as the only sub‐contractor supplying Somatic‐Embryogenesis (SE) 
seedlings. Nestlé signed an agreement with ICCRI after transferring SE technology that had assisted 
the Institute to produce large‐scale cocoa seedlings that were further disseminated via the national 
program as part of a business strategy to ‘create shared value’. As the (Legal & Corporate Affairs) 
Director of PT Nestlé Indonesia74, stated: 
We are pleased that with the SE technology granted from Nestlé, based on the partnership 
between Nestlé and ICCRI since 1994, ICCRI has supported the government in developing 
original Indonesian coffee and cocoa plantlets with better yield and resistant to disease in a 
shorter time. 
The strategic partnership established between Nestlé and ICCRI had highlighted a symbiotic 
relationship.  ICCRI’s role as a government program partner served as an intermediate position that 
allowed Nestlé to indirectly influence the government program.  Individual lobbying comes with high 
cost and risk, from negative publicity to an uncertain political outcome. Within this collaboration, 
Nestlé strategically externalised the upstream development costs to a well‐established research 
centre strongly affiliated with the government.  
Due to a combination of weak institutional capacity at different administration levels, lack of public 
publication of the program evaluation assessment and the politicisation of the program, the 
outcome of the program fell short of expectations and was criticised by several scholars. 
Commenting on its failure, Gusli et al. (2011) claim that the centralised dissemination of agri‐inputs 
(SE planting materials and fertilizer) was not supported by local government capability to organise a 
logistic system. Interestingly, Mars had been active in promoting small‐scale seedling businesses 
operated by the farmers across Sulawesi, and the Gernas program threatened the viability of these 
businesses. Bureaucratic ineffectiveness of centralised distribution reflected a lack of practical 
expertise to overcome logistic challenges. For example, attempts to maintain the quality of millions 
of SE seedlings disseminated across vast geographic upland regions were not supported by adequate 
infrastructure, as the supply was monopolised by ICCRI and its contractors (Siregar, 2011).   
Despite the criticism surrounding the implementation of Gernas kakao, the program continued for 
some years since the increased investment in cocoa processing required supply assurance, 
particularly from the smallholder farmers. The continuation of the Gernas program was strongly 
supported by the largest nationally‐owned cocoa processing firm, BT Cocoa, who was also the long‐
term serving director of AIKI (Indonesian Cocoa Industry Association). For example, during the CSP 
workshop on ‘Optimisation of Partnership Towards Sustainable Indonesian Cocoa 2020’, hosted by 
the Ministry of Agriculture on 15 April 2015, the President Director of BT Cocoa specifically targeted 
the government’s policies:  
                                                          
74 Nestlé R&D Tours signed a Cooperation Agreement with the Indonesian Coffee & Cocoa Research Institute, published on 
3 November 2009, [Retrieved on April, 2017]  http://www.nestle.com/media/newsandfeatures/nestle‐tours‐cooperation‐
with‐indonesian‐coffee‐cocoa‐research‐institute  
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To support cocoa sustainability, we (from AIKI) suggest 3 proposals: 1) Implementation and 
continuation of Gernas kakao for several more years is fundamentally necessary since 
investment in cocoa industry now exceeds the Indonesian (annual) production capacity; 2) 
We hope for the elimination of a VAT on primary commodities, since this (financial) burden 
on all cocoa stakeholders makes the idea of sustainable cocoa impossible; 3) AIKI hopes that 
the cocoa export tax is maintained at a flat 15% [instead of the progressive tax between 5-
15% depending on global prices. (Untuk mendukung keberlanjutan kakao, kami dari AIKI 
menyarankan 3 usulan: 1) Gernas kakao mutlak dilakukan dan dilanjutkan untuk beberapa 
tahun kedepan karena investasi industri kakao sudah melebihi kapasitas produksi Indonesia; 
2) Bagaimana mungkin kakao bisa berkelanjutan kalau kebijakan PPN untuk komoditas 
primer menjadi beban semua pelaku kakao, kami harap PPN komoditas primer dihapus; 3) 
AIKI berharap agar bea-keluar kakao ditetapkan flat 15%). 
From the above statement, it seems obvious that the industrial association was expecting the 
government to continue to scale‐up the Gernas kakao program, despite the failures of inept 
government and wasteful use of public funds (see Appendix I). Similar requests were also expressed 
by the Indonesian Industry Minister, who, during the inauguration ceremony for Cargill’s new cocoa 
processing factory in East Java, urged the Ministry of Agriculture to continue the failed Gernas kakao 
program. He was reported as saying (Media Industri, 2014: 37):  
The growing downstream cocoa industry in Indonesia needs to be supported by ensuring 
ample supply of raw material. As such, Ministry of Industry expects support from the relevant 
agencies [Ministry of Agriculture] to support development of the downstream cocoa industry 
through, for example, the continuation of the Gernas program as an effort to ensure the raw 
material supply for domestic cocoa processors. (Tumbuhnya industri hilir pengolahan kakao 
di Indonesia, perlu didukung oleh ketersedian bahan baku yang mencukupi. Oleh karena itu 
Menperin mengharapkan dukungan dari instansi terkait dalam pengembangan hilirisasi 
kakao, seperti Program Gerakan Nasional (Gernas) kakao dapat dilanjutkan kembali sebagai 
upaya menjamin keteresedian bahan baku industri pengolahan kakao dalam negeri).   
Responding to these concerns, the Directorate General of Estate Crops (Ministry of Agriculture) also 
reinforced the continuation of the Gernas kakao program with new ambitious production targets. He 
stated (Media Industri, 2014: 35):    
With implementation of Gernas kakao, national cocoa production will be stimulated to 
become, at the very least, the second largest in the world with a target of 1.1 million tonnes. 
(Dengan dilaksanankan Gernas kakao ini setidaknya produksi kakao nasional didorong 
menjadi nomor dua di dunia dengan target 1.1 juta ton).   
As a result, a few months after the inauguration, newly‐elected president Joko Widodo approved the 
continuation of the Gernas program for 2015 after visiting one farmer group in Mamuju, West 
Sulawesi that had been assisted by BT Cocoa in November 2014.  The program had been earlier 
discontinued and excluded from the 2015 national budget plan (Respondent MI6, pers. comm., 
2015).  However, following pressure exerted by industry actors and affiliated ministries, the new 
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government included the Gernas kakao program in its amended national budget plan75, notably 
renaming it the Cocoa Sustainability Development Program (Program Pengembangan Keberlanjutan 
Kakao, PPKB).   
Despite the government’s expressed interest in promoting the industrialisation of the cocoa sector, 
its capacity to provide extension services was limited. Re‐implementation of the failed program 
signalled political interest. Fold and Neilson (2015) allude to ‘the largely unsuccessful attempt to 
rejuvenate cocoa production through the highly‐political GERNAS program’. The political orientation 
of the program may explain its deliberate exclusion of CSP members and disinterest in partnership 
with foreign lead firms. The whole program, which demonstrated the bureaucratic ineptness of local 
governments and a quasi‐government research institute (ICCRI) also lacked independent evaluation. 
Despite its apparent failure, the domestic industrial association strongly supported the continuation 
of the Gernas program because the program explicitly accommodated the industrial actors’ concerns 
regarding the imbalance between the national cocoa production and the growing cocoa processing 
industry76. Concomitant with the rhetoric of improving cocoa farm production and the farmers’ 
livelihoods, the Gernas program was re‐implemented with the support of the industrial actors, 
marking a counterproductive outcome at the expense of public money and the smallholder cocoa 
farmers. It should, however, also be understood as an attempt to exert upstream control over 
production by a coalition of Indonesian government actors and local industrialists in response to the 
growing influence of foreign lead firms on the GPN for Indonesian cocoa.  
6.3.2 Government attempts to promote sustainability: ISCocoa 
The emerging interest of the transnational firms to engage in sustainability discourse was followed 
by increasing adoption of voluntary sustainable certification, leading to increasing vertical 
coordination with the smallholder farmers. This attracted the interest of the government, 
particularly of the Ministry of Agriculture and, in response, the Directorate General of Processing 
and Marketing of Agriculture77 attempted to introduce the Indonesian Sustainable Cocoa (IScocoa) 
certification scheme in 2013. The government initiative to introduce a sustainability certification 
scheme followed similar attempts for Indonesian Sustainable Coffee (IScoffee) and Indonesian 
Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO). This was affirmed by the Minister for Agriculture during the opening 
                                                          
75 Also referring APBN‐P, Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara‐Perubahan. 
76 Cocoa industry collapse because of crisis (re. cocoa), published on  14 July 2016 
http://industri.kontan.co.id/news/industri‐kakao‐kolaps‐akibat‐krisis ; National production predicted to decline 10%, 
published on 16 August 2016  http://agro.kemenperin.go.id/3973‐Produksi‐Kakao‐Dalam‐Negeri‐Diprediksi‐Susut‐10%25; 
Update: Indonesia cocoa industry expects to process less beans this year,  published on 22 November 2016 
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/22/reuters‐america‐update‐1‐indonesia‐cocoa‐industry‐expects‐to‐process‐less‐beans‐
this‐year.html  
77 Direktorat Jendral Pengolahan dan Pemasaran Hasiil Pertanian (Ditjen PPHP). 
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ceremony at the 87th Meeting of International Cocoa Council on 18 March 2013, supported by the 
International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO)78: 
…The Minister for Agriculture, Suswono, has announced that Indonesia will also implement 
a cocoa certification scheme to convince consumers about the sustainability of Indonesian 
cocoa. Indonesia is moving towards cocoa sustainability. Currently, we are not yet 
implementing it, but we are moving in that direction. This will be in the interest of consumers. 
(…Menteri Pertanian, Suswono menyatakan, Indonesia juga akan menerapkan sertifikasi 
kakao yang dapat meyakinkan konsumen atas keberlanjutan (sustainability) kakao nasional. 
Indonesia akan menuju ke sustainable kakao. Saat ini memang belum diterapkan tapi 
arahnya ke sana, ini untuk kepentingan konsumen). 
Although sustainability has attracted the respective governments’ interest, the concept of 
sustainability introduced via the IScocoa agenda reflected the main issues faced by the domestic 
industrial actors (such as low quality unfermented cocoa, ineffective supply chain and weak 
government control). It did not really address other critical gaps, such as the limited enforcement of 
sustainable cocoa farming practices, reflected in the ongoing application of agro‐chemicals, the 
intensification of farming practices and social issues (declining profits for smallholders) that 
threatened smallholders’ livelihoods. ISCocoa was proposed by the sub‐Directorate of quality and 
standardisation during a Workshop on Indonesian Cocoa, held on 18 September 2013 to address 
upstream cocoa production and distribution concerns79.  
The workshop that promoted ISCocoa identified the underlying rationale for the proposed initiative 
as addressing identified cocoa problems, which in the main appertained to upstream cocoa 
production, and reflected the emerging challenges faced by the industrial actors. These challenges 
included those linked to large scale unfermented bean production, declining cocoa farm 
productivity, and the limited capability of farmer‐based organisations. Despite their concern 
regarding the low quality and tardy development of farmer organisations, the Indonesian cocoa 
farmers enjoyed a competitive farm gate price (at least compared to producers in West Africa) which 
was largely due to a liberal market system. The liberal market system had contributed to a complex 
upstream supply chain structure, but it also stimulated a competitive environment and a competitive 
farm gate price. In addition, a current alternative market (wet‐dry bulk bean and certified cocoa 
bean) has been introduced by the transnational firms along with relatively improved and transparent 
farm level market practices.  
The smallholder farmers had been reluctant to adopt fermentation due to inadequate financial 
incentives. They argued that because cocoa farm yield was declining, it would prove less economical 
to adopt a fermentation process that required additional labour and time, a certain minimum 
                                                          
78 Industrial actors welcoming cocoa certification scheme, published on 18 March 2013, 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/makro/13/03/18/mjumw6‐industri‐sambut‐positif‐sertifikasi‐kakao     
79 Workshop of Indonesian Cocoa on 18 September 2013, presented by Director of quality and standardisation about 
Cocoa sustainability certification, [Retrieved on April, 2017]  http://dekaindo.org/files/pdf/DITJEN%20PPHP‐
Sertifikasi%20Berkelanjutan.pdf 
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volume to affect a fermentation process, and risked failure due to the unfavourable environment 
(Respondent LT8. pers. Comm., 2014; Respondent FG2, 2014). In addition to needing quick cash, the 
farmers were inclined to accept the discount consequences and maintain the production of 
unfermented cocoa bean. High global market demand compromised quality concerns.   
The above identified issues reflected the struggles of (domestic) industrial actors who were facing 
increased competitive pressure on sourcing quality cocoa beans and were unable to adapt to the low 
quality of unfermented beans. While this was essentially expressed as a supply chain management 
concern, it was inaccurate to claim that there was lack of a market partnership between the farmer‐
industrial actors. Since 2010, a few transnational firms (MSI, Olam and ECOM‐TMCI) have engaged 
with the farmer groups (or few cooperatives) or established market relationships based upon 
informal market contracts. Moreover, these informal contracts did not create a captive relationship 
as the certified farmers and (or) groups were not restricted to supplying other markets or buyers 
who offered better prices or services.  However, to date, this marketing relationship between the 
domestic industrial actors and the farmers had not been established due to the disintegration of the 
trading segment and the domestic actors’ dependence on sourcing cocoa bean from independent 
suppliers (collectors and traders). The last issue identified in Figure 6.3 ‐ weak government control 
over cocoa bean production and distribution – was informative. Even though, the liberal market had 
contributed to competitive upstream markets, and had encouraged smallholders to plant cocoa, 
there was a perception that the government needed to intervene directly in supply chain marketing.  
Figure 6.3 Government Rationale for IScocoa13   
 
Following this rationale, the government offered solutions in the form of Ministry of Agricultural 
policies to address upstream cocoa production challenges. Its primary focus was on post‐harvest 
cocoa farming management and reorganising the liberal upstream supply chain structure (See Figure 
116 
 
6.4). The government further proposed an even more interventionist scheme to accommodate the 
implementation of these policies. It would reinforce the national quality standard (SNI 
2323:2008/Amd.1.2010) for cocoa beans by institutionalising the scheme into the local government 
structure to ensure the monitoring and distribution of upstream cocoa production networks (see 
Figure 6.5).  The scheme emphasized the role of the Estate crop department in assisting farmer 
group‐based fermentation unit. The local food safety authority80 would be responsible for quality 
assessment and the verification of traceability. This scheme emphasised the dominant role of the 
government and its authority to intervene in upstream production networks.   
The last of the three Ministry of Agriculture policies suggested in Figure 6.4 led to a draft regulation 
of cocoa bean quality and marketing, became known as the Indonesian Sustainable Cocoa scheme 
(see Figure 6.6). The IScocoa agenda later became a reference for Ministry of Agriculture regulation 
no. 67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014 that addressed the output quality standard for mandatory 
fermentation practises (referring to national standard (SNI 2323:2008/Amd.1.2010) and the farm 
level market system (see Figure 6.5).  Through this combination of the IScocoa certification scheme 
and a regulatory instrument to effect product‐process upgrading, the government attempted to re‐
claim control over both upstream production and marketing. In other words, the government 
proposed integrated state control and verification of agencies at the district, provincial and national 
levels, while the farmer organisations/cooperatives served as certificate holders81.   
Figure 6.4 Ministry of Agriculture rationale for a national cocoa program 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Food safety authority established at the provincial level, currently only 26 of 33 provinces have established the agency.  
81 Ministry of Agriculture regulation, Peraturan Kementrian Pertanian, No. 67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014. [Retrieved on 
April, 2017]   
http://perundangan.pertanian.go.id/admin/p_mentan/Permentan%20No.67%20Tahun%202014%20Persyaratan%20Mutu
%20&%20Pemasaran%20Biji%20Kakao.pdf 
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Figure 6.5 Proposed scheme for a regulated cocoa marketing system13  
 
The proposed IScocoa scheme tabled the multiple roles of the government and affiliated agencies, 
from designing the standards, providing technical assistance, registering farmer groups, and 
assessing cocoa bean quality to the releasing of certificates verifying the origins of the cocoa bean.  
This bureaucratic structure signalled the increasing control of government agencies in the upstream 
cocoa production networks. In contrast, the certification schemes (RA and UTZ) adopted by the 
transnational firms involved these roles being distributed among three actors: 1) Certificate holders 
(often firms) responsible for providing technical assistance and bean quality measurement; 2) 
Certification body (eg. UTZ) responsible for designing the standard, and for registering and releasing 
the certificate; and, 3) Independent auditor responsible for verifying compliance with the standards 
(eg. Control Union). This government contested certification scheme suggested a dominant role of 
multiple agencies to reorganise the upstream cocoa production and distribution. A combination of 
the less independent IScocoa and weak governance system would systemically increase the cost and 
bureaucratic control, opening‐up multiple rent‐seeking opportunities.  
Figure 6.6. Proposed draft Ministry of Agriculture regulation (Permentan) for Iscocoa13 
 
The dominant role of government in the competing sustainable cocoa scheme drew little interest 
from the industrial actors, particularly those transnational firms that had established their owned 
sustainability initiatives and adopted third‐party certification schemes (RA and UTZcertified) better 
suited to the global market demand. Cognisant of the transnational firms’ lack of interest in IScocoa, 
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the Ministry of Agriculture attempted to reinforce Ministry regulation no. 
67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014 following an introductory workshop in May 2015. A decision was 
taken to reinforce the regulation by 201682. However, the process of exerting integrated state‐
control over upstream production remained unclear after Presidential regulation (PP no. 45/2015) 
restructured the Ministry of Agriculture and abolished Ditjen P2HP in April 201583. The current 
mandatory fermentation (Permentan no. 67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014) policy was postponed for 
the second time until 2018.  The postponing of the regulation suggested a lack of Ministry of 
Agriculture capacity to reverse the intensified liberal market.  
IScocoa’s agenda, which was reinforced by Ministry of Agriculture regulation no. 
67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014, suggests a local adaptation of the established North based voluntary 
certification schemes, which reflected to challenges faced by domestic actors rather than a response 
to sustainability concerns. Also, the proposed IScocoa scheme failed to reflect the smallholder 
farmers’ interest on how to minimise their vulnerability to volatile global markets and address falling 
farm profitability.  The government scheme did not attempt to bridge the regulatory gap in 
sustainable farming practices or to consolidate voluntary private certification schemes. It didn’t 
address growing rural‐urban inequality, ongoing social structure change in the rural landscape or 
overtly attempt to minimise environmental destruction.  The stated government program 
beneficiary, state‐assisted farmer groups, struggled to implement fermentation upgrading due to 
uncertain market incentives. Yet, the industrial association urged the government to implement 
mandatory fermentation84 and a national cocoa bean standard. As the head of APIKCI (the cocoa and 
chocolate industries association) stated85:    
Sony [the Head of the Association] assesses the urgency of implementing a national cocoa 
bean standard (SNI 2323:2008/Amd.1:2010) in order to obtain more competitive cocoa bean 
quality and price compared to other cocoa producing countries, whose cocoa has started to 
invade the domestic market. (Sony menilai urgensi sertifikasi SNI kakao memang harus 
didahulukan agar biji kakao Indonesia memiliki kualitas dan harga yang bersaing dengan 
biji kakao dari negara-negara lain yang mulai menginvasi pasar tanah air).  
                                                          
82 Introducing Ministry of Agriculture regulation (Permentan no. 67/Permentan/OT.140/5/2014) on mandatory adopted 
fermentation at the farm level, published on 16 July, 2015, [Retrieved on April, 2017]  http://dekaindo.org/ind/lokakarya‐
menyongsong‐pemberlakuan‐peratuan‐menteri‐pertanian‐2015  
83 The abolition of Ditjen P2HP, published on 8 May 2015, http://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ditjen‐p2hp‐kementerian‐
pertanian‐resmi‐bubar 
84 The cocoa industry urged the government to implement mandatory fermentation regulation for the upstream market 
across Indonesia, published on 14 December 2015. http://industri.kontan.co.id/news/pengusaha‐minta‐kewajiban‐
fermentasi‐kakao 
85 Industrial association statements regarding the government’s attempts to re‐claim the upstream cocoa production, 
published on 2 September 2014. http://industri.bisnis.com/read/20140902/99/254446/sertifikasi‐kakao‐informasi‐
pemerintah‐masih‐belum‐jelas 
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According to Sony, foreign firm domination has reached 75% of total capacity of national 
cocoa processing. Besides the financing challenges, the local firms also face marketing 
challenges. This is because of the brand [reputation] of [the transnational] cocoa processing 
industries. Furthermore, the domestic downstream actors are concerned over the supply 
constrains from collectors. (Bahkan menurut Sony, penguasaan asing mencapai 75% dari 
seluruh kapasitas produksi olahan kakao nasional. Selain keterbatasan dana, para 
perusahaan lokal juga lebih sulit mencari pasar. Hal ini disebabkan merek dari perusahaan 
industri pengolahan biji kakao. Selain itu, pengusaha di sektor hilir produk kakao juga mulai 
resah akibat terhambatnya pasokan bahan baku dari pengepul). 
This statement explicitly shows the domestic firms’ interest to reinforce the national standard and 
gain export value, despite significant declining cocoa bean exports and increasing domestic demand 
from the growing industry. Plainly, the domestic industrial association also criticised the increasing 
concentration of transnational firms in the upstream cocoa production, following the limited supply 
from local trading actors. Increasing transnational firms’ upstream intervention appears to drive 
competitive pressure for the domestic processors, and the enforcement of national standards 
(including Permentan on 67) was expected to constrain these interventions. Despite the 
government’s failure to restore upstream productivity and profitability (the Gernas kakao program), 
the industrial actors pressured the government to implement a national standard for cocoa bean. 
This represented a disincentive for the cocoa farmers who were obliged to adopt a farm level 
fermentation process. The increased import of fermented cocoa bean threatened to compromise 
the domestic sourcing of unfermented bulk cocoa bean. This criticism reflects the reality that lead 
transnational firms entered into competitive sourcing contracts with strategic and specialised 
suppliers (also foreign firms), which excluded the less competitive and small‐scale domestic firms. 
The trajectory of state industrial policy and outside‐in coupling strategy has proven inadequate to 
enrol the domestic firms into global production networks.  
Reflecting back on the previous discussion by the National Reference Group (see discussion 5.2.3 
Extra‐firm bargaining strategy) reveals minimum participation on the part of the Ministry of 
Agriculture in engaging with international certification bodies (Rainforest Alliance, Fair Trade, and 
UTZcertified) vis‐à‐vis harmonising the national‐international standard. This was despite the 
publication of the National Indicators for sustainable cocoa (authored by CSP and Mars) that 
attempted to integrate these schemes with a range of government regulations and policies. 
Transnational firms and certification bodies also commented on a perceived lack of government 
interest (Respondent CC1, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent SS7, 2014). From the government’s 
perspective, the implementation of a certification scheme was dominated by the North‐based 
actors, who were responsible for designing the standard, its implementation and verification 
(Respondent MI6, pers. comm, 2015).  Despite acknowledging the transnational actors’ existing 
support for the smallholder farmers (Respondent MI6, pers. comm, 2015), the government 
perceived a violation of sovereignty, as production conditions were being dictated by North‐based 
actors. This concern was exacerbated by influential lobbying by the struggling domestic processors. 
In addition to recognising the market governance challenges and attempting to protect the domestic 
actors, Deputy Assistant of Estate Crops and Agriculture of the Coordination Ministry of Economy 
who has actively built engagement with the (cocoa) multi‐stakeholder partnerships delivered a 
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diplomatic response and exercised a peculiar sense of authority (Respondent MI1, pers. comm, 
2015):      
We are delighted if the private sector wishes to assist our farmers and establish sustainable 
ecosystems. But, we cannot be dictated to and forced to design certain policies since we are 
constrained to strict regulation in making decisions. This is unlike the flexible nature of the 
private sector, so it is better if the private sector adapted to our regulation. (Kita senang kalau 
pihak swasta berniat membantu petani kita dan membangun ekosistem yang berkelanjutan, 
kami akan dukung. Tapi kami tidak bisa didikte untuk mengambil kebijakan tertentu, dalam 
pengambilan keputusan kami dibatasi oleh aturan yang ketat. Tidak seperti pihak swasta 
yang lebih flexible, lebih baik pihak swastalah yang beradaptasi dengan aturan kita). 
Although the updated cocoa sustainability policy remains uncertain, the government’s engagement 
in sustainability discourse reflected Fold’s (1998) argument pertaining to the power struggles within 
the state as the regulatory options become more limited as a result of intensified globalisation. The 
government’s attempt to reverse the upstream liberal market by re‐organising the upstream cocoa 
production networks suggests the intricate political‐economy relationships between the state and 
local capitalist actors. Yet, this process was followed by the lack of capacity not only to deliver a 
public service and to institutionalise the quality standard, but also an inability to intervene in the 
market driven nature of the contemporary GPN. The government’s motivation regarding ISCocoa 
was explicitly shown to represent the interests of the domestic industrial actors in an increasingly 
competitive supply environment. Based on this discussion, the government’s interest in introducing 
a national version of a sustainability certification scheme was to favour the domestic industrial 
actors, most likely at the expense of struggled smallholder farmers. In effect, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the respective government agencies were trying to create bureaucratic barriers and 
to increase their control over the upstream cocoa production‐distribution in response to the 
increasing domination of the transnational trading‐processing firms.    
6.3.3 State perception of the sustainability initiatives 
The Indonesian government’s participation in sustainability discourse aimed to sustain the country’s 
cocoa sector development, but the government primarily sought to protect the domestic industrial 
actors from the growing power of transnational lead firms. The aim of the Gernas kakao program 
was to improve cocoa farm productivity and quality, but also within the context of securing the 
national supply capacity for industry. The introduction of the IScocoa scheme was motivated by 
concerns related to the challenges faced by the domestic cocoa industry, rather than minimising the 
environmental and social risks that threatened the farmers’ livelihoods. Within this context, the 
government attempted to reclaim the governance of sustainable certification schemes currently 
implemented by north‐based certification bodies rather than regulating content of the standards. 
Domestic firms faced competitive exclusion from participating in the lead firm production networks. 
The government’s Gernas kakao program failed to sustain the smallholders’ competitiveness, to 
further strengthen the country’s supply‐based capacity. Fold and Neilson’s (2015) comments on the 
political motivation to sustain the Indonesian cocoa sector were reminiscent of how the timber 
commodity chain reconstruction was negotiated through political struggles and renegotiation 
between the nation‐state and involved firms (Gellert, 2003). This path dependency of political 
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struggles is identified in the continuation of the failed program under the rhetoric of improving the 
smallholder farmers’ livelihoods. These realities of Indonesian political economy merged with the 
government’s participation in the construction, or adaptation, of the sustainability discourse, which 
did not necessarily emphasise the environmental and social issues promoted by the international 
certification schemes.  Even though the government introduced trade barriers and industrial policy 
incentives to lure foreign direct investment as a coupling strategy with the GPN, the ISCocoa scheme 
essentially created bureaucracy barriers to reorganise upstream cocoa markets. The government 
positioned itself as the protector for local actors, while considering transnational firms as rivals 
rather than partners for upstream cocoa development. They did this through their own innovative 
use of sustainability discourse.   
Following similar concerns shared by the domestic industrial associations and the government, in a 
somewhat ‘rambling’ fashion (Respondents MI1; MI2; MI4, pers. comm., 2015) the government 
officials expressed their concern over the transnational firms’ increased domination of the domestic 
cocoa‐processing segment. As Respondent MI2, 2015 said:  
The fate of local cocoa industry is under pressure because of the presence of large 
[transnational] industries. In such conditions, who is going to protect local industries? If the 
large industries are failing, they can [always] sell the factory and move to the other countries, 
but what happens when the local industries go bankrupt? (Nasib industri kakao lokal sangat 
tertekan dengan keberadaan industri besar, melihat kondisi ini siapa yang akan membela 
industri lokal. Kalau industri besar bangkrut, mereka bisa saja jual pabrik dan pindah ke 
negara lain, trus bagaimana kalau industri lokal yang bangkrut). 
Likewise, the defensive suggestions by government officials to act in the national interest reflected 
the plight of many small‐scale domestic processors who were struggling due to limited operation 
and limited capitalist capability, which taken together spelled idle operation. A similar attitude was 
expressed by a local government official (Respondent MI7, pers. comm, 2015): 
Foreign firms already control the upcountry cocoa market and have direct relationships with 
the farmers. In such a situation, how can local traders compete? (Untuk sektor kakao, 
perusahaan asing sudah menguasai pasar di daerah dan berhubungan langsung dengan 
petani. Kalau sudah begini bagaimana pedagang lokal bisa bersaing).  
The above comments serve to demonstrate the struggle endured by local actors in two functional 
segments, i.e., cocoa processing and trading, to remain competitive within the GPN. With reference 
to losing autonomy in the public sphere, the District government officials not only blamed the effect 
of a speculative liberal market system, but also the competitive pressures exerted by the 
transnational firms in terms of capacity and flexibility in delivering a range of extension services 
(Respondent MI6, pers. comm., 2015; MI8, pers. comm., 2014; MI7, pers. comm., 2015). The 
government’s concern regarding the transnational firms’ capitalist capability and flexibility to ‘spatial 
switching’ was previously identified by Massey (1984 cited in Coe et al., 2004: 472) as the result of 
trans‐local actors’ interactions in the GPN.   
Reflecting upon the two discussions of government interventions and attempts to participate in 
sustainability discourse shows a conflict of political and economic interests. The Ministry of 
122 
 
Agriculture and District governments were trying to protect the domestic industrial‐trading actors 
from increasing upstream competition. This set of industrial policy incentives aimed to improve the 
domestic actors’ competitiveness and national competitiveness proved costly, at the expense of 
public funds and using rhetoric to improve smallholder farmers’ livelihoods. This short‐term gain did 
not address the long‐term gains possible by improving the domestic actors’ technological and 
organisational capacity. But the political struggles over the lack of government capacity to deliver 
public services (Fold and Neilson, 2015) and the devolution of political‐economic authority to 
(decentralised) local governments and institutional agencies ultimately benefited the interests of the 
politicians and economic actors at the expense of vulnerable smallholder farmers.   
As previously suggested by Kaplinsky (2000), simply participating in globalisation doesn’t ensure 
economic or development gains, but rather it is more important to consider how to participate. The 
how to participate is not only emphasising the capability of actors participating in the GPN, but also 
the role of extrafirm actors, including the state, to accommodate and enable the process of 
participating in the global economy. The Indonesian cocoa sector is still dependent on export 
markets, while the oligopoly market structure has increased vertical competitive pressures for local 
actors. Adding to Ong (2000) argument on ways of the state‐globalisation interactions the special 
economic zone (Batam, Indonesia) suggests the foreign corporation have taken the state governing 
authority.  However, in the cocoa sector such authority had not been replaced by the corporation 
because of the hands‐off policy approach and institutional limitations in attempt to reclaim the 
governing authority on exercising governing authority particularly linking to upstream cocoa 
development. The intensified liberal market is unlikely to reverse, while the dominant investment of 
transnational firms cannot rely upon the struggled institutions to deliver extension services and 
ensure the supply security.  For the Indonesian government, the emerging firm sustainability 
initiatives have expanded the lead firm control over upstream cocoa production networks. Most 
importantly, the Indonesian state has interpreted the various lead firm sustainability initiatives 
(including certification, partnership platforms and even donor support activities) as veiled attempts 
to gain control of sites of upstream production. Such an interpretation is understandable given my 
analysis in Chapter 5 that demonstrated how lead firm discourses and practices around sustainability 
were intimately related to emergent governance structures and actor strategies in the sector.    
Conclusion  
This chapter shows how the government has attempted to influence the spatial dynamics of 
domestic cocoa production networks and capture greater value added from global market 
expansion. This was a response to lead firm strategies, many of which embrace sustainability 
discourses, to increase vertical coordination and ensure the supply production. These multi‐scalar 
interests within the emerging firm sustainability initiative have resulted in the attempt to create 
local institutional barriers by the Government of Indonesia even though their limited institutional 
capacity has failed to strengthen the supply capacity of the upstream actors. The government’s 
attempts to improve the country’s comparative advantage and concretise an integrated upstream‐
downstream cocoa production networks were thwarted by the intricate interests of politicians and 
economic actors. The motivation behind these policies explicitly reflected domestic industrial actors’ 
concerns regarding the increased dominance of the transnational firms in the GPN. The 
unprecedented outcome of the transnational firms’ concentration put competitive pressure on 
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sourcing from the competitive upstream market as increased demand was not followed by increased 
supply from the smallholder farmers. Lead firms made the strategic decision to impose a responsible 
sourcing policy in the form of sustainability initiatives that restricted market accessibility and had the 
effect of restricting supply capacity for domestic processing and trading firms.   
Sustainability slowly became a mainstream market instrument used to increase the vertical 
coordination between the lead firms and their (competent) capitalist supply partners, specifically to 
minimise the risks affecting the supply capacity of smallholder farmers. In tandem with the growing 
economic scale and scope of production, the transnational supply partners have strengthened their 
position while gradually excluding the less competitive domestic firms from participating in the 
global production network. In response, the Indonesian state has also mobilised the discourse of 
sustainability (keberlanjutan) in an attempt to both support local industrialists and exert political 
sovereignty. To date, however, these attempts have been mostly unsuccessful (eg. the bureaucratic 
control through Permentan no. 67/2014 has been delayed), and government participation in the 
sustainability discourse remains ambiguous. Moreover, the limited institutional capacity to reverse 
the liberal market trends suggest a continuation of declining state control to intervene in the 
upgrading process. These attempts to control the upstream production networks show an intricate 
relationship between the government and few industrial groups who are resisting the growing 
influence of transnational firms.  
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7. Farm level upgrading and sustainability initiatives  
The emerging firm sustainability initiatives in Indonesia have shown increased farm level 
intervention in areas traditionally delivered by development agencies and the state. With the 
primary goals of improving smallholder farmers’ supply capacity, and addressing various socio‐
environmental issues, the transnational firm initiatives can also be understood as presenting 
opportunities for farm‐level upgrading. Within the context of global value chain analysis, upgrading 
means ‘moving‐up’ in terms of adding value from the product or process, or integrating new 
functions structured to capture greater value by participating in a GVC/GPN (Gereffi, 2005: 171). The 
idea of ‘upgrading’ corresponds to the use of ‘value capture trajectories’ in the GPN literature (Coe 
and Yeung, 2015). Initially, Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identified four type of upgrading: 1) 
Process upgrading, more efficient reorganising of the production system; 2) Product upgrading, 
increase unit value of the product; 3) Functional upgrading, adding and increasing the skill content of 
activities; and, 4) Inter-sectoral upgrading, moving or expanding into a new production system. It 
should be emphasised, however, that several scholars (Barrientos et al., 2010; Selwyn, 2013; Milberg 
and Winkler, 2011) have argued that these four types of economic industrial upgrading are not 
necessarily accompanied by social upgrading, and that social upgrading may also occur in the 
absence of economic upgrading.  The idea of upgrading does, however, provide a framework for 
conceptualising opportunities for livelihood improvements and rural / regional development within 
the GPN.  
Chapter 6 addressed the institutional limitations of the Indonesian government’s attempt to 
strengthen Indonesian supply capacity by introducing the Gernas Program. The state’s inability to 
successfully facilitate the involvement of local industrialists in the GPN reflects similar developments 
in other major cocoa producing countries, such as the Ivory Coast where policies to encourage 
transnational investment in local processing delivered only marginal benefits to the local economy 
(Talbot, 2002).  Looking back on previous non‐state sustainability programs initiated in the early 
development of the Indonesian sector, value chain interventions primarily focused on product and 
process upgrading, and creating a direct linkage with the global market. However, these programs 
delivered limited outcomes. For example, the USAID‐AMARTA86 cocoa program attempted to 
encourage the upstream involvement of lead cocoa firms, but failed to deliver a high‐quality and 
stable supply of cocoa beans (Henriksen et at., 2010). Neilson and McKenzie (2015) argue to the 
effect that these interventions simply encourage adoption of new technology in the absence of clear 
incentives. As such, they generated enhanced awareness about agronomic options amongst farmers, 
but not necessarily a willingness to apply those same practices. The adoption of new technologies 
required significant financial investment and additional labour that was not necessarily 
compensated by improved market prices.  
The firm‐based sustainability initiatives introduced new opportunities for different forms of 
upgrading. By applying a certification scheme along with the in‐house design of the Mars CDC‐CVC 
business oriented‐outreach model, Mars aimed to improve the yields and profitability of smallholder 
                                                          
86 United States Agency of Development International‐Agribusiness Market Support Activity (USAID‐AMARTA) 
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farming production system – a form of process upgrading. In this chapter, I will now identify the 
different form and value capture trajectories of farm level upgrading introduced via the 
implementation of certification schemes and the Mars CDC‐CVC business extension model.  These 
increased upstream interventions suggest the substantial role of the transnational cocoa‐chocolate 
firms in influencing the local production system structure as well as smallholders’ livelihoods. I will 
assess the extent to which upgrading opportunities through sustainability initiatives are translated 
into improved livelihood outcomes for cocoa farmers in Indonesia. To do so requires a more 
sensitive understanding of the rural development context and prevailing livelihood strategies within 
cocoa‐growing communities. The following sections discuss different forms of farm‐level upgrading, 
while exploring who captures the value of sustainability‐linked upgrading, and considers the 
resulting livelihood trajectories for smallholder farmers.    
7.1 Cocoa-based livelihoods on Sulawesi  
Cocoa production on Sulawesi is overwhelmingly dominated by smallholders who spontaneously 
adopted cocoa in the 1990s. This cocoa boom period coincided with a growing population, and while 
land was initially abundant, there was eventually limited land for the continued expansion of cocoa 
farming. The average land holding has shrunk from more than 2.5 hectares in the 1990s (Ruf and 
Yoddang, 2004: 180‐81) to 1.4 hectares per household today. This relatively small scale of cocoa 
farms also included individual plots claimed by a single farmer in multiple locations. Farmers who 
have reached middle age either pass on their small plots to their heirs or have them managed by 
relatives. Following an erosion of forest rent, the farmers acknowledged that maintaining the cocoa 
farms has become increasingly labour intensive and costly, and that often there is insufficient return 
to support their livelihoods. However, they remain optimistic and will continue to maintain cocoa 
farms, as commented by a farmer (Respondent GL4, pers. comm, 2014): 
Although our cocoa farms are less productive and infested with diseases, along with other 
local farmers I will not abandon cocoa farming. Because this is an export crop, its price never 
declines too much. Because of cocoa, many of my friends have children who have studied in 
the university and they have gone on the Hajj. (Meskipun kebun kakao sudah kurang 
berproduksi dan kena penyakit, tapi saya dan petani disini tidak mau tinggalkan kakao.  
Karena ini tanaman ekspor dan harganya tidak pernah turun sekali. Karena kakao, banyak 
teman disini yang anaknya sekolah sampai universitas dan pergi haji).     
Driven by economic interest, the adoption of cocoa farming in Sulawesi was divided into two 
approaches. Many of the cocoa farms in the Luwu region are monocropped, with limited shade trees 
and intercropping. In West Sulawesi regions like Polewali Mandar, the adoption of cocoa was 
intercropped with already established native fruit trees (Durian and Langsat) and coconut trees. Out 
of this intercropping, cocoa provided the major revenue for the family farming business, because the 
fruit trees are seasonal and primarily depend on the domestic market.   
7.1.1 Household structure and farm characteristics 
The following description of cocoa farmer characteristics was based on a preliminary survey of the 
sustainable certification scheme in Polewali Mandar District of West Sulawesi, (Hafid et al, 2013, 
refer also to Appendix E). In Sulawesi, the household structure is patriarchy‐oriented and farming is a 
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family business. Family members – both male and female – work together to manage and maintain 
the farms. Eighty per cent of households in West Sulawesi comprise more than four individuals, as 
the members collectively manage the farms and undertake the harvest. The middle‐aged farmers 
are generally literate, with most of their children finishing their schooling at least to the primary 
level (see Table 7.1).  
In West Sulawesi, cocoa farm yields have declined over the last decade leaving the farmers to face 
bust periods with limited alternative livelihood options (Respondents FG2 and FG3, 2014; 
Respondents FG5, FG6, FG8, 2015). A perennial crop, cocoa is usually harvested twice a year over a 
five‐month period. Ideally, the farmers spend the remaining seven months re‐investing in farm 
maintenance, a replenishment period often marked by minimum inputs since farmers claimed that 
they already struggled to meet their daily subsistence needs. Agro‐chemical spraying to combat 
widespread pest‐disease infestation, however, has become a common practice among the cocoa 
farmers because of the labour efficiency (Neilson et al., 2011) and relatively low cost.  
Table 7.1 Characteristics of cocoa farmers in Polewali Mandar District, West Sulawesi (n: 158) 87 
 
 
                                                          
87 Based on a Sustainability impact assessment survey I undertook in West Sulawesi, 2012. An ACIAR‐funded the research 
project: Improving the sustainability of cocoa production in Eastern Indonesia through integrated pest disease and soil 
management in an effective extension and policy environment, HORT/2010/011. 
1. Household structure    
‐ Farmer age (average) 
‐ Less than 3 individuals  
‐ 4‐5 individuals  
‐ More than 6 individuals 
42 years  
22% 
47% 
31% 
 
2. Highest education  Farmers (n: 158) Household members (n:713) 
‐ No enrolment  
‐ Primary (9 years)  
‐ High school (and university) 
13% 
74% 
13% 
19% 
68% 
13% 
3. Livelihood (income sources)   
Estimated annual income 
‐ All sources  
‐ Only cocoa           
‐ Cocoa/ha farm 
 
777 US$ 
494 US$ 
378 US$ 
 
4. Cocoa farm (Mean)   
‐ Farm size (Ha)  
‐ Years of growing cocoa  
‐ Annual production  
‐ Yield (kg/ha)  
‐ May (peak month) harvest in 2012 
1.4 
20 
481 kg 
358 kg 
113 kg 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Marketing (majority sold to)   
‐ Transnational trader  
‐ Local trader  
‐ Collector    
‐ No answer 
43% 
2% 
48% 
7% 
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In an effort to combat declining cocoa farm yields and ongoing pest‐disease infestation, short‐term 
gain was introduced via previous programs and projects (e.g., Gernas kakao and AMARTA). This 
involved applied grafting of unproductive trees and regular application of agro‐chemical spraying 
and fertilizer. However, the yield outcomes generally failed to match farmer aspirations. The project‐
based programs had limited impact on achieving long‐term increases in cocoa yield and farm 
profitability. Farmers felt that the interventions had limited impact on reducing their vulnerability to 
risk and uncertainties related to environmental deterioration and global market fluctuations.  
As farming serves as the primary livelihood activity within these rural communities, the farmers who 
participated in our survey stated that cocoa farming represented more than sixty per cent of their 
total annual income. Additional income accrued from other crops, livestock, and temporary casual 
work outside the regions. However, some of the ‘better off’ farmers hired casual workers for 
laborious works (e.g., pruning, applying fertilizer, and harvesting), but these jobs were usually short 
term and uncertain. Previous government project such as Prima Tani88 has introduced integrated 
cocoa farming practices by raising livestock (goats) on cocoa farms. But this top‐down program 
approach had limited capacity for being scaled up and there was limited market demand for goats 
(initially at least, although some respondents more recently claimed that demand from the 
neighbour regions had encouraged goat farming ‐ Respondents FG8; FG9; FG19, 2015). Their hope is 
to minimise their vulnerability from dependence on cocoa farming and capture opportunities in 
relatively stable local markets. 
7.1.2 Cocoa farming costs  
Deterioration of forest rent has led to increased costs associated with cocoa farming. Most of the 
earlier cocoa sustainability projects promoted good farming practices from a rather linear 
perspective and the assumption that increased knowledge about ‘Good Agricultural Practices’ would 
result in higher adoption rates, increasing yields and improved livelihoods. Upgrading to good 
farming practices, however, was associated with higher input applications (especially labour) than 
conventional farming practices. Despite neglecting to consider local livelihood constraints and 
limited capital resources, and the possibility that demands on rural labour were higher than 
assumed, farmers were expected to voluntarily adopt the practice. Instead, they opted to maintain 
the conventional low input farming practices. In response, in 2012, a pilot project introduced a 
program involving a combination of micro‐finance and technical assistance. This problem‐driven 
Cocoa Innovation Project (CIP)89 aimed to maintain farm profitability by providing access to 
microfinance and phone‐based extension services. While these accessible financial services were 
restricted to investment in farming projects only, the farmers gained a certain degree of authority 
                                                          
88 Prima Tani program introduced in 2005 by Agriculture Research and Development agency, as instrument to link the 
research innovation and agribusiness actors and stakeholders, [Retrieved on April, 2017] 
http://pustaka.litbang.pertanian.go.id/publikasi/wr27505j.pdf  
89 This Cocoa Innovation Project (2012‐2013) was a continuation of the AMARTA II program. This two‐year project funded 
by the World Cocoa Foundation and ACDI/VOCA, also partnered with BTPN bank, Armajaro trading firm and the 
International Finance Corporation. 
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over selecting which practices and types of input to willingly adopting based on their personal 
assessments. 
The project was implemented in four major cocoa‐producing regions including North Luwu and 
Polewali Mandar. Based upon information gathered through the pilot project (Respondent SS23, 
2015 and see Appendix H), Figure 7.1 shows that most of the farmers from both districts expressed 
concern over pest infestation. The Figure shows higher investment in pest outbreak targeting than 
improving the soil quality. For example, all the assisted farmers from Polewali Mandar had invested 
in both chemical and organic pesticides, whereas only half of their number were willing to invest in 
fertilizer. Also, all the assisted farmers from North Luwu who applied pesticides and fertilizers 
preferred chemical over organic inputs. A comparison of farming practices employed in different 
districts shows a higher percentage of North Luwu farmers were willing to invest their capital across 
most of the farming practices. Only half of the Polewali Mandar farmers were willing to invest in 
harvesting and post‐harvest practices such as bean sorting and drying. Overall, the total annual 
investment in cocoa farming was approximately US$200, which is almost fifty percent of the total 
revenue per hectare (see Table 7.1). The project’s final report showed a higher rate of debt return 
identified among the North Luwu farmers than those from Polewali Mandar District.   
Figure. 7.1 Farmer annual investments in cocoa farming practices in 201490 
 
Figure 7.1 not only shows the farming cost structure, but also how much farmers spent relative to 
how many actually performed the task: clearly, they were more concerned about pest and disease 
infestation. Their concentrated efforts try to minimise the risk, which meant paying less attention to 
replenishing the exhausted soil from the forest rent. Although most of the North Luwu farmers were 
willing to invest in fertilizer, their capital investment in organic pesticides was much lower than in 
chemical pesticides as the farmers were more familiar with chemical applications. The farmers’ 
unwillingness to invest in fertilizer was likely related to perceptions of high cost.  Meanwhile, the 
pesticide brands promoted by the agrochemical company agents were associated with lower costs 
and labour efficiency, despite the limited verification of the brands effectivity. Also, there is a 
possibility of pest‐disease resistance after long periods of application. The farmers’ high investment 
                                                          
90 Raw data (see Appendix J) was analysed with the permission of the project manager. The project has completed in 2013.   
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in commercial pesticides may only temporarily deliver the desirable effects, and are likely unable to 
ensure long‐term effect such as eliminating infestation from the farm ecosystem.        
7.1.3 Livelihood risks and opportunities  
Besides their ongoing pest‐disease problems, cocoa farmers also face the uncertainty of 
environmental risk due to changing weather patterns, e.g., drought, floods and landslides. A 
combination of high environmental risk and exhausted cocoa farm conditions is contributing to a 
decline in farm yield, by extension further affecting the smallholder farmers’ incomes and 
livelihoods. As the above section shows, there is a high cost of managing these risks accounting for 
an estimated half of total annual revenue from cocoa farming, and much of this was spent on agro‐
chemical applications. Meanwhile, the market price is based on global supply‐demand dynamics 
rather than reflecting to the actual cost of cocoa farm management. Their understanding of this risk 
has prompted the Sulawesi farmers to own multiple locations of small‐plot farms as a strategy to 
minimise their vulnerability to mass deterioration of farm productivity. Although this strategy 
demands extra labour and is less efficient, overall it seems to have contributed to the slowing down 
of the vulnerability of the declining farming profitability. The farmers from West Sulawesi said that, 
over time, heavily damaged farms tended to be abandoned leaving the farmer to concentrate on the 
relatively productive farms (Respondent FG6, 2015; Respondent FG8, 2015).   
Although the farms have become important livelihood instruments to generate household income, 
re‐investing and maintaining farm productivity was far from the household spending priority. For 
example, the cocoa farmers from the Polewali Mandar region were asked open‐ended questions 
regarding how they spend the revenue generated from their cocoa farms (Figure 7.2). The relatively 
low priority afforded to farm inputs is indicative of their unwillingness to reinvest on farm, and 
behind the non‐productive items of consumption. e.g., house rehabilitation, attending ceremonies 
and buying new furniture. From this perspective, it seems that social aspects gained more interest, 
particularly the preserving of social relationships and improving the family’s social status among the 
rural communities. For example, attending ceremonies to rehabilitate the traditional wooden houses 
into brick houses is now a priority to upgrading the social standard of living (see Appendix C.2). 
Investment in children’s education is also reflective of broadly held desire for children to work in the 
non‐agricultural sector. 
The ongoing implementation of certification schemes was focused on farm management and 
establishing vertical coordination between the upstream and industrial actors in the interests of 
collectively establishing a sustainable supply chain. Driven and incentivised by the lead firms, the 
ongoing schemes were implemented by supply partners dominated by transnational trading firms. 
The supply partners, who were also known as certificate holders, were responsible for establishing a 
farmer‐based control system (Internal Control System). The ICS serve as an ‘arms‐length’ control 
system for the firms to ensure cocoa sourcing occurs from certified farms and that proper record 
keeping is maintained. Control over the ICS by the firm, and its position as the formal certificate 
holder, means that it has effective management operational control of the ICS, including over the 
distribution of any certification premiums. The nature of the voluntary volume‐based premium, in 
addition to the actual price, was unlikely to motivate genuine practice change amongst certified 
farmers given their low levels of productivity. Regarding the transparency issue surrounding the 
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incentive distribution, many non‐government organisations and cooperatives argued that a 
certification scheme would only benefit the certificate holder rather than ensuring fair distribution 
among the smallholder farmers (Respondent SS13, 2014; Respondent SS14, 2014).  
Figure 7.2 Farmer expenditure priorities from cocoa farm revenue  
 
It is difficult to claim with any certainty what the farm‐level impacts are from certification schemes. 
My 2012 impact assessment (the findings linking to livelihood from which are presented in Appendix 
K) examined the early implementation of a certification scheme in the Polewali Mandar region 
delivered by a local NGO who owned the Wasiat and Amanah cooperatives. This involved a 
comparison of certified farmers against nearby non‐certified farmers. Wasiat provided technical 
assistance for the adoption of an UTZcertified scheme under a market contract with Armajaro 
trading, which was supplying Nestlé. The farmers who participate in the certifications scheme 
showed certain degree of knowledge on prohibited chemicals (including the brands) and seeking for 
the recommended (less harmful) agrochemicals to comply with the standards.  Applying 
agrochemical was preferable than adopting manual maintenances (e.g. frequent weeding, removing 
infected pod, and regular pruning) to obtain healthy farms, yet the manual means more labours 
investment in addition to high cost of inputs application. Both standards did not prohibit the 
application of chemical fertilisers, but encourage the application of organic ones that can be recycled 
from the pods and pruned branches, to combine with manures application, and (or) intercropping 
with nitrogen fixing trees.   
Linking to financial accessibility, the both groups of farmers were engaging in different degrees with 
financial services, although certified farmers had better access to financial services from 
cooperatives and local banks (Figure 7.3). The non‐certified group tended to obtain loans from local 
collectors and had higher bank debts than the certified group who had lower debts than other 
providers. Based on this debt structure, the non‐ certified farmers appear more vulnerable to falling 
into a debt trap than the certified farmers whose debts remained within the range of cocoa farm 
revenue.    
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Despite the up‐country presence of transnational firms, many farmers maintained their relationship 
with collectors and local traders who often also served as informal loan providers. This combination 
of economic and social relationships is less likely to collapse. Responding to the farmers’ need, the 
local trading actors were also providing farming inputs (supplies of fertiliser and agrochemical 
pesticides) that seemed less likely to be replaced by the formal institutions or to be eliminated from 
the upstream production networks.  
Figure 7.3 Comparing micro‐finance accessibility between the certified and non‐ certified farmers    
  
Different ethnic groups within Indonesia appear to adopt different livelihood approaches. One 
previous study (Fahmid, 2013) linked ethnicity with willingness to innovate, arguing that Bugis and 
Mandar farmers were more individualised than Javanese migrants, who tended to have strong 
solidarity and inclined towards group work.  The study identified that the Bugis farmers were 
focused on investing in productive capital accumulation of land expansion and the application of 
agro‐inputs, the Mandar farmers from West Sulawesi were focused on applying their local resources 
and tacit knowledge as key investment, while the Javanese farmers were more familiar with 
upgrading to intensified practices of cocoa farm management.   
Recognising these cultural differences, and the broader limitations of formal institutions to support 
upstream cocoa development, Mars introduced an individual approach to extension delivery. This 
individual approach reflected the importance of economic motivations of behaviour within cocoa 
farming communities, which were incorporated within the farming business model, which Mars 
refers to as a Cocoa Village Clinic (CVC). This approach introduced additional functions that 
previously were undertaken by the local traders to support cocoa development, but more focus on 
farming development such as agro‐inputs and extension service providers. As this business extension 
model focus on improving cocoa farm productivity, finding the effectivity of commercial agro‐inputs 
and integrated farming practices are tested and verified in CDC before further distributed across 
CVCs. Therefore, Mars holds the control over the farming innovation and service coordination 
system to reshape the upstream cocoa production development.  Mars adapted these functions to 
specifically focus on the delivery of cocoa farming services embedded within the CDC‐CVC extension 
model (see Table 7.2). Further discussion of functional upgrading introduced through CVC farming 
business model is discussed in section 7.2.3.  
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Table 7.2 Summary of CVC functions and outcomes in the Luwu region 
CVC Function Activities Current Outcome 
Supplying agro‐inputs 
 
 
‐ Entering collaboration with the agro‐input 
providers. 
‐ Regular coordination with CDC on producing 
desirable planting materials. 
‐ Engaging and collaboration with farming tool 
providers. 
‐ Improving access to agro‐inputs and 
farming tools 
‐ Updated technology and market 
demand 
 
Extension services 
 
 
 
 
‐ Building coordination with government officials 
and local leaders. 
‐ Establishing and maintaining demonstration 
plots. 
‐ Actively engaging with their peer farmers in 
promoting CVC business and updated technology 
on farming practices. 
‐ Facilitating micro‐finance accessibility with 
banking or other financial support. Managing 
Internal Control System (ICS) for adopted 
certification. 
‐ Reputation as reliable and eligible 
contractor for government or non‐
government projects 
‐ Maintaining the attractiveness of 
cocoa farming 
‐ Having economic and social 
relationships with their peer farmers 
‐ Improving micro‐finance accessibility 
with formal institutions  
7.2 Farm-level upgrading through sustainability initiatives 
Upgrading is a lengthy and complicated process. At the industrial level, firms are continuously 
seeking economic rent from innovation and repeatedly upgrading to higher value‐added production 
process. At the upstream level, the upgrading process has been highly dependent upon value chain 
intervention by the extra‐firm actors including government and development agencies and, more 
recently, the certification bodies. The following sections discuss different forms of upgrading 
embedded in the sustainability initiatives as currently implemented by most of the transnational 
supply partners and their implications for rural smallholder farmers.   
7.2.1 Product upgrading 
The term product upgrading can be applied to the process of improving cocoa bean quality and 
achieving a higher per unit price. This type of upgrading is challenging in the Indonesian cocoa 
sector, where the ‘hands‐off’ government policy created competitive markets with few quality 
controls and distinctive cocoa development in Indonesia. In contrary to Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 
where the state plays crucial roles to properly institutionalise product upgrading (designing, 
implementing and enforcement of quality controls). In Indonesia, profits are sought through volume‐
based production rather than seeking higher margins through quality differentiation.  The global 
market was willing to compromise on buying unfermented beans in exchange for stable bulk 
production, thus price discounting was applied rather than outright rejections. A combination of a 
lack of early technical assistance and relaxed market conditions contributed to retaining the 
production of bulk unfermented cocoa bean for the global market.  
At the farm level, initial attempts to encourage quality‐oriented product upgrading was undertaken 
by local trading actors (collectors and traders). Because the smallholder farmers were often seeking 
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quick cash, they were hesitant to prolong the drying days, as it involved additional time and labour. 
It was only the value chain interventions via sustainability projects early in the 2000s that 
encouraged relatively direct access to the global market via transnational trading actors that quality 
expectations became more widespread. Eventually these interventions contributed to application of 
standardised quality measures, slowly reducing the asymmetrical knowledge gap between farmers 
and the local trading actors, where quality‐based price differentiation emerged. 
The emerging firm sustainability initiatives have intensified and driven reinforcement of quality‐ 
based assessment along with the growing interest in adopting certification schemes. Transnational 
traders are using the farm‐gate price to incentivise desirable quality attributes, with an additional 
premium to encourage volume‐based certified bean transactions. This process of product upgrading 
is slowly reshaping quality based assessment and incentives at the farm level.  
a. Quality-based assessment 
Early quality‐based assessment was introduced by various transnational trading firms as they slowly 
increased their economic scale via their upcountry presence in the dominant cocoa producing 
regions. However, the early presence proved challenging for the firms to remain competitive 
because the established local trading actors had built captive relationships with the smallholder 
farmers. By collaborating with cocoa sustainability projects (SUCCESS, AMARTA, READ, and SCPP) 
that had promoted value chain interventions, the transnational trading firms introduced a direct 
global market linkage with the smallholder farmers as a more transparent alternative export market. 
However, these collaborations also had their limitations when it came to achieving economic scale of 
direct sourcing (Henriksen et al., 2010). This was in part due to declining farm yields, even though 
the market promised higher prices from the transparent quality assessment and farm‐level market 
price.   
The emerging demand for sustainably certified products meant that quality‐based incentives 
became mainstreamed. This transparency of marketing both attracted and encouraged the farmers 
to allocate more labour to comply with the quality requirements, e.g., more drying days, reducing 
waste and mould, and supplying a uniform bean size. The quality‐based assessment has now also 
been adopted by the local traders as a way of maintaining both trust and economic relationships 
with the smallholder farmers, although the assessment remains partial. 
The quality requirements set out by the firms matched those referred to in the national standard for 
cocoa beans (SNI 2323:2008/Amd.1:2010). However, the extent to which the self‐defined 
requirements firmly referred to the national standard was highly dependent on the firm. While the 
adopted certification scheme (RA and UTZ) did not define the product standard, the scheme put 
more focus on the process standard of managing the agro‐environment appropriately and 
maintaining acceptable social practices. The self‐defined quality requirements were regionally 
adjusted to meet local conditions. For example, the same firm may apply different quality 
requirement assessment records in different regions. More complex quality requirements were 
applied in North Luwu due to the emerging demand for partially fermented cocoa bean, but less 
complex requirements were applied in the Polewali Mandar region (see Appendix D).  
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Despite the differences in defining cocoa quality requirements, compliance generally required 
increased investment in labour, assessment instruments, and was time consuming. The high cost of 
applying effective quality assessment has created an entry barrier for some local trading actors to 
integrate into their purchasing practice. Indeed, some transnational trading firms temporarily close 
their buying stations during the off‐peak season to minimise labour costs (Respondent LT5, pers. 
comm., 2014; Respondent LT12, pers. comm., 2014). Quality assessments were based on random 
sampling, i.e., manually counting the cocoa bean to define the uniformity of size, and a cutting test 
to determine the incidence of defective beans (the level of mouldy, slaty, insect‐damaged, 
germinated or flat bean). Due to the nature of random sampling, the small volume supplied by the 
farmers challenged the efficiency of farm level transactions, since manual assessments were time‐
consuming. To overcome this inefficiency, the certification standards suggested the establishment of 
an ICS (or group) as a collecting hub to improve the vertical coordination of the collection and 
assessment process.   
With the growing adoption of sustainable certification schemes, the quality standards definition has 
extended to farming production processes rather than the cocoa bean itself, hence increasing the 
complexity of defining quality content (as previously identified by Reardon et al., (2002) and Ponte 
and Gibbon (2005)). Reflecting on the context of sustainability initiatives, the lead branded chocolate 
firms played a significant role on dictating to the contract suppliers which scheme should be adopted 
and how it should be coordinated and integrated to the specific segment of the supply chain. 
Following the externalisation of cocoa processing and industrial chocolate production functions to 
contract suppliers, sustainability initiatives appear to add another function that further contributing 
to shape labour division and create an entry barrier for some supply chain actors.   
The process of mainstream quality‐based assessment introduced by the transnational trading firms 
emphasized a capitalist capability that was limited among the local trading actors. Although the 
quality requirements remain self‐defined, integrating a quality system into the trading process 
would require substantial investment in human and financial capital. As quality assessment becomes 
mainstream practice and the ICSs become more capable of performing the collection function, this 
trajectory is slowly excluding the small‐scale local trading actors from the global production network. 
For participating farmers, this offers an opportunity for product upgrading through quality‐based 
price differentiation. However, quality improvement also comes at a cost and not all farmers are 
willing to make the necessary investments of time and money, and increasingly rigorous quality 
assessments are removing the option for farmers to engage in ‘downgrading’ as a livelihood option.  
b. Sustainable market premium 
Alongside the quality‐based incentive, the implementation of certification schemes has introduced a 
volume‐based premium for complying with the certification standards or codes of conduct. Lead 
manufacturing firms were offering incentives to encourage the adoption of the certification 
schemes, and this presented an opportunity for their strategic processor suppliers to pass this on to 
their own farmer supply base. The schemes were also adopted by a few cooperative and farmer 
groups, albeit with financial support from the North based international organisations or non‐
economic actors. As dominant certificate holders, major trader‐processor firms were responsible for 
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managing compliance to standards as well as the distribution of market premiums across the 
supported ICSs. 
Although the voluntary premium has encouraged the adoption of certification, the cocoa farming 
practices defined by the certification standards are not necessarily oriented towards improving bean 
quality and farm yield. Shifts towards environmentally friendly and socially responsible farming 
practises are not necessarily aligned with definitions of product quality, and market incentives for 
certified cocoa was volume‐based. Regarding the declining farm yields, the smallholder farmers who 
participated in the certification scheme claimed that the annual premium was inadequate to support 
their livelihoods (Respondent GL5, 2014; Respondent GL6, 2014). This incentive has more benefit for 
the firms’ certificate holders due to the volume based incentive obtain from the large quota of their 
market contract. Despite, the fact that the alternative market introduced by the scheme has 
minimised the smallholder farmers’ dependence on local trading actors, a few farmer leaders remain 
sceptical on the positive outcomes regarding implementation of the scheme, Respondent GL4 (2014) 
explained:   
The certification schemes were simply intended to build a direct relationship between farmers 
and transnational firms, but they were unable to dismantle the social relationships that existed 
between the farmer and local traders. (Sertifikasi hanya bertujuan untuk membangun 
hubungan antara petani dan perusahaan internasional, tapi tidak bisa memutus rantai 
silaturahmi antara petani dan pedagang).  
With the (relatively insignificant) price premium for compliance being passed down to assisted 
farmers along with a degree of price transparency, farmers have been empowered to choose and 
alter their marketing options. For example, they can sell to local traders when there are labour 
constraints and a need for quick cash, but when the price is more competitive and they have the 
resources to meet quality standards, the farmers prefer selling to international traders.   
The narrow focus of the on‐farm extension services and disregard for substantial issues like easy‐
flexible access to micro‐finance and daily basic needs, have led the farmers to claim that the 
implementation of the schemes is more oriented towards simply administrative compliance and 
communication of the updated standards rather than actual service delivery (Respondent FG3, 2014; 
Respondent FG8, 2015). In response to this criticism, the certificate holder staff claim that they are 
only following the standards and their own premiums need to be negotiated annually with their 
customers. Due to the voluntary market incentive, the certificate holders have to maintain and 
support the sustainability teams who deliver extension services and coordinate the collection 
function at the farmer (Respondent LT14, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent LT5, pers. comm., 2014).  
The farmers assisted by the cooperative and non‐government organisations acknowledged that 
there is more transparency of negotiated premium communicated to the farmers in these cases. 
However, because the cooperatives generally lack economic scale and organisational capability to 
meet the market contract quotas (see Chapter 5), the extension of certificate holder status to 
farmers is highly dependent on external supports. The cooperative staff acknowledged the 
challenges in complying with rigorous market barriers and obtaining direct sourcing from 
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smallholder farmers, such as the complex quality assessments and sourcing policies exercised by the 
customers.     
As previously argued by Jha et al., (2011), due to volume‐based incentives and persistently low 
yields, the economic implications of the certification schemes for the smallholder coffee farmers’ 
livelihoods were relatively insignificant. However, the scheme has contributed to increased 
engagement between the smallholder farmers and the transnational firms and minimised farmer 
dependence on local traders, but it has not necessarily improved the functioning of farmer based 
organisations and cooperatives. Reflecting on the adoption of Rainforest Alliance in the Ivorian 
cocoa sector, it has been shown that the certification premium only covered the costs of agro‐
chemical application and farmer training, while compliance cost varied widely (Lemeilleur et al., 
2015). This perspective shows that market premiums from certification may have limited financial 
incentive for the smallholder farmers, but the farmers can still benefit from the technical assistance 
as a way to capture value after improving farming practises.   
7.2.2 Process upgrading  
The lead firms’ primary goal in implementing upstream intervention in the Indonesian cocoa sector 
has been to ensure the supply capacity of the smallholder farmers.  Following the decline of cocoa 
farm yield and the farmers’ competitiveness, a series of sustainability initiatives proposed earlier has 
focused on improving the actual process of cocoa farming, usually through ‘Good Agricultural 
Practices’. As repeatedly debated by the industrial actors, a change of farming practices is 
fundamental for obtaining a desirable quality of cocoa bean. In other words, product upgrading is 
defined by process upgrading. Lead firms’ upstream intervention via sustainability initiatives 
emphasizes process upgrading through agronomic improvement of small farming practices. 
Technology transfer is therefore embedded within virtually all sustainability initiatives, and this 
offers an opportunity for farmers to engage in process upgrading by producing cocoa in a more 
efficient manner.   
a. Improved farm yield 
As earlier suggested, certification standards or codes of conduct have limited direct concern over 
encouraging improved farm yield, while the lead firms’ participation in sustainability discourse in 
Indonesia was driven by insecure supply capacity. This explicit goal resembles the Mars concept of 
upstream cocoa development, as the CDC‐CVC extension model aims to ‘triple the yield on cocoa 
farms’. However, Mars argues that the CDC‐CVC concept was more comprehensive than the 
previous short‐term gain practices such as improving good agricultural practice and replanting high‐
yielding seedlings. The concept emphasizes the critical role of accessible agro‐inputs ‐ particularly 
fertilizers ‐ in supporting the ongoing farm productivity gains, in addition to adopting good practices 
and desirable planting materials. Attention to increasing yields has therefore become a core element 
of how lead firms have introduced sustainability initiatives in practice. 
Despite most of the cocoa‐ associated programs and projects’ sharing a goal of improving farm yield, 
there are differences in designing and delivering these concepts. The CDC‐CVC aimed to introduce 
standardised practices and to maintain decentralised coordination of monitoring their five‐yearly 
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progress to guarantee the expected outputs. At the farmer level, adoption of the CVC model of 
farming as a business required substantial capital investment. While the CVC model has 
demonstrated the potential for improved farm yield, farmers recognised that this was accompanied 
by increasing application of farming inputs and subsequently to increased production costs. As 
improving on‐farm practices are following by regular application of appropriate fertilizers dosage 
and increase labour of maintaining a healthy environment to minimise pest‐disease infestations.  
Sustaining cocoa farm profits has meant upgrading from less to comprehensive agro‐input 
applications. On the other hand, the earlier project‐based programs tended to share the knowledge 
and updated technology without necessarily enforcing their adoption, as Neilson and McKenzie 
(2015) describes as being aware of the idea versus willingness to apply it at farm level. Thus, 
ensuring the farmers actually apply the standardised farming practices has been a core objective of 
the CDC‐CVC model.  
The mainstream focus on improving farm yield often reflects the generic demand for higher yield 
and the pest‐disease resistant characteristics of planting materials commonly identified by the 
farmers and cocoa stakeholders. There is also a possibility of modifying and adapting the intrinsic 
content of the cocoa bean to reflect the higher value demanded by the industrial actors; for 
example, cocoa butter and flavonoid extract. However, the separation of research output from the 
market domain has challenged the traditional government’s capacity to deliver specific agro‐input 
services in response to dynamic global market demands. The government’s limited opportunities to 
capture economic rent through the technology of genetic modification to create desirable varieties 
has encouraged Mars to ‘domesticate’ its farming knowledge and technology as a long‐term strategy 
to sustain industry growth.  For example, the rising price of cocoa butter over the last decade has 
encouraged the development of higher fat content varieties. As Mars’ field staff said (Respondent 
CC2, pers. comm, 2015): 
Unlike (public) research institutes that only focus on the quantity of (cocoa farm) production, 
nowadays the trend of our research focuses on (bigger) bean size and fat content. If it’s 
possible, we are looking for cocoa varieties that have fat content above 60 per cent. (Tidak 
seperti lembaga penelitian yang hanya fokus pada kuantitas produksi, saat ini trend 
penelitian kami fokus pada ukuran biji dan kandungan lemak. Kalau bisa, kami mencari 
varietas kakao yang memiliki kandungan lemak lebih dari 60 persen).   
The establishment of a field research centre near the cocoa‐producing region of North Luwu, and 
the ongoing implementation of sustainability initiatives have accelerated the uptake and adoption of 
desirable cocoa varieties compared to other cocoa‐producing regions such as Polewali Mandar and 
Mamuju. As Mars development centre in East Luwu continuously generates new improved varieties 
and technology practices, there is more dynamic, voluntary engagement among the farmers and 
cocoa stakeholders who share an interest in cocoa farming development. For example, the visual 
confirmation of economic benefit from the adoption of improved varieties has led to higher demand 
and significant price differentiation of improved varieties of seedlings. From this perspective, Mars 
has verified that the farmers will voluntarily seek and adopt new technologies once they have 
evidence of economic benefit.  
138 
 
However, the concern over emphasizing cocoa farm yield and productivity along with 
implementation of firm sustainability initiatives was also identified through adoption of Rainforest 
Alliance certification scheme in the Ivory Coast. Lemeilleur et al. (2015) demonstrated a positive 
correlation between the scheme implementation and farm productivity, as the scheme referred as 
‘straightforward agricultural extension’ at the expense of consumer willingness to pay for 
sustainable standards, thus questioning the legitimacy of eco‐labelling and/or sustainability 
certification scheme. Although within the Indonesian context, the direct relationship between the 
adoption of certification schemes and improved farm productivity remains unclear. But, the Mars 
concept of sustainability, previously described as ‘certification plus’, is strongly oriented towards 
such an outcome.     
b. Transfer of technology 
Despite a series of Gernas programs, the government’s contribution to generating and extending the 
updated technology of efficient and better practices in cocoa production has been limited. The 
program was considered to be innovative simply because of the application of the mass production 
of Somatic Embryogenesis seedlings. It did not involve improved engagement between downstream 
demand and upstream supply. Although the adoption of this technology has assisted the 
government to deliver mass production, distribute desirably‐uniform varieties, and improve the 
quasi‐government cocoa research institution (ICCRI), but the output of this technology has not 
necessary benefited smallholder farmers. Application of this top‐down approach generally excluded 
the farmers from engaging with the proposed technology, positioned them as passive recipients of 
technology. 
Mars has also controlled the design and distribution of updated technologies through the CDC‐CVC 
concept of extension services, but the assisted farmers contributed to selecting which technology fit 
to their condition. The CDC, as a field research station, conducts ‘in‐vitro’ experiments on different 
aspects of farm management, while the dispersed CVC businesses conduct ‘in‐vivo’ experiments and 
distribute the outputs to nearby smallholder farmers. As an independent and integrated field 
research centre, the Mars development centre mainly focuses on a range of experiments linked to 
agronomic practices that focus on increasing farm yield. This involves exploring desirable hybrid 
varieties, and verifying the efficiency of agro‐chemical application, nurseries, and demonstration 
farms’ different types of grafting techniques (see Appendix C.1).   
The CDC‐CVC model of technology transfer positions the cocoa doctor (or the owner of CVC 
business) as an agent who contributes to screening of adaptable and approved technologies before 
promoting them across peer farmers. While Mars has ownership and control over what kind of 
research outputs they attempt to distribute, the owners of CVC businesses have control over 
selecting which technologies are suited to the geographic conditions, and how they adapt to the 
socio‐economic circumstances. This presents opportunities for process upgrading that not only 
allows the farmers to verify which varieties and technologies are more suitable and profitable for the 
region, but also positions them as decision‐makers on managing their own farming businesses.   
This different process of technology transfer shows that sustainability initiatives allow the 
transnational firms to exercise decentralised control over developing an adapted service delivery for 
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scaling‐up desirable varieties and technologies. With their in‐house design of sustainability 
initiatives, the transnational firms have more flexibility to develop ‘sustainable farming practices’ 
that reflect their particular interests.  This decentralised model of transfer technology has assisted 
the training of farmers exclusively selected based on their individual capitalist capability and social 
capacity. The selection of assisting farmers within the dominant patriarchy communities is reflecting 
to more practical rational in promoting ‘good cocoa farm’ rather than selecting from the specific 
groups of community (e.g. ethnicity and social status). Thus, the selected farmers tend to own visible 
and accessible farms to attract public attention, relative capital assets to scale up and adopt 
technologies, and individual qualities to outreach more farmers such as productive age, energetic, 
and appealing to gain interest from the other farmers.  
7.2.3 Functional upgrading 
Sustainability initiatives do offer opportunities for functional upgrading at the farm‐level, involving 
the introduction of new value‐adding activities by farmers and is especially evident in the Mars CDC‐
CVC concept. Selected farmers have been assisted to develop into service providers (cocoa doctors) 
for others by demonstrating and managing profitable farming business (the Cocoa Village Clinic, or 
CVC). The concept emphasises direct economic value capture from diversifying the farming business 
of the CVC, which in turn is supported by the Cocoa Development Centre (CDC).  
Focusing on farm level upgrading, the CVC concept has attempted to improve the individual’s 
capability to sustain a cocoa farming business, reflecting the fact that farmer groups do not serve 
individual interests. Having learnt from the previous group‐based assistance program, which 
resulted in limited actual practice adoption, Mars attempted to change the farmers’ mindsets by 
showcasing successful farms and prosperous farmers through a ‘seeing is believing’ approach. Other 
farmers, it was hoped, would voluntarily adopt the practice after seeing evidence of improved farms 
and livelihoods. The Mars CDC in East Luwu has produced approximately eighty ‘cocoa doctors’ who 
have been mandated to establish CVC businesses and provide agronomic services to their peers 
(Respondent CC3, pers. comm, 2015).   
The farmers who trained as ‘cocoa doctors’ to operate the CVC were expected to serve different 
roles as farmers, trained agronomists, and entrepreneurs.  Conventionally, these roles would be 
performed by different actors and institutions who were neither part of the community nor shared 
any of the farmer livelihood challenges. Recruiting cocoa doctors from the farming community 
would minimise the social gap and improve the trust of the community. At the same time, it would 
improve the cocoa doctors’ self‐confidence and encourage them to stand out among their peers 
(Respondent CC1, pers. comm, 2014; Respondent CC3, pers. comm, 2015). The assisted farmers 
served additional functions to support Mars production system, including supplying agro‐inputs, 
providing extension services, and collecting cocoa bean (see Table 7.1). An equivalent process was 
observed amongst certification schemes that required ‘extension’ staff to act as ICS, many of whom 
were recruited from the farming community, and who generally had access to improved educational 
opportunities.   
While the disengagement of traditional extension providers from farming communities in project‐
based programs discouraged farmers from voluntarily adopting good practice and undermined 
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individual capabilities, this integrated function (i.e., extension services and agro‐inputs supply) of 
CVCs attempted to improve both vertical coordination with industrial actors and horizontal 
coordination with the supporting actors (such as agro‐input suppliers, local government, financial 
institutions and peer farmers). This has also allowed functional upgrading for the cocoa farmers 
turned cocoa doctors, while continuing to encourage production improvements amongst the 
farming community and enhancing supply capacity.   
a. Agro-inputs supplier 
A reliable supply of agro‐inputs is a crucial element for achieving higher farm yields that might allow 
process upgrading. Following the deterioration of forest rent and the devastation caused by pest 
disease infestation, the cocoa farms entered a bust period marked by less assured information and 
partial technical assistance on how to restore farm productivity. A combination of affordability and 
obvious symptoms of pest disease infestation encouraged the farmers to intensively apply agro‐
chemicals despite their limited information and confirmation of their effectiveness by experts or 
official agents. The CDCs aimed to fill this gap by providing technical support and information on the 
application of agro‐inputs, while CVCs supplied the inputs. Through this model, Mars hoped to 
embed more reliable information regarding chemical use within the supply network.    
Making agro‐inputs available at the farm level was the primary focus of the new CVC businesses that 
was followed by significant financial investment, as described in the CDC‐CVC manual (Mars 2013: 
22):  
A start-up Productivity Package is necessary to set up a successful CVC. The package must 
consist of: 
1. Agronomy and business training combined with coaching services from the Cocoa 
Academy and CDC. 
2. Relevant infrastructure in place, such as nursery (US$1,000 for 5000 seedlings), a ‘Wow 
farm’ and budwood garden (US$ 300 for 300 trees), a warehouse (US$ 2,000 for 10 tons of 
fertilizer), communication equipment (US$400, and in some cases, an irrigation system for 
the nursery (US$1,000), at [a]total cost of US$4,700. 
3. A credit system for $6,000 to carry inventory of inputs and tools. 
In an attempt to ensure adoption of the productivity package, Mars signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with local formal financial institutions to facilitate micro‐finance accessibility and 
support the entrepreneurial capacity of assisted farmers (Respondent CC1, pers. comm, 2014). The 
experience of accessing a formal financial institution signified the importance of asset accumulation, 
since credit provision opened an opportunity to increase the scale of the farming businesses. This 
intervention delivered more comprehensive assistance that was not limited to ensuring the 
availability and accessibility of agro‐inputs, but also encouraged farmer entrepreneurship. The CVCs 
had become ‘delivery instruments’ widely promoting and distributing desirable varieties and farming 
practices across the rural communities. 
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b. Extension services provider 
Technical assistance and knowledge is now embedded within agro‐input supply by some value chain 
interventions. This further encourages process upgrading, as farm rehabilitation and enhanced 
supply often relies upon appropriate agro‐inputs application and better farm practices. In contrast, 
prevailing technical assistance projects from the government for the estate crops sector tend to be 
politically motivated, and are often designed to meet short‐medium goals rather than long‐term 
planning, for definite goals like food sovereignty (Ministry of Industry, 2009; Ministry of National 
Planning and Development, 2013). These politically‐driven, short‐term term goals create a 
negotiable space to consider which sectors to support and disregard, and as a result, estate crop 
extension activities tend to be under‐resourced. Rather than depending on this unreliable public 
domain and disengagement from upstream cocoa production networks, sustainability initiatives 
have attempted to fill the gap of accessible supports.  
As well as adding to the functional roles of the assisted farmers as extension agents, the CVC model 
has meant that owning a profitable farming business has become an instrument to show‐off the 
output of improved farming practices and gain the attention of fellow farmers. The requirement for 
significant financial investment to transform conventional farming seemed a less viable option for 
many smallholder farmers. Based on Mars’ assessment, to establish a nursery and rehabilitate cocoa 
farms required financial support totalling between US$4,700 – US$11,000, with a wide range of 
potential profit depending on local market conditions (Mars, 2013). Field observations revealed that 
the successfully trained farmers mostly came from areas with limited exposure and experience of 
cocoa farming development, showing high demand for quality planting materials and limited 
availability of agro‐inputs.  
To demonstrate how a cocoa farmer has upgraded to new functional activities as a result of 
engagement with a sustainability initiative by examine a success story of one cocoa doctor (Andi 
Asri) from Wajo district (the South of Luwu district). Andi Asri success to transform small plot cocoa 
farm into cocoa business was rather distinctive than the other cocoa doctors from dominant cocoa 
producing areas who have been exposed to a range of technical assistances and relatively accessible 
global market. His success on developing cocoa business, partially because limited development of 
cocoa farming in Wajo District, from the faring production, global market accessibility, technical 
assistances, and agro‐inputs services. With limited development comes with limited competition in 
cocoa farming business, Andi Asri becomes a pioneer to upgrade the conventional cocoa farming 
into cocoa (agri)business, linking the peer farmers into the global market and establishing his private 
extension service business with supports from Mars.   
Andi Asri claims to be gaining annual revenue of more than US$ 35,000 from his CVC business (six‐
hectare farm, nurseries, agro‐inputs distributions, and farming tools selling). Andi further planned to 
build an insecticide factory to support cocoa sustainability in Wajo district (Cokelat magazine, 2015: 
p.53). Identifying himself as a private extension agent, he claimed that his work had impacted on the 
community by supporting improved farm yield, increasing volume supply for local traders, and 
creating farming jobs for casual workers. Other farmers who participated in the cocoa doctor 
program have also benefited through process and functional upgrading (suppliers of agro‐inputs and 
farming tools, and by acting as bean collectors). The significant profit accruing from the cocoa 
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farming business has inspired most of the assisted farmers to concentrate and employ an asset 
accumulation strategy for expanding the economic scale and scope of their farming businesses. For 
example, increase their nursery capacity, buying additional land and transform them into cocoa 
farms, and increasing their scale of agro‐input supply (Respondent GL11, pers. comm, 2015; 
Respondent GL13, pers. comm, 2015). 
7.3 Upgrading and dependence on the cocoa GPN 
Another aspect of sustainability engagement associated with offering new upgrading opportunities, 
is that farmers become increasingly invested in the cocoa sector, where rural livelihood 
improvements assume a linear rationale of agricultural modernisation leading to improved 
livelihood. At the same time, upgrading opportunities are becoming increasingly dependent on a 
GPN characterised by competitive, oligopolistic structures. Smallholder farmers are reliant upon 
markets and extension provision delivered by transnational industrial actors. This dependence 
appears to benefit lead firms concerned about supply risks. As explicitly stated in the CDC‐CVC 
manual (Mars, 2014: p.8): 
A CDC requires ongoing investment by an institute or company, while a CVC will generate 
its own revenue and is cost neutral for the sponsor. The profit motive for more and repeat 
business means that CVC owners are highly motivated to reach many farmers and deliver 
high quality work. On the other hand, the benefit of higher volumes and better quality of 
beans, and the loyalty of participating farmers, allow companies to obtain quality premiums 
and trade higher volumes. 
While the Mars CDC‐CVC concept of agricultural extension services focuses on encouraging high‐
input farming practices, the sustainability certification schemes focus on improving vertical 
coordination with the dispersed smallholder cocoa farmers. This vertical coordination partially was 
aiming to encourage the contracted suppliers, particularly the transnational intermediate firms, to 
participate and share resources in delivering a range of services. This process of improving vertical 
coordination among the supply chain actors suggests the dominant role of transnational firms as 
market and extension service providers. Eventually, the initiatives received financial support from 
the north based organisation through public private partnership programs (e.g. SCPP and MCA‐
Green Prosperity), as the program included certification schemes as instruments to reach and 
coordinate dispersed smallholder farmers. Although the certification scheme improved vertical 
coordination, while minimising social and environmental deterioration and improving farming 
practices, it did not necessarily address progressive quality improvement or risk management.  
The scarcity of land and deterioration of forest rent leading to increasing supply risks induced 
support to adopt a high input farming approach and single sector farming business, as reflected in 
the CDC‐CVC business extension model.  This cocoa farming business model oriented to overcome 
yield gaps through improved agronomic technologies also emphasises capital investment, often 
requiring credit from formal financial institutions. This coordinated effort to facilitate the competent 
farmers to develop cocoa farming as a business, to access financial support and to adopt improved 
agronomic technologies suggests an initial step towards capitalist farming where livelihoods depend 
on a single‐crop. This extension business model was built upon the oligopolistic market demand 
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where the value gained from the improved farming business depended on cocoa market prices. The 
single‐crop oriented business model creates vulnerability, since deteriorating market prices91, 
because of over‐supply or market failure, could eventually affect the whole farm system.  
As the smallholder farmer is systematically enrolled into global cocoa production networks, the 
competition among the millions of farmers intensifies, adding competitive pressures in managing 
their cocoa farms. At the same time, the increasing farming costs after shifting to higher agro‐inputs 
practices and environmental risks are borne by the farmers. Indeed, under the firm sustainability 
initiatives, the farmers may engage with more relevant and effective technical assistance, but such 
assistance were partially pragmatic to the farmers’ circumstances and are not necessarily 
compensated by the market price. The vertical coordination is applied from the firm perspective to 
improving the smallholder supply capacity and efficiency of the upstream production system, and so 
helps minimise the supply risks of the transnational firms. But it does not necessarily compensate for 
the increasing agro‐inputs cost and uncertainty of climate change that may affect the farming 
outputs.      
The improved farm business depends on linking farmers to credit from public finance institutions. 
From the support side, most credit providers have stringent a policy that requires land as a fixed 
asset of collateral to assure the loan repayment, while declining market prices and an inability to 
manage such risks can lead to dispossession of the land. This scenario is beyond the control of 
smallholder farmers. Although credit can support the farmers to engage with process upgrading, it 
does not necessarily protect the smallholder farmers from the unprecedented risks linked to market 
demand, or risks outside the market domain such as unfavourable climate and/or intensified pest‐
diseases infestation.  The sustainability initiative, as embodied in the CVC farming business, creates 
dependence to the extension services that delivered by the transnational firms. This approach offers 
temporary gain from farm level upgrading practices, yet the smallholder farmers continues to bear 
the credit consequences unprecedented risk exposure.   
This single sector upgrading opportunities reflect the lead firms’ interest in securing supply, ensuring 
quality, and establishing commercial relationships within their uneven power relationships with 
more than a million smallholder farmers. The coordinated technical assistance made available under 
the sustainability notion to support and create entrepreneurial farmers is effecting change in the 
rural landscape wherein smallholding farming is no longer profitable due to uneven capitalist 
competition among peer farmers. As the certification scheme becomes mainstream for cocoa 
production and eventually loses the economic value of market differentiation, downgrading is no 
longer option for maintaining cocoa farms by abandoning or shifting to low value crops. Meanwhile, 
the capitalist farmers become the subject of intense competition, have to endure the high cost of 
high agro‐inputs farming business, the uncertainty of environmental risks, and political disruption.   
                                                          
91 Slumping cocoa prices are testing to the limit top producing countries  to ensure stability for farmers, heightening risks 
for the domestic economy and world markets, published on 23 March 2017, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017‐03‐22/cocoa‐slump‐threatening‐top‐producer‐is‐deja‐vu‐for‐80s‐
traders; UPDATE 2‐Hit by falling cocoa prices, Ivory Coast slashes budget, published on 20 April, 2017, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ivorycoast‐economy‐idUSL8N1HS29L  
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Conclusion 
Sustainability in this context reflects an aim to assist smallholder farmers to engage with different 
forms of farm‐level upgrading, with the primary goal to ensure supply security. This firm 
sustainability initiative emphasises value creation by shifting to higher input farming practices 
associated with single‐crop farming business practices. Although temporarily the farmers benefit 
from process and functional upgrading, these initiatives also emphasise the importance of capital 
accumulation and economic scale of production. At the same time, lead firms and contract suppliers 
maintain their dominant position in exercising control through vertical market coordination and 
driving efficiency. This pressures the smallholder farmers’ capability to bear market price volatility 
and environmental risks.  
Sustainability initiatives have shown increasing intervention in cocoa development by transnational 
firms, and vertical coordination with supply partners through to smallholder farmers. The adoption 
of certification schemes has established a traceability system whereby certificate holders coordinate 
the sourcing of cocoa bean from the farmer level, in addition to ensuring compliance to sustainable 
farming standards. The schemes have (1) introduced product upgrading opportunities by enforcing 
quality‐based assessment and price transparency, and (2) introduced a volume‐based premium to 
incentivise the compliance to sustainable farming standards. With certificate holders served by the 
concentrated transnational trading firms, the established traceability system aims to monitor the 
efficiency farm level assistances and bench‐marking efforts of certificate holders. The sustainable 
farming standards focus more upon the broad picture of environmental and social issues rather than 
specifically upon improving cocoa farming yield and ensuring the supply capacity of the smallholder 
farmers.  As a result, firms such as Mars combine existing standards with their own system of farmer 
supports. 
As well as encouraging the adoption of certification schemes by supply partners, Mars has designed 
a private CDC‐CVC extension service with the primary goal of improving cocoa farm yield. This model 
of extension service has increased both vertical and horizontal coordination within the farm‐level 
cocoa production networks. Adopting an individual approach, Mars is attempting to drive and 
upscale CVCs as farming businesses, which operate as assisted farmer extension service providers. 
This combination of farming business and extension service facilitates individual functional 
upgrading of farmer agents, and this, in turn, is a crucial element in encouraging other farmers to 
engage with product and process upgrading. Although the initiative has filled the gap of poor 
coordination between input supply and cocoa farm production, the capturing of value from this 
upgrading opportunity requires prior capabilities, a condition that will disqualify the participation of 
less well‐resourced farmers. As more capitalist farmers enter different forms of upgrading, capturing 
and accumulating value added, the process threatens to create uneven competition between the 
capitalist and smallholder farmers. This capitalist competitive pressure will eventually exclude the 
smallholder farmers. This scenario of imbalance capitalist competition on capturing the value from 
the global production networks between the upstream local actors and transnational firms has 
previously showed in Ghana cocoa production networks (Barrientos et al., 2007).   
The initiative to deliver extension supports by creating farming businesses and delivering 
sustainability initiatives involves increasing vertical coordination and increased farmer dependence 
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on the presence of the transnational firms, with primary goal to improve cocoa farm yield and 
further ensure supply security. Yet, under the certification schemes such farm level impact remains 
unclear despite the schemes have established a traceability platform to monitor the supply risks (re. 
opportunistic practices, non‐transparent market, and high‐cost upstream production networks) and 
identify the smallholder farmers in different geographic location. Broadly under the sustainability 
banners, the transnational firms have reclaimed the dominancy of domestic market and control the 
public services from the value creation to redistributing of knowledge based on the economic 
interest, to sustain chocolate‐cocoa industries.   
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8. Sustainability and (uneven) regional development  
Extending the cocoa production networks analysis to include regional development, in this chapter I 
discuss the intricate trans‐local dynamics linked to the emerging firm sustainability initiatives. The 
previous chapters have discussed the inter‐firm coordination dynamics and cocoa production 
trajectories from a production networks perspective.  This chapter focuses upon a territorial‐based 
analysis of the complex interactions that have consequences for the competitive pressure on local 
actors to participate in the lead firm production networks. The increased dominance of transnational 
firms on the growing regional cocoa industry is effectively reshaping new patterns of uneven 
development. Applying an actor‐based analysis, the GPN approach highlights the role of the lead 
firms as important strategic actors shaping regional transformation. GPN scholars Coe at al. (2004: 
469) define regional development within the globalising economy as follows: 
[R]egional development is conceptualised as a dynamic outcome of the complex interaction 
between territorialised relational networks and GPNs within the context of changing regional 
governance structures. 
Moving away from the GCC‐GVC industrial focus on how regional clusters are incorporated into 
production systems, the GPN approach introduces a multi‐scalar analytical nexus of dynamic 
‘strategic coupling’ into global production networks that are often mediated by a range of extra‐firm 
actors including the state. While this does not necessarily result in positive development outcomes, 
strategic coupling offers the potential to stimulate the processes of value creation, enhancement 
and capture that can eventually contribute to regional development (Coe et al., 2004).  Pursuant to 
the emerging sustainability initiatives of the strategic lead actors engaged in restructuring upstream 
production networks and reshaping regional transformation, in the following sections I discuss the 
trajectories of strategic coupling and processes of value capture within upstream cocoa production 
networks. Considering their importance from an historical perspective, I briefly contextualise these 
developments within the ongoing regional development dynamics in the Sulawesi region.  
8.1 Making Sulawesi a supply-based region 
Cocoa sector development across Indonesia occurred in the post‐independence era as a result of 
economic opportunities related to informal accessible markets and the spontaneous actions of 
smallholder farmers (Ruf and Lancon, 2004). The adoption of cocoa farming by smallholder farmers 
in Northeast Kalimantan in the 1980s was dominated by local migrants in the region and by 
middlemen – some of whom were smugglers ‐ who connected the farmers to the market in Tawau 
(Malaysia). But this spontaneous cocoa farming adoption had limited capacity to drive resource‐
based development at a significant scale and to contribute to the creation of regional assets. This 
was partly due to the uncertainty variously driven by risk of pest infestation, market access and 
labour supply.  
Following a similar pattern of spontaneous cocoa adoption, the Sulawesi cocoa boom in the 1980s 
and 1990s rapidly increased the scale of cocoa production in the region.  Local migration within this 
less‐populated region brought abundant labour to convert the forest into cocoa farming through 
relational knowledge exchange networks among the Bugis ethnic groups. The social networks among 
the Bugis groups delivered extension support that encouraged the adoption of cocoa farming 
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production including agro‐input supplying and cocoa bean marketing. The migrant farmers with 
small amounts of capital obtained cheap forest land from local owners and transformed it into cocoa 
farms. With limited government intervention, relatively open markets facilitated the growth of 
upstream collecting/trading segments. Local actors were either directly exporting to nearby markets 
(Singapore and Malaysia) or simply supplying the domestic and international exporters. The rapid 
increase in cocoa farm production and strong global market demand became regional assets that 
attracted a range of trading actors to participate in the Sulawesi upstream market. Included among 
these actors were international trading firms, despite the lower quality of bulk unfermented bean 
compared to that of West African cocoa.  
Since the early 2000s, external support from importer countries like the US, often in the form of 
project‐based sustainability programs, attempted to further strengthen the supply capacity of the 
cocoa‐ producing regions. Applying value chain interventions and using market incentives, the 
sustainability projects even more explicitly integrated the smallholder farmers into the global cocoa 
production networks. As an initial step towards directly enrolling the smallholder farmers in the 
global trading network, the programs appear to have improved the local actors’ global market 
possibilities. But, the programs had limited capacity to restore cocoa farm yields (Henriksen et al., 
2010), minimise environmental risks, and ensure broader rural development.  
Following the establishment of a competitive upstream market, but within a still struggling small‐
scale domestic processing sector, the government introduced a roadmap for the development of an 
industrial cocoa cluster in 2009 (Ministry of Industry, 2010). This was followed by a series of 
industrial policy interventions (see discussion in Chapter 6) that aimed to ensure domestic supply of 
cocoa beans for industry. At the same time, Mars (later followed by other branded chocolate firms) 
publicly committed to sourcing sustainable cocoa by 2020. The ongoing implications of these trans‐
local dynamics contributed to a restructuring of Indonesia’s cocoa production networks that are 
constantly reshaping regional industrial development in the Sulawesi region.   
8.2 Introducing strategic coupling practices 
As previously discussed in Chapter six, the government was open to inviting foreign direct 
investment in the sector. It was considered necessary to engage with global market networks by 
helping the domestic firms to access global production networks.  The government recognised that a 
key mechanism for driving economic development was to plug domestic firms into the GPNs. As 
Dicken (2011: 448) argues, due to the dominant role of the lead firms in organising global production 
activities, it is difficult for local firms/economies to prosper outside of these networks. In response to 
the lack of competitiveness of the domestic cocoa industry, the coupling process via global firm 
investment aimed to ensure value capture within Indonesia and to facilitate significant skill 
improvement and technology transfer.   
The early coupling process was dominated by the international trading firms, when the Indonesian 
government favoured resource‐based exports with limited development of the downstream cocoa 
sector. The year 2006 saw the initiation of a policy attempt to retain the economic value of 
downstream development. But the policy incentives were inadequate to significantly drive the 
development of the downstream cocoa sector. Subsequent policy incentives repeated this approach 
and enacted a response primarily from transnational firms, but not necessarily from the domestic 
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firms. These trajectories of policy incentives appear to confirm Yeung’s (2009: p.3) argument that 
government policy interventions to facilitate structural coupling and drive development, while 
necessary, remain insufficient to promote regional development.   
Mars’ investment in cocoa processing facilities in 1996 was driven by regional supply capacity, as the 
Sulawesi region contributed approximately seventy per cent of national production. Olam’s 
investment was driven by the economic scale and favourable trading policy for various high value 
export commodities including cocoa. After recognising that the trading segment was dominated by 
local actors who had established both economic and social relationships with the smallholder 
farmers, both Mars and Olam were the first major buyers who applied a direct cocoa sourcing 
strategy to smallholder farmers. However, the presence of the transnational firms eventually proved 
a challenge for the local actors involved in both cocoa processing and trading segments. Hampered 
by limited capabilities and poor competitiveness, the local actors struggled to plug‐in to the lead 
firms’ production networks and improve their competitiveness to participate in globalisation.  
In 2009, the Indonesian government introduced a five‐year roadmap for agroindustry cluster 
development, including development of cocoa as ratified into Ministry of Industry regulation no. 
113/M‐IND/PER/10/2009. The primary goal of the roadmap was to develop a regional industrial 
cluster and transform Indonesia from a cocoa bean exporter into a cocoa products exporter 
(Ministry of Industry, 2010). This was followed by the introduction of a progressive export tax for 
cocoa beans in 2010 which substantially increased new investment in the cocoa‐processing segment 
(see discussion in Chapter 6). The implications of export restriction not only increased the domestic 
processors’ operational capacity, but also increased foreign direct investment by transnational firms. 
The latter established cocoa processing facilities both on Java Island and in various regions including 
Sulawesi (see Figure 6.2).  Among these investments, Barry Callebaut invested in a new cocoa‐
processing facility through a joint venture with local actor Comextra Majora trading after acquiring 
Petrafood processing facilities in West Java.  Cargill and Olam, which were both originally established 
as trading firms, functionally upgraded into cocoa processing and consequently became vertically 
integrated. During this period of domestic restructuring of the cocoa production networks, only one 
small‐scale national firm, i.e., Kalla Kakao industry established a cocoa‐ processing facility in 
Southeast Sulawesi. Six new investments were established by transnational processors, such that 
transnational processing capacity quickly exceeded domestically‐owned capacity. Today, the 
Indonesian processing segment is dominated by a few transnational firms with large processing 
capacity. The domestic processors remain small‐scale and unable to expand their economic scale 
and scope of production.   
Among the domestic cocoa‐ processing firms, only BT Cocoa, which had a significant economic scale 
of production, upgraded its processing facility in 2013 ‐ following a long‐term market contract with 
Nestlé92 ‐ to supply a new beverage factory in West Java. Recognising BT Cocoa’s supply capacity, the 
market contract was followed by an agreement to implement a cocoa sustainability initiative. 
                                                          
92 Nestlé asked BT Cocoa to supply cocoa products after partnering in implementing a cocoa sustainability initiative in 
Mamuju, West Sulawesi, published on 2 August 2013. http://industri.kontan.co.id/news/nestle‐minta‐bt‐cocoa‐memasok‐
bubuk‐cokelat/  
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Following this agreement, BT Cocoa functionally downgraded its operation and opened cocoa buying 
stations across Sulawesi (in Makassar, Mamuju, Palu, and Kolaka). It subsequently commenced the 
implementation of a sustainability initiative (BT Care) in Mamuju and Bali. For BT Cocoa, entering 
into a market contract with Nestlé was a milestone, despite the fact that the volume of the contract 
was still far below BT Cocoa’s supply capacity. Nestlé’s plan to relocate its Malaysia and Philippines 
factories to Indonesia provided an opportunity for BT Cocoa to obtain a larger volume of market 
contract93.  The move into the trading function required direct engagement with the smallholder 
farmers. This value capture trajectory shows that a firm’s engagement in value capturing activities 
does not necessarily follow a deterministic upgrading path.  
For the original trading firms like Olam, the industrial policy reduced the opportunities for value 
capture from the trading function alone. However, due to its economic scale and supply capability, 
Olam was able to obtain a long‐term supply contract with Mars, which had recently increased its 
cocoa processing capacity and added integrated functions (e.g., cocoa processing and farm 
plantation) to become a vertically integrated firm.  Olam’s capacity to manage both horizontal and 
vertical pressure was not easily emulated by the small‐scale domestic firms. For example, the 
implications of the export levy were to downgrade the status of the domestic exporters to domestic 
suppliers and function as collectors. Also, increasing vertical market barriers such as third party 
certification schemes put competitive pressure on the local trading/collecting actors, who now had 
to compete with the strong and competent transnational trading‐processing firms. Among the 
domestic trading actors, only Comextra Majora was able to secure a supply position after its joint 
venture with Barry Callebaut which was in turn a supplier to Nestlé and Mondelēz.  
The small economic scale of cocoa processing ‐ and limited capacity to engage with additional 
functions ‐ has put competitive pressure on domestic actors from both the processing and trading 
segments to supply the leading branded manufacturers. The increasing engagement of lead firms in 
sustainability discourses has increased the vertical pressure for intermediate actors to directly 
engage with the smallholder farmers. This functional upgrading (and downgrading) has not only 
required capital investment, but has also become the subject of competitive pressure among the 
concentrated global vertically integrated suppliers.  
Domestic branded lead firms such as Garuda Food preferred to enter long‐ term outsourcing 
contracts with Barry Callebaut94 rather than with local cocoa processors. This supply agreement 
                                                          
93 Nestlé plans to relocate its factories in Malaysia and the Philippines in Indonesia, published on 20 June 2010,  
http://industri.kontan.co.id/news/nestle‐bakal‐relokasi‐pabrik‐ke‐indonesia‐1  
94 Garuda Food and Barry Callebaut signed a long‐term chocolate outsourcing agreement and the delivery of an important 
part of Garuda Food’s compound chocolate requirements, published on 16 June 2015. [Retrieved on April, 2017]   
https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/news/2015/06/garudafood‐and‐barry‐callebaut‐enter‐long‐term‐supply‐agreement‐
indonesia  
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extended from joint innovation on chocolate research and development95 to supporting Garuda 
Food’s strategic growth in the domestic market after their recent expansion in China and India. 
Following in the footsteps of Nestlé and Petrafood, Garuda Food acknowledged that the presence of 
Barry Callebaut would enhance Garuda Food’s core competences particularly in designing future 
product and brand development. From this strategic partnership, Garuda Food, as a branded 
manufacturer, was able to direct the global industrial chocolate producers to establish new 
investments near their manufacturing plants, thereby externalising their chocolate production and 
transferring research costs back to Barry Callebaut. This reified intermediate position (particularly in 
Indonesia’s domestic production networks) among their peers, in addition to seeking more value 
capture from future domestic market growth and more broadly from the emerging Asian countries.    
Lack of local actor competitiveness encouraged the Indonesian government to continue paving the 
way for strategic coupling with the global cocoa production networks. Since the early development 
of the cocoa sector, the government had invited international export‐import firms to increase their 
local (trading) actor market accessibility but not necessarily their competitive capability. A similar 
pattern of structural coupling that was applied to drive the development of the Indonesian cocoa 
industry resulted in a temporary improvement in the domestic processors’ competitive capability 
which, by extension, slowly increased their production capacity. However, whereas this effort 
interplayed with the vertical pressure of the lead firms’ sustainability commitment and dynamic 
configuration of the global cocoa production networks, the intermediate segments (trading‐
processing) became vertically integrated and concentrated among a few transnational firms. As this 
structure extended to Indonesia’s cocoa production networks, the domestic processors again found 
themselves facing competitive challenges including vertical barriers imposed by lead firms and 
horizontal barriers of capitalist capabilities (e.g., integrated functions and low cost production) 
exerted by the transnational trading‐processing firms.  As a result, the model of ‘outside‐in’ coupling 
strategy implemented through industrial and trading policies proved inadequate to horizontally 
improve the domestic actors’ capitalist competitiveness and participation in the global cocoa 
production network.     
8.3 Local coupling and (uneven) regional development  
As the early development pattern demonstrated, the growth of cocoa production in the Sulawesi 
region was economically driven and spontaneous, allowing value capture from its trading function, 
and confirming Sulawesi as a supply‐based region. In tandem with the current downstream cocoa 
development, the region’s supply base asset has become the economic rationale for the domestic 
and transnational firms to establish and expand their cocoa processing facilities (see Figure 6.2). A 
combination of supply base assets and the current establishment of processing facilities has 
upgraded Sulawesi into a vertically integrated cocoa region. Coe et al. (2004) argue that the 
important dimension of development is the extent to which value capture occurs in the context of 
the firm’s capability to retain surplus within its organisation boundaries, and ideally to further 
redeploy this within the region. Focus on the regional development in Sulawesi, the recent 
                                                          
95 Expansion of chocolate factory, in addition to cocoa processing facilities in Bandung and Makassar, published on 5 
October 2016. [Retrieved on April, 2017]   https://www.barry‐callebaut.com/news/2016/10/barry‐callebaut‐celebrates‐
grand‐opening‐its‐first‐chocolate‐factory‐indonesia  
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development has shown dominant role of the transnational actors to sustain supply base function 
and vertically‐integrated to processing function. Yet, such development recognised limited 
investment of the local economic actors to capture the value creation and retain the surplus within 
its organisation boundaries, as the investment dominated by transnational firms. This make Sulawesi 
economic development is dependent to the investment and presence of transnational firms, and 
dislocation of investment may occur once the regional assets deteriorated.  
Reflecting on the GPN perspective, the term ‘regional development’ refers to the dynamic aggregate 
effects of the value capturing trajectories of a range of firms located in a specific territory. Regarding 
the discussion surrounding lead firm sustainability strategies and the government response to 
increasing upstream market intervention, the outcomes of these intersections are further linked to 
development of the Sulawesi region. In the following sections I discuss the aggregate effects of value 
capture as translated into development impacts at the local and regional levels. Coe and Yeung 
(2015) allude to the four indicators of the global production networks impact on the intersection of 
the configuration of production networks and supply‐ based assets: 1) Capital flows; 2) 
Organisational ecology; 3) Knowledge and technology transfer; and, 4) Employment effect.  
8.3.1 Capital flows  
In an attempt to strengthen Sulawesi’s supply‐based capacity, capital investment was delivered via 
different forms of program partnerships and the establishment of upcountry buying units.  A 
comparison of Mars’ and Nestlé’ investment in sustainability initiatives shows that Mars’ investment 
in developing the in‐house CDC‐CVC model involved intensive capital inflows crucial to establishing 
development centres and to financing CVC farming businesses. Nestlé’s investment in defining and 
implementing sustainability initiatives was more limited and primarily involved negotiating with the 
contract suppliers. The capital flows within the context of implementing sustainability initiatives 
were highly dependent on the extent of each lead firm’s attempt to strengthen and improve its role 
in upstream cocoa production.   
Mars’ establishment of a cocoa processing subsidiary in the Sulawesi region was driven by a 
combination of exploring the value capture from high value grounded research on exploring novel 
credentials of the cocoa bean (flavanols), and ensuring the supply capacity of the region.  The 
company’s investment was not simply undertaken to encourage and incentivise the adoption of a 
third‐party certification scheme, but also to develop an extension model as an instrument to 
encourage an integrated cocoa farming business. This model of sustainability was also extended to 
the contract suppliers (in addition to adopting certification schemes) to achieve the spatial scale 
impact of cocoa development.  
Mars’ concept of a franchise CDC‐CVC extension model has been enacted to its contract suppliers 
and program partners. The company’s Cocoa Development Centre in East Luwu District has grown in 
terms of scale and scope of services. Mars’ curriculum on agronomic training and internship have 
been adapted and developed for other formal education institutions including agriculture vocational 
schools and local universities. The recent new cocoa development centre investment in the Pangkep 
District of South Sulawesi showcases the importance of economic scale in promoting and delivering 
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cocoa extension services96, and is supported by the provincial government. The capital flows 
directed towards the CVC farming business came in the forms of individual investment and/or 
obtaining financial support from formal micro‐finance institutions. Capital investment within the 
cocoa production networks primarily aimed to enhance the value of the farming businesses and to 
further improve the supply capacity of the Sulawesi region.   
Within the context of implementing a certification scheme, the capital flows of financial incentives 
were voluntarily provided by the lead firms under a supply market contract to further reinvest in the 
contract suppliers’ sustainability activities that involved a range of extension services. Along with the 
implementation of the schemes, the incentive was internalised to support the sustainability team, to 
transform it into extension services for the smallholder farmers. But because the main adopters of 
the certification schemes were the contract suppliers, the value capture for the smallholder farmers 
in terms of distribution of premium incentives and delivery of extension services depended on the 
supplier. Due to the volume‐based incentive, the contract suppliers tended towards compromising 
the quality of the extension services’ efficiency. For example, while the certified contract suppliers 
tended towards reducing the number of certificate holders, they increased the market contract 
volume to enhance the value of the sustainable market (see Table 5.1). However, managing the large 
volume of market contracts challenged the local actors’ capability (cooperatives and farmer groups) 
as the sizable contracts were often obtained by the transnational firms’ subsidiaries (for example, 
Olam and Ecom).     
Studies of China’s industrial sectors argue that FDI does not necessarily translate into positive 
outcomes for the local economy. Foreign research development laboratories have limited intention 
of collaborating with local firms, academics and research institutions (Fu, 2011). Foreign investment 
in the design and implementation of firms’ sustainability initiatives is not limited to compliance with 
certification standards. It involves knowledge and technology generation from which the industrial 
actors are often otherwise disconnected. Buoyed by the financial support of the North‐based 
countries, and with the aim of encouraging sustainable market and farming practices through public 
private partnership programs, Mars also independently finances adapted field research centres and 
the in‐house CDC‐CVC business extension model. Since 2005, the early development of Mars 
research development centre and CVC farming businesses involved a range of collaborations with 
national and international cocoa stakeholders. But these collaborations only strengthened Mars’ 
capacity to extend its upstream research and development without necessarily exploring the inter‐
chains opportunities for farmers to minimise the vulnerability of single sector oriented development. 
The private finance and independent research centres established across the Sulawesi region 
position Mars ‐ along with its supply partners ‐ as knowledge and technology creators. Although 
these capital flows in the development of the cocoa sector may benefit those cocoa farmers who 
have the capacity to develop their farming businesses, this supply linkage also supports Mars’ 
                                                          
96 New investment of four million US$ for a cocoa development centre in Pangkep District, three times the cost of the 
existing development centre in East Luwu, South Sulawesi, published on 19 August 2016. 
http://makassar.antaranews.com/berita/76814/mars‐investasi‐jutaan‐dollar‐bangun‐pusat‐penelitian‐kakao  
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production system, adding competitive pressure on the local firms (collectors, traders and 
processors).   
The value capture of lead firm capital investment in sustainability initiatives is mainly distributed 
among the transnational contract suppliers and capitalist farmers. While the industrial policy has 
attempted to protect the local actors, it has not necessarily initiated efficient linkages or minimised 
the capitalist capability‐technological gap between the national and international firms.  With the 
currently limited participation of local traders and processors in capturing value from the lead firms’ 
sustainability initiatives, the local government’s limited capacity to facilitate a coupling process via 
joint capitalist investment and regulatory incentives works to widen the technological gap. This 
means that eventually the inefficient and non‐competitive local firms will be excluded from the lead 
firm production networks. As the value creation from the emerging sustainability initiatives has 
mainly been captured by the transnational contract suppliers, eventually the Indonesian 
downstream and upstream cocoa production networks will be concentrated among a few 
transnational firms.   
8.3.2 Organisational ecology  
Following the fragmented upstream supply and increased concentration of two downstream 
segments, the branded chocolate manufacturers and vertically integrated cocoa processing‐trading 
firms are employing various sustainability initiatives. The lead branded firms are reorganising their 
production networks by disintegrating their cocoa processing facilities and increasing their vertical 
coordination with the contract suppliers. This allows them to effectively compete in the oligopolistic 
global market structure. Yeung (2009: 331) refers to this reorganising for more efficient and flexible 
production networks as an ‘organisational fix’. Yeung further argues that whereas organisational 
fixes result from the choice of business strategies, investment and divestment in specific regions 
depend on the regions’ capacity to complement the lead firms’ needs (in the form of lower 
production costs, for example). The disruption of a production system due to increased labour costs 
and increased taxes may lead to what is known as a spatial fix, reflecting the ongoing phenomenon 
of foreign firms’ increasing investment in cocoa‐producing countries, but reducing their investment 
in the North based consuming countries.  
For more than three decades, the regional cocoa production networks in the Sulawesi region were 
dominated (1) by trading actors with a range of economic scale and geographic distribution, and (2) 
by the presence of small‐scale domestic cocoa processors.  After the cocoa sector became a priority 
sector for a downstream development strategy, the government introduced an export tariff that 
significantly increased the costs of international trading. Although this industrial policy attempted to 
strengthen the local industrial actors’ capacity, the policy trajectory – and its resultant spatial fix ‐
interplayed with the lead firms’ economic interest in ensuring supply security and was followed by 
restructuring of Indonesia’s cocoa production networks. This spatial fix, which was followed by an 
organisational fix, increased the vertical competitive pressure on the local actors to participate in the 
lead firm production networks. And, it further emphasized the substantial role of the transnational 
firms in defining the future development of the Sulawesi region, as will be further discussed in the 
following section.   
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The recent downstream development in Sulawesi has been supported by two transnational firms ‐ 
Barry Callebaut and the Transmar group ‐ which have made new investments in cocoa processing 
facilities. However, nation‐wide Barry Callebaut has also made multiple new investments. These 
include its acquisition of Petrafoods, a joint venture with local trading firm Comextra Majora, and its 
establishment of a new industrial chocolate factory after entering a strategic partnership with 
Garudafoods.  Meanwhile, the existing Cargill and Olam trading firms incorporated new functions 
including cocoa processing into their trading operation, with Cargill preferring to construct a new 
processing facility in East Java rather than in Sulawesi, mainly because of the established industrial 
cluster and better quality infrastructure. Olam preferred to establish a vertically integrated cocoa 
production and processing facility on Seram Island, Maluku province. This decision was mainly based 
on the low labour cost of managing a cocoa plantation and the abundant land, despite the limited 
infrastructure established. Mars recently increased its processing capacity, and this expansion was 
followed by new CDC investments across the Sulawesi region. Among the new investments in cocoa 
processing, only the locally‐owned firm Kalla Kakao (of the Kalla group) established a new processing 
facility in Southeast Sulawesi (in Kolaka). This investment was followed by the signing of 
collaboration agreements to implement extension services with a local NGO to assist nearby farmers 
to undertake product and process upgrading. Despite the different strategies employed for the 
purposes of new investment and expansion, these transnational firms have shown the importance of 
capitalist competitiveness in terms of adapting to ever‐changing policies and responding to 
increased market barriers, responses that are not easily replicated by the local firms.  
The growing investment in the cocoa industry within this stagnant supply production period has 
been supported by sustainability initiatives. The initiatives have become an instrument to enable the 
transnational actors to increase vertical coordination with the supply‐ based actors to further ensure 
supply for new investments. The state responded with policies that strengthened the position of 
transnational subsidiaries, leading to an increasingly concentrated processing sector that 
marginalised the smaller‐scale local processors. Reflecting on the discussion in Chapter 6, this 
trajectory of production network restructuring has been seen as a threat rather than as an 
opportunity to support regional development.  The interplay of trans‐local challenges and economic 
interest in capturing value from the growing cocoa industry resulted in coordinated efforts among 
the competitive supply chain actors and lead firms to introduce sustainability initiatives. For the 
disintegrated lead firms (Nestlé and Mondelēz), the role of contract suppliers is crucial as a means to 
implement ‘arms‐length’ sustainability initiatives. For example, Barry Callebaut, one of Nestlé’s 
contract suppliers, is adopting a certification scheme via a collaboration with ‘arms‐length’ traders in 
Polewali Mandar (see Figure 8.1), and BT Cocoa is participating in a sustainability initiative in 
Mamuju via a Sustainable Cocoa Production Program (SCPP) implemented by Swisscontact (see 
discussion 5.3.3 in Chapter 5).   
For the Mars’ subsidiary, the contract supplier roles are a combination of ‘arms‐length’ and 
upscaling of sustainability initiatives. The subsidiary exercises decentralised control over the 
establishment and coordination of these initiatives. Becoming a part of Mars’ production network is 
followed by a supply quota of certified cocoa and agreement to establish a CDC‐CVC to gain 
economic scale and impact of sustainability outputs. For example, Olam’s subsidiary established a 
CDC‐CVC in Kolaka District and Ecom subsidiary in Polewali Mandar District (see Figure 8.1). 
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Although this additional function of delivering sustainable extension services may have provided 
mutual benefit by sharing resources to ensure supply security, the decentralised CDC‐CVC system 
maintains Mars’ key position in creating value from transferring upstream knowledge and 
technologies.     
Figure 8.1 Cocoa production and processing networks in the Sulawesi region   
 
Looking at the lead firms’ role in the reorganisation of the cocoa production networks, the emerging 
sustainability initiatives have coupled the Sulawesi region with the global production networks. But 
this has not necessarily been followed by the enrolment of the local firms. The supply capacity of the 
region has complemented the lead firms’ need to create and enhance economic value from the 
growing Asian market.  Under the sustainability initiatives, the global firms orchestrated a 
coordinated production network that connected smallholding farm production with large‐scale 
processing performed by contract suppliers. Reorganisation of the upstream cocoa production 
networks by Mars and Nestlé aimed to improve the firms’ capitalist competitiveness through more 
efficient and flexible forms of upstream production networks previously performed by less efficient 
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and more diverse local actors.  With the increasing role of the global firms in organising Sulawesi’s 
cocoa production networks, regional development’s fate became more dependent on firm strategic 
decisions and commercial practices.     
8.3.3 Knowledge and technology transfer 
Harvey (1989, cited in Yeung 2009: 331) notes that firms are continuously seeking new competitive 
advantages such as advanced technologies and communication systems as part of the dynamics of 
the capitalist accumulation process, a phenomenon referring to time-space compression. This 
competitive pressure concept has increased the demand for a time‐to‐market (Schoenberger, 2000 
and Sheppard, 2002 cited in Yeung 2009), a critical instrument in obtaining technological advances 
that will support the firms to win market shares. Within the cocoa‐chocolate industries, seeking new 
frontiers of competitive advantage is also part of the strategic development for cocoa‐chocolate 
processors. It results in a turn-key relationship which Fold (2002) refer to as bi‐polar. For example, 
Fold (2002) claims that the processors’ investment in the automatic processing of large volumes of 
cocoa led to a more efficient production system and an improved logistical system after replacing 
sacks with the containerisation of bulk bean trading. Although the improved capability of supply 
partners to complement the lead firms’ core competences resulted in their vertical disintegration, 
the lead firms continue to increase the vertical specialization that is currently a feature of upstream 
cocoa production and research.  
The global production networks concept emphasizes the importance of knowledge and technology 
transfer in retaining value creation and enhancement. Innovation amongst Indonesia’s industrial and 
upstream production, however, was scarcely created by the domestic actors. The quasi‐state 
research institutions’ capability to deliver new frontier innovations are highly dependent upon 
government support. The ongoing domestic development of the cocoa industry, and the emerging 
lead firms’ sustainability initiatives indicate the distribution of value creation in the cocoa processing 
and farm‐level production networks. The value creation from the cocoa processing segment has 
been established by most of the transnational firms as part of a long‐term strategy to sustain and 
increase economic rent via increases in the economic scale and scope of the production system.  This 
established value creation and enhancing of the cocoa and chocolate industries is not easily 
replicated and adopted by domestic production networks.  As previously suggested, the 
development and rapid diffusion of knowledge has emphasised the importance of local policy 
networks of public and private actors to drive local innovation rather than being simply the result of 
incidental synergies in the industrial cluster or atmosphere (Scott, 1996 cited in Humphrey and 
Schimtz, 2002). The current industrial policy that aims to bridge the technology gap, for example 
zero tax on importing agro‐industry (including cocoa) machinery, remains temporarily to incentivise 
the processing actors to improve their competitiveness.  
The knowledge creation and technology improvements embedded in sustainability initiatives to 
sustain cocoa farm production have broadened the industrial actors’ domain to the extent of 
delivering extension services to the scattered smallholder farmers. The sustaining of Sulawesi’s 
supply based assets is closely related to smallholder supplying capability and the efficient upstream 
production networks that define a region’s ability to continue coupling in the global cocoa 
production networks. Although the Indonesian government has tried to improve and strengthen this 
regional asset, its institutional capacity to produce and deliver farming technology through national 
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programs and policies has been limited due to weak coordination and limited resources among the 
affiliated agencies (see discussion in Chapter 6). Traditionally, the government affiliated research 
and extension institutions are responsible for producing knowledge and delivering extension 
services. But, the complex structure and political dynamics have affected the agencies’ capacity, 
evident in the failure of the Gernas program. Despite the resource‐based milieu of the Sulawesi 
region, the lack of institutional thickness to effectively facilitate knowledge creation (Amin and 
Thrift, 1994) has motivated the transnational firms to deliver extension services instead.  
Having experienced the national government’s reluctance to engage in public private partnership 
since the early introduction of the Gernas program in 2008 (see discussion, section 6.3, Chapter 6), 
Mars developed an adapted farming business extension model instead of depending on government 
programs. The concept of CDC‐CVC aims to capture value from an improved and integrated farming 
system (see Chapter 7). In effect, Mars filled the gap in the limited traditional state agencies’ roles in 
generating cocoa farming knowledge and delivering extension services to the smallholder farmers 
and, more broadly, to the cocoa stakeholders. The concerns associated with this role was 
accessibility and capability, because of the vertically coordinated nature (see my discussion of farm‐
level upgrading in Chapter 7) of the upgrading process. The transfer of technologies (efficient 
agrochemical and high yield pest resistant varieties) is restricted to those farmers who participate in 
Mars’ sustainability initiative.  As the market contract is bound to the capability to establish a CDC‐
CVC, it is unlikely that the (uncompetitive) capitalist local actors will upgrade their commercial 
relationships by adopting functional extension services. Thus, the supplying role will be concentrated 
among few capitalist transnational firms. This limitation also extends within the context of the 
certification schemes, wherein the transfer of technology is mainly extended to (better‐off) certified 
farmers who own more productive farms than their smallholder counterparts who tend to own less 
productive damaged farms.  
Mars’ participation in upstream cocoa development has expanded its vertical specialisation in both 
the upstream and downstream production networks. This has affected the learning and knowledge 
transfer trajectories previously provided by the government and international development 
agencies, and reorganised the production networks. The value creation of sustainability initiatives 
has centred on the lead firm (Mars) capability to not only transfer knowledge and technology, but 
also to produce the adapted knowledge and technology that has eventually undermined the 
government’s traditional role. Although lead firm sustainability implementation in the Sulawesi 
context has created upstream value via an integrated farming and extension business, the focus of 
this technological learning and transfer is at the base of the production network, which is dominated 
by low‐skilled labour intensive activities rather than on strengthening the domestic cocoa industry. 
The supply partner’s ability to support and complement the lead firms’ sustainability initiatives has 
led to a learning process primarily captured by the transnational (trading‐processing) suppliers.  The 
government’s industrial policy proved inadequate to strengthen the domestic firms’ capitalist 
capability and to limit the lead firms’ and contract suppliers’ trading services. The subsequent 
intensification of the various sustainability‐affiliated extension services excluded the domestic 
processing‐trading actors from participating in the lead firm global production networks.   
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8.3.4 (Rural) employment  
The establishment of different forms of sustainability initiatives was followed by the recruitment of 
private extension service agents previously organised by the government, and project‐ based 
sustainability programs. Since the early value chain interventions in the 2000s (see Chapter 5), the 
trajectories of the project‐ based sustainability initiatives have introduced the concept of private 
extension service agents with the specific role of sustaining the cocoa sector. However, these 
services tended to have limited scaling‐up and timeframes due to the nature of the project‐based 
programs.  Following the emergence of sustainability initiatives, the concept of private extension 
services became more prominent and acceptable among the rural communities. Working for a 
private firm was seen as a respected and stable employment opportunity.   
Within the Sulawesi rural region, employment creation in the resource‐based sectors, for example in 
agriculture and mining, tended to show slow development progress partly due to its dependency on 
the national program and revenue shared. Nearly two decades of decentralisation has had limited 
impact on improving the local institutional capability to drive rural development and sectoral 
development (Brodjonegoro and Asanuma, 2000; Firman, 2009). The implementation of national 
programs (e.g., the Gernas kakao program) that were also project‐based was followed by the 
recruitment of temporary fresh graduate extension agents rather than integrating the program into 
the local extension agency structure.  
Due to the uncertainty surrounding the government program, and the limited capacity of the local 
institutions to sustain the public extension service under sustainability initiatives, the transnational 
lead firms and contract suppliers are establishing their own extension service agents. The 
combination of social and economic interest behind the initiatives has gained the interest of other 
institutions and organisations in collaborating with and supporting these private extension services. 
This growing adoption of the Mars’ CDC‐CVC extension model has signalled a long‐term commitment 
to rural employment that was previously temporary under the project‐based contract.  The contract 
suppliers’ growing adoption of a range of sustainability initiatives has extended the demand for 
employment extension services in most of the cocoa producing regions.   
Mars efforts to upgrade traditional cocoa farming into modern farming businesses ‐ as manifested in 
CVC farming business ‐ suggest a transformation of social class and rural landscape from 
smallholding into capitalist farming business. This phenomenon is not necessarily new within the 
Sulawesi context. Li (2014), comments on the process of capitalist accumulation and dispossession 
among the Lauje highlanders, Central Sulawesi. Li (2015) further writes that after centuries of 
growing food crops, the famers have shifted to mono‐crop cocoa production because the highland 
was too poor for intensive food production. Growing cocoa shifted from ‘a choice to compulsory’. 
The highlanders had to transform their land into private property, and were obliged to produce 
efficiently. The prevailing land conditions and cocoa farming challenges have polarised the 
highlanders into two classes, the ‘haves and the have nots’ (Li, 2015).  
Linking to Mars’ functional upgrading, the CVC, as a coordinated cocoa farming business, has 
emphasized intensive capitalist investment in restoring the cocoa farming business.  Chapter 7 
shows the importance of capitalist investment to obtain functional upgrading and seeks pragmatic 
economic opportunities from the poorly coordinated state institutions. This concept of a profitable 
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farming business required start‐up investment from a credit system followed by accumulation of 
single sector farming services and productive assets (land, farms, and capital). The focus of most of 
the assisted farmers who have established their cocoa farming businesses was on the accumulation 
of productive assets, a goal clearly articulated by an assisted farmer from East Luwu (Pye‐Smith, 
2011: 21): 
Take for example, the story of Muh Syarif, a cocoa trader in Lera village, East Luwu regency. 
In 2007, he bought a hectare of abandoned cocoa farm and began grafting superior varieties 
onto the old trees after visiting a demonstration plot in Pongo. He is now getting over 3 
tonnes per hectare and has used some of his profits to buy and rehabilitate other cocoa 
gardens.   
The ongoing smallholder farming challenges followed by declining farm yields ‐to the extent of 
abandoning the farms – reflected to the highlanders’ dilemma. Abandoning the farm led to 
dispossession by the capitalist farmers who tended towards accumulating productive assets and 
attaining a more efficient‐profitable farming system albeit at the expense of the struggling 
smallholder farmers.  Although the successful farmers managing the growing CVC farming business 
contributed to the local employment creation of casual farming jobs with quick access to cash, the 
outcome was relatively irregular and highly dependent on the farming season. The increasing 
numbers of capitalist farmers engaging with more capital‐intensive cocoa farming, along with the 
uneven capitalist competition, put additional pressure on the smallholder farmers. The 
consequences of this intensified uneven competition led to a capitalist relationship via a 
dispossession and accumulation process of productive assets that further reified rural poverty.   
Employment creation under the sustainability initiatives aimed to enhance cocoa production value, 
not only in terms of social value (producing under improved farming practices), but also economic 
value to ensure smallholder supply capacity for the sustainable cocoa‐chocolate industries. With 
value creation and enhancement expected to generate from this employment, the farm level 
production networks concentrated on a single farming system that was dependent on the presence 
of the transnational firms. This single sector‐oriented upstream cocoa development emphasized the 
industrial actors’ interest in sustaining supply capacity and encouraging a capitalist farming system 
followed by the exclusion of the struggling smallholder farmers (those with limited capital) and the 
emergence of increasing numbers of capitalist farmers.   
The transnational firms’ dominant role in providing extension services and dictating the market 
system not only increased the specialisation within the global value chain, but also the power 
beyond the market domain. The market driven and oriented services enrolled the smallholder 
farmers into the global production networks, where they became subject to intensified global 
competition. Ultimately, the fate of the farming business was defined by the oligopolistic lead firms 
and their supply partners. The domestic presence of the transnational processors remained for as 
long as the cocoa producers were capable of meeting and complying with a stringent sourcing policy 
while internalising the cost of farming risks and overcoming global price volatility and an ever‐
changing market demand.   
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8.4 Conclusion: Lead firm sustainability, value capturing and regional development 
This study explores the incorporation of the emerging lead firms’ sustainability initiatives into 
industrial governance and the extra‐firm bargaining strategies employed to improve upstream cocoa 
production competitiveness. The implementation of a range of sustainability initiatives has 
contributed to intensifying concentration of ‘bi‐polar’ production networks previously identified by 
Fold (2002), but I have also identified a need to articulate this beyond conventional industrial inter‐
firm relationships. The industrial coordination by the lead firm chocolate manufacturers and 
contract supplier of cocoa‐chocolate producers are increasing their control over upstream cocoa 
production. The recent restructuring of global production networks (see a detailed discussion in 
Chapter 4) shows a trend towards an outsourcing strategy applied by the lead firms after increasing 
their investment in the emerging market regions. The contract suppliers have increased their power 
in terms of becoming vertically integrated and more concentrated even than the branded lead firms. 
This vertically integrated function is necessary to extend the lead firms sustainability initiatives and 
to build direct relationships with the dispersed smallholder farmers, as the contract suppliers serve 
as an ‘arms‐length’ extension of the lead firm.   
Increasing global upstream intervention by the transnational industrial actors via sustainability 
engagement has been driven by economic concerns linked to unstable supply and social‐political 
issues including child labour practices and political instability (Bitzer et al., 2012; Barrientos, 2013). 
These concerns were reflected in significant increasing global cocoa price in 2008 after political 
turmoil in Ivory Coast. In Indonesia, economic driven linking to declining farm productivity and 
growing investment of transnational firms in domestic cocoa industry, accordingly engaging in 
sustainability discourse is expected to overcome the supply security to sustain the recent 
investment.  Managing these supply related risks are beyond the conventional outreach of the lead 
firms who had disintegrated their processing function to the contract suppliers and withdrawn from 
upstream cocoa production. Responding to the emerging risk environment, the lead firms have 
increased their engagement with sustainability discourses and built horizontal coordination with 
extra‐firm actors ‐ including the state ‐ to minimise the uncertainty of political, social and 
environmental outcomes generated outside the production network. In addition to growing market 
demand, after the transnational industrial actors’ increasing investment in both emerging markets 
and the cocoa producing countries, managing the risk environments is vital to sustaining the 
industries’ growth and maintaining a lead position within the production networks.  
Although previously this horizontal coordination took the form of lobbying that linked end market 
policy and regulatory incentives (Raynolds, 2003; Grant and Stocker, 2009), sustainability 
engagements in the forms of sustainability partnerships (such as CSP and PISAgro) have become an 
instrument to engage in the public space, particularly in the cocoa‐ producing countries.  This 
emerging firm sustainability engagement with the horizontal extra‐firm actors contributes to the 
debate surrounding the over‐emphasis of industrial governance proposed by the proponents of the 
GCC‐GVC framework (Gereffi, 1993; Gereffi et al., 2005). As well, it recognises the intricate 
relationships with the extra‐firm actors (Ponte, 2014; Dicken et al., 2001; Coe et al., 2008). Exploring 
the lead firm engagement in sustainability discourse suggests that sustainability has become a 
strategic instrument to enter extra‐firm bargaining strategies for minimising risk environments and 
capture maximum (economic) value from favourable environments. The sustainability‐inflected 
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nuances of extra‐firm bargaining strategies also identifies industrial actors as key and equal partners 
(Hartwich et al., 2008; Pattberg (ed.), 2012; FAO, 2016; Narrod et al., 2009) in the negotiation of 
policy. At the same time, the strategies implemented allow for increasing financial returns and 
shareholder value rather than simply addressing social injustice (Banerjee, 2008).   
Integrating the sustainability notion into sourcing policy (third party certification schemes, a 
traceability system, and sustainability programs) has created upstream market barriers. These 
market barriers have driven the transnational intermediate actors, particularly the cocoa 
trader/processors, to engage in additional functions, most notably the delivery of extension services.  
The extension service in the form of scaling‐up the certification schemes across the supplier partners 
had unclear the impact of improving farm productivity, but adoption the schemes is necessary for 
commercial relationship and maintaining market accessibility. While for the branded chocolate 
manufacturers, the schemes offer an instrument to minimise the supply risks from the oligopoly 
supply structure and independent verification provide legitimacy on the firm commitment to 
participate in sustainability discourse. 
Combination of integrated market and extension service functions imply the strategic role of 
intermediate actors, not only in terms of economic scale of cocoa trading‐processing, but also the 
scope of production activities that currently required to vertically coordinate with the branded 
manufacturers and dispersed smallholder farmers. Following major acquisitions leading to vertically 
integrated trading/processing firms, industrial cocoa‐chocolate producers are now more globally 
concentrated than the branded manufacturers (see discussion in section 4.2.2 of global cocoa 
processors and chocolate couverture), and the lead firms are seeking means of managing the 
growing power of these intermediate actors.  This growing power threatens to destabilise branded 
manufacturers lead position in the global cocoa‐chocolate production networks (as argued earlier by 
Fold, 2002: 244‐5). This study highlights increasing industrial‐centred power beyond reorganisation 
of industrial activities, as the lead firms’ sustainability initiatives have resulted in increased vertical 
coordination with the upstream cocoa production networks. Not only has this intensified the bi‐
polar relationships and reduced upstream complexities, but it also minimises the spatial supply and 
environmental risks, and engages with the smallholder producers for more efficient supply chains.  
Given that the global intermediate actors have become more competent and flexible when obtaining 
functional upgrading and downgrading within intra‐firm control of internal production networks, the 
focus of sustainability initiatives in Chapter 7 shows the introduction of different forms of farm‐level 
upgrading (e.g., product, process and functional) to the smallholder farmers and upstream actors. 
These initiatives have systematically invited the smallholder farmers’ participation in the global 
production networks, in the process subjecting them to the dark side of globalisation (Kaplinsky, 
2000; Kaplinsky 2005). Their participation will be sustained if the farmers maintain lower costs and 
more efficient cocoa farming production than farmers in other cocoa producing countries. This 
process of facilitating farm level capability to systematically respond to highly competitive industrial 
actors shows the importance of capitalist investment to producing a sustainable and stable supply of 
cocoa, while the voluntary volume‐based incentives are mainly controlled by the concentrated 
transnational industrial actors. Despite the voluntary nature of the volume‐based incentive, under 
uncertain environmental factors (e.g. changing rainfall patterns, soil degradation, increased pest 
disease infestation and global price volatility), the smallholder farmers are encouraged to adopt high 
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cost, yet apparently more efficient, farming systems (see Figure 7.1). This means that they are 
inevitably drawn into uneven upstream competition with the emerging assisted capitalist farmers 
(see discussion in section 7.2.3 of functional upgrading).  
Selwyn (2011) and Tokatli (2013) claim that enabling farm‐level innovation and new markets does 
not necessarily result in positive development outcomes due to the significant accessing gap in 
competencies and the concentrated business environment. The different forms of farm level 
upgrading introduced via sustainability initiatives suggest that economic interest prevail (the 
emphasis by industrial actors on improved farm productivity) rather than minimising environmental 
and social issues. The establishment of a traceability system and volume‐based incentives aimed to 
minimise the supply risks encountered by the industrial actors. It showed limited interest in 
minimising smallholder livelihood vulnerability from the global price volatility and their dependence 
on a single cash crop. While increased farm production outputs (see Figure 6.1) are now evident 
after a few years of firm sustainability initiatives in the major producing countries (the Ivory Coast 
and Ghana), this has not necessarily been followed by a reduction in child labour practices (Tulane 
University, 2015) or compensation for farming risk generated by climate change and land 
degradation. Kaplinsky (2000) described the process of ‘immiserising growth’ whereby increasing 
cocoa farm outputs because of increasing yield and rural employment occur at the same time as 
falling economic returns because of falling global prices due to oversupply. Eventually, increased 
efficiency and decrease in the supply risk of cocoa farming production will sustain industrial growth. 
But, this could come potentially at the expense of increased farmer livelihood vulnerability and the 
deterioration of social aspects within rural farming communities.  
Alongside with implementation of firm sustainability initiatives, the Indonesian government’s 
attempts to develop a domestic cocoa industry after imposing a combination of trade‐barriers to 
ensure domestic supply and industrial policies to incentivise the growing industry. This industrial 
policy provided a disincentive to trading actors, but was responded to by transnational trading firms 
through adding functions and becoming vertically integrated trading‐processing. The incentive of 
industrial development not only affected the local trading actors, but increased large scale foreign 
investment in processing segment, putting competitive pressure on the small scale local processors. 
In addition, the increasing upstream sustainability interventions of transnational firms were followed 
by an increase in market barriers and upstream vertical coordination for local actors. This by 
extension discouraged the local actors from participating in the lead firms’ production networks, as a 
series of industrial policies introduced to support the domestic firms’ competitiveness proved 
temporary. In addition, the government lacked institutional capacity to strengthen the smallholders’ 
supply capacity and drive farm‐level upgrading. Eventually, this intricate trans‐local intervention 
contributed to the restructuring of the domestic production networks. 
The state’s ‘outside‐in coupling strategy’ was followed by flawed programs and weak institutional 
capacity, the public spending for downstream cocoa development suggests an intricate web of 
political‐economic interests. The government remained unable to improve the competitiveness of 
the local industrial actors, to enable them to participate in the global cocoa production networks. On 
the other hand, the transnational trading firms were able to overcome the vertical and horizontal 
pressures and position themselves as strategic partners, in the process reifying the lead firms’ 
commitment to delivering sustainability initiatives. The capitalist capacity of the transnational 
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trading‐processing firms, which was inherent in their economic scale and their capacity to 
complement the lead firms, was not easily emulated by the local firms. This government coupling 
strategy via the industrial policies alone has been insufficient to drive the competitiveness of local 
firms. The limited competitiveness of local firms is slowly excluding them from the global cocoa 
production networks.   
From a territorial perspective, it remains pre‐emptive to determine the extent of positive 
development impacts for Sulawesi as a result of coupling with the global production network, 
considering that it has only been approximately five years of sporadic implementation of the 
sustainability initiatives. Although the ongoing value capture of farming technology and coordinated 
cocoa production suggests increasing investment by transnational firms, the voluntary adoption of 
the recommended technology is highly dependent on the smallholder farmers’ livelihood strategy 
and level of dependence on cocoa farming to support their livelihood. However, the upstream 
research investment by transnational firms to strengthen regional supply assets is creating a 
dependent relationship, as the region become more dependent on the presence of the transnational 
firms. This development outcome shows that the combination of industrial policies and initiatives 
designed to attract foreign direct investment suggested by GVC proponents (Gereffi, 1995 cited by 
Talbot, 2002:708) has proven inadequate to strengthen the regional assets. The limited competitive 
capabilities of the local actors were unable to drive the growing cocoa industry, and the weak 
institutional capacity to deliver extension services has been replaced by the transnational firms. 
Thus, the region’s plugging-into the global production networks has not necessarily been followed 
by equal distribution of the economic gain that has accrued from the upgraded economic activities 
(Ponte, 2002; Blowfield, 2003; Talbot, 2002; Arnold and Pickles, 2011; Milberg and Winkler, 2011; 
Barrientos et al., 2011). The transnational industrial actors’ gain through the economic scale and 
scope of production, but this has been at the expense of the cheaper productive capital supplied by 
the smallholder farmers that is creating new processes of uneven development.  
The firms’ sustainability engagements have been observed to increasingly interact with a variety of 
extra‐firm actors, including the state, NGOs, certification agencies and international development 
organisations. This engagement in the Indonesian cocoa sector suggests a need to rethink value 
chain governance away from the overemphasis on industrial governance, as evident in the previous 
value chain studies that suggested overly fetishizing upgrading with positive development outcomes 
in the agrofood sector (Barrientos et al., 2010; Selwyn, 2013; Milberg and Winkler, 2011). The 
increasing participation of the transnational firms in upstream cocoa development has attempted to 
capture value from the supply security delivered by the smallholder farmers. However, the value 
creation under sustainability initiatives through farm level upgrading suggests a stronger economic 
interest of industrial actors to minimise supply risks and increase their vertical coordination (or 
control) of the dispersed smallholder farmers.  Regarding Mars’ value capture trajectories, their 
concept to restore profitability of the cocoa farming business highlighted the capitalists’ ability to 
shift to high input farming and to accumulate productive assets as a long‐term strategy to maintain 
their efficient and profitable farming businesses. This capital accumulation process, encouraged by 
the implementation of sustainability initiatives, is eventually leading to the capital dispossession of 
the less competitive smallholder farmers, a process previously observed by Li (2014, 2015), creating 
widening social gap and deepening rural poverty. The emerging sustainability initiatives have, 
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however, created rural employment for the delivery of agronomic services. But, this employment 
has been highly dependent upon the presence and strategic development of the transnational 
leading firms.   
The lead firm sustainability engagement systematically encouraged smallholder farmers’ 
participation in the global production networks, in the process subjecting them to the intense 
competitive pressure of globalisation (Kaplinsky, 2000; Kaplinsky 2005). Their participation in the 
emerging firm sustainability initiatives were based primarily on the economic interests of industrial 
actors to minimising their upstream supply risks. To sustain this participation depended on the 
capability to maintain low cost‐efficient cocoa farming production. This has meant that integrating 
the sustainability notion into business practices, initiated by the branded chocolate manufacturers, 
has led to increasing market barriers and a dependence on global firms. This further implies the 
importance of capitalist competitiveness to complement the industrial actors’ strategy of 
development. The fortune of the Sulawesi region’s coupling with the global production networks 
shows that the value capturing and retaining for regional development has been dominated by the 
transnational firms. The reality is that the regional supply assets have become dependent on the 
presence of the transnational firms. The weak institutional capacity to deliver extension services has 
resulted in the function being overtaken by the transnational firms.  The local actors limited 
capitalist capability has disqualified their participation in the growing cocoa industry. The 
development trajectories of the region’s plugging-into the global cocoa production networks have 
not been followed by equal distribution of the economic gain realised from the upgraded economic 
activities. While the transnational industrial actors’ participation in sustainability discourse has 
gained capitalist competitiveness, it has come at the expense of cheaper productive capital supplied 
by the smallholder farmers, an outcome leading to future uneven development.  
This study has shown the dynamic restructure of global‐local cocoa production networks, as the lead 
transnational firms played dominant role to reconfiguring the economic governance and capturing 
the economic value from the increasing participation in the upstream cocoa production.  Although 
recently the state has shown (somewhat) policy interventions to sustain the upstream development, 
but this intervention remained politicized with limited engagement with the key players, in the other 
hand the state needs foreign direct investment to support the development of cocoa industry.  With 
the local actors are struggling to continue participating in the global production networks, the state 
needs to build inter‐scalar communication and engagement with the transnational firms (rather than 
sees as rivals), creating enable competitive environment for both global‐local firms to engage in 
innovation that provides conditioning stages for the local firms to become more competitive. 
Another trajectory from the firm sustainability initiatives is the ongoing widening social gap between 
the capitalist and smallholder farmers, and unequal power between the farmers and the industrial 
actors. In addition to enabling role, the state needs to moving away from the (short‐term) project 
based programs and more focus on long‐term empowerment program, nurturing inclusive local 
institutions rather than adding more bureaucracy structure in the upstream production networks.  
Finally, creating a coordinated inter‐sectoral (and scalar) policy and programs to prevent deepen 
poverty and widen social gaps at the local government level whilst improving the local institutional 
capacity.   
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Appendix A. Overview of global price fluctuated against the stock grinding ratio  
The slide was copy from the overview of cocoa supply and demand presented by Laurent Pipitone during the ICCO Cocoa Market Outlook Conference, 
London, 27 September 2016 
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B. Overview of Interviews  
B.1 Key Informant Interview Reference list 
Code         Date Location Format Language Respondent Organisation/business Spatial 
operation  
Economic activities at the village and district level 
GL1 24 April 2014 Guliling‐Mamuju In Person  Indonesian Leader Farmer group Village 
GL2 24 April 2014 Pamulukkang‐Mamuju In Person  Indonesian  Leader Farmer group Village 
GL3 24 April 2014 Kalukku‐Mamuju In Person  Indonesian Leader  Farmer Group  Village 
GL4 29 May 2014 Batu Pangada’ala‐Polman In Person  Indonesian Leader Farmer group Village 
GL5 29 May 2014 Rappang Barat‐Polman In Person  Indonesian  Leader Farmer group Village 
GL6 30 May 2014  Binuang‐ Polman In Person  Indonesian Leader  Farmer Group  Village 
GL7 3 March 2015 Masamba‐North Luwu In Person  Indonesian Leader Farmer group Village 
GL8 3 March 2015 Tarobok  In Person  Indonesian  Leader Farmer group Village 
GL9 3 March 2015 Kapidi In Person  Indonesian Leader  Farmer Group  Village 
GL10 4 March 2015 Lumbewe In Person  Indonesian Cocoa Doctor Owner of CVC business Village 
GL11 4 March 2015 Jalajja In Person  Indonesian  Cocoa Doctor Owner of CVC business Village 
GL12 4 March 2015 Asana In Person  Indonesian Cocoa Doctor Owner of CVC business Village 
GL13 4 March 2015 Kasituwu In Person  Indonesian  Cocoa Doctor Owner of CVC business Village 
Gl14 2 March 2015 Masamba In Person  Indonesian Cooperative leader CV Marewa‐assisted by Veco and Wasiat Village 
LT1 23 April 2014 Mamuju In person  Indonesian Owner of trading firm Trader‐has major contract with a local cocoa processor District 
LT2 23 April 2014 Mamuju In person  Indonesian Owner of trading firm Trader‐mostly engaging with regional buyer District 
LT3 26 April 2014 Malunda‐Majene In person  Indonesian Owner of trading firm  Trader‐mostly engaging with regional buyer District 
LT4 30 May 2014 Polman In person  Indonesian  Director of Bumi Surya Arm‐length trader of Barry Callebaut District 
LT5 30 May 2014 Polman In person  Indonesian  Sourcing manager Subsidiary of ECOM‐TMCI for Polman‐Mamuju District 
LT6 30 May 2014 Polman In person  Indonesian  Collector also group leader Independent collector  Sub district 
LT7 30 May 2014 Polman In person  Indonesian  Collector Independent collector Village 
LT8 31 May 2014 Larompong‐ Luwu In person  Indonesian Collector Independent collector Village 
LT9 31 May 2014 Larompong‐ Luwu In person  Indonesian Collector Independent‐often supply to MSI Village 
LT10 1 June 2014 Malangke‐North Luwu In person  Indonesian Collector  Independent‐often supply ECOM‐TMCI Village 
LT11 1 June 2014 Baebunta‐North Luwu In person  Indonesian  Collector Independent‐often supply ECOM‐TMCI Village 
LT12 1 June 2014 Masamba‐North Luwu In person  Indonesian  Sourcing manager Subsidiary of Olam for North and East Luwu District 
LT13 2 June 2014 North Luwu In person  Indonesian  Owner of trading firm  Trader‐often Olam, but also other regional buyers District 
LT14 2 June 2014 Masamba‐North Luwu In person  Indonesian  Sourcing manager Subsidiary of ECOM‐TMCI for North and East Luwu District 
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B.1 Key Informant Interview Reference list (Continue) 
Code         Date Location Format Language Respondent Organisation/business Spatial 
operation  
Activities and responsibility at the provincial and national level 
CC1 4 Feb 2014 Makassar In person  Indonesian  Certification manager Mars Symbioscience Indonesia  National  
CC2 18 Feb 2015 Luwu In person Indonesian CDC‐CVC field staffs Mars Global District  
CC3 4 Mar 2015 Luwu In person Indonesian CDC‐CVC field staffs Mars Global District  
CC4 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person English Procurement manager Nestlé Indonesia National 
CC5 11 Mar 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Sustainability manager ECOM‐TMCI National 
CC6 12 Mar 2014 Seram, Ambon By phone Indonesian Cocoa plantation manager Olam Indonesia National 
CC7 26 Apr 2014 Malunda, West Sulawesi In person Indonesian Sustainability staff BT Cocoa National  
CC8 9 Feb 2015 Makassar In person English Asia‐pacific Sustainability manger Barry Callebaut Asia‐pacific 
CC9 26 Mar 2014 Makassar In person Indonesian Procurement manager BT Cocoa  National 
MI1 24 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Assistant deputy of estate crops and agriculture Coordination Ministry of Economy  National 
MI2 9 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Staff responsible for cocoa Ministry of Industry  National 
MI3 5 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Estate crops coordinator Ministry of Industry National 
MI4 6 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Estate crops coordinator Ministry of Trade National 
MI5 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Dirjen estate crop  Ministry of Agriculture National 
MI6 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Deputy of Dirjen estate crop  Ministry of Agriculture National  
MI7 13 Feb2015 Polewali Mandar In person Indonesian Head of estate crop department Polewali Mandar District District 
MI8 15 Feb 2015 Polewali Mandar In person Indonesian Estate crop official  Polewali Mandar District District 
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B.2 List of respondent for semi‐structure interview 
Code         Date Location Format Language Respondent Organisations Spatial  
SS1 31 May 2014 Luwu In person Indonesian Certification coordinator Mars Symbioscience Indonesia Indonesia 
SS2 21 Mar 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Field staff Mars Symbioscience Indonesia Indonesia 
SS3 21 Mar 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Field staff Mars Symbioscience Indonesia Indonesia 
SS4 4 Feb 2015 Makassar‐CSP meeting In person English Productivity & cocoa development researcher Mondelez Asia Pacific 
SS5 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta‐CSP meeting In person Indonesian Sustainability manager BT Cocoa National 
SS5 4 Feb 2015 Makassar‐CSP meeting In person Indonesian ME staff Olam Indonesia National 
SS7 15 May 2014 IICC‐ Conference In person English Country representative UTZCertified National 
SS8 28 Dec 2015 Netherlands By email English ME officer UTZcertified Global 
SS9 21 may 2014 Bantaeng In person Indonesian RA manager Rainforest Alliance National 
SS10 21 May 2014 Bantaeng In person Indonesian Field staff Rainforest Alliance District 
SS11 30 May 2014 Jakarta By phone Indonesian Auditor Control Union National 
SS12 3 Jun 2014 Bogor By phone Indonesian Auditor Bio‐Cert National 
SS13 5 Jun 2014 Makassar In person Indonesian Program manager cocoa‐coffee Veco National 
SS14 30 May 2014 Polewali In person Indonesian Director Wasiat District 
SS15 30 May 2014 Polewali In person Indonesian Field staff Wasiat  District 
SS16 28 Feb 2014 Makassar In person Indonesian Project manager‐SCPP Swisscontact District 
SS17 31 Dec 2016 Makassar By phone Indonesian Program officer Swisscontact District 
SS18 22 Apr 2014 Mamuju In person Indonesian Field coordinator‐Mamuju Swisscontact  District 
SS19 31 May 2014 Luwu In person Indonesian Field coordinator‐Luwu Raya Swisscontact District 
SS20 24 Feb 2015 Mamuju In person Indonesian Operational manager Swisscontact  District 
SS21 26 Mar 2014 Makassar In person English Country representative IDH National  
SS22 15 May 2014 Bali In person Indonesian  Program officer IFC National 
SS23 3 Feb 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Program manager (2011‐14) WCF‐CIP project National 
SS24 3 Feb 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Executive director CSP National  
SS25 5 Feb 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Staff CSP  National 
SS26 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Member PISAgro National 
SS27 15 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian Chairman of Executive Board DEKAINDO National  
SS28 15 May 2014 Bali In person Indonesian General Secretary ASKINDO National 
SS29 13 Feb 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian House Representative Golkar Party Province 
SS30 13 Apr 2015 Jakarta In person Indonesian House Representative Gerindra Party National 
SS31 12 Apr 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian House Representative PDIP Party National 
SS32 15 May 2014 Bali  In person Indonesian Scientist 1 ICCRI  National  
SS33 16 Feb 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Scientist 2 ICCRI  National 
SS34 19 Feb 2015 Makassar In person Indonesian Scientist 3 ICCRI National 
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B.3 List of Focus Group Discussion  
Code         Date Location Language Group name  No of 
participants  
Supporting organisation  Spatial  
FG1 24 April 2014 Tadui‐ Mamuju  Indonesian Kakao Abadi 10 Nestlé and Swisscontact Village 
FG2 24 April 2014 Pammulukang‐Mamuju Indonesian Sekata 6 Nestlé and Swisscontact Village 
FG3 29 May 2014 Binuang‐Polewali Mandar Indonesian Marannu 6 TMCI‐Ecom subsidiary Village 
FG4 30 May 2014 Anreapi‐Polewali Mandar Indonesian Tunas Harapan 8 TMCI‐Ecom subsidiary Village 
FG5 25 February 2015 Tadui‐Mamuju Indonesian Padaidi  10 Nestlé and Swisscontact Village 
FG6 25 February 2015 Tapore ‐ Mamuju Indonesian Harapan Baru  9 Nestlé and Swisscontact Village 
FG7 25 February 2015 Kalukku‐Mamuju Indonesian Batumameang  8 Nestlé and Swisscontact Village 
FG8 27 February 2015 Luyo‐Polman Indonesian Lestari 10 Cooperative, Wasiat‐Veco Village 
FG9 27 February 2015 Luyo‐Polman Indonesian Bina Harapan 6 Cooperative, Wasiat‐Veco Village 
FG10 27 February 2015 Mapili‐Polman Indonesian Mesakada 7 Cooperative, Wasiat‐Veco Village 
FG11 28 February 2015 Betetanga‐Polman Indonesian Tammu tammu 12 TMCI‐Ecom subsidiary Village 
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Appendix C.1 Overview of on-site visit of ongoing implementation of sustainability initiatives in East and North Luwu Districts 
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Appendix C.2 Overview of on-site visit of ongoing implementation of sustainability initiatives in Polewali Mandar District 
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Appendix C.3 Overview of on-site visit of ongoing implementation of sustainability initiatives in Mamuju District 
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Appendix D. Comparing adapted quality assessment performed by a transnational firm (re. Ecom subsidiary) depending on geographic supply capacity  
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Appendix E. Questionnaire of pilot survey in 2012 about the emerging certification schemes  
B. FARM CHARACTERISTICS 
I. VITAL STATISTICS 
1) Information on your household structure 
Household member (initials)  Age Gender Living 
elsewhere 
Hours work on 
cocoa farm 
daily 
School grades completed (SD, SMP, SMA, University) 
1. __________________ ____  F/   M      
2. __________________     ____  F/   M      
3. __________________ ____  F/   M      
4. __________________     ____  F/   M      
5. __________________ ____  F/   M        
 
How many years have you been growing cocoa? _____________years 
3) Areas of owned farms? 
Farms  Size (ha) Number of plot Number of tree/plot 
 Cocoa  _______ _______ _______ 
 Unproductive farm  _______ _______ _______ 
 Other crop, __________ _______ _______ _______ 
 Other crop, __________ _______ _______ _______ 
 Other crop, __________ _______ _______ _______ 
 Total _______ _______ _______ 
 
8) Do you know how much your household income last year?  YES /   NO, if YES, how much? Rp ________________ 
9) If NO, can you estimate the following?  
Household member  Percentage (Note: should 
add up to 100%)                
Comments  
 Cocoa  ____ ______________________________________ 
 Other tree crops  ____ _____________________________________ 
 Livestock  ____ _____________________________________ 
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 Other agriculture  ____ _____________________________________ 
 Tradesmen (Tukang) ____ _____________________________________ 
 Trader (pedagang)  ____ ______________________________________ 
 Transport (Ojek‐supir)  ____ _____________________________________ 
 Wage labour (buruh)      ____ _____________________________________ 
 Small manufacture  (pabrik)  
 Remittances (uang kiriman, sumbangan)      
____ _____________________________________ 
Other, ______________________  ____ _____________________________________ 
 
 
C. ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY 
I. PRODUCER RISK  
8) How do you know the cocoa price? ____________________________________________ 
9) How much dried cocoa bean have you harvested on your farm in the last 
a) Month? _________________(kg/bag‐karung) 
b) Year? _________________(kg/bag‐karung) 
10) Who bought your cocoa over the last month?  
  Farmer cooperative    village collector              trader                          exporter  
13) Have you used money from cocoa sales for any of the following items / activities?  
 Sending children to higher education,  
 Buying a motorbike,  
 Buying a car / truck,  
 Building a new house,  
 Going on the hajj,  
 Paying for an important ceremony (wedding, circumcision, eidadha) 
 Buying  new mobile phone 
 Other, ________________ 
14) Do you have access to credit before the harvest?   YES /  NO. 
If yes, where from?  
 Bank      Amount _______________ 
 Tengkulak     Amount _______________ 
 Producers organisation / cooperative   Amount ________________ 
 Friends or family     Amount _______________ 
 No
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Appendix F. Comparing the farm gate price among the trading actors in Polewali Mandar district before and after implementation of export tax (Ministry of 
finance regulation, No 67/PMK. 011/2010) 
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Appendix G. Overview of rural communities, the emerging capitalist farmers
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
192 
 
Appendix H. Overview of rural communities, livelihood opportunity and challenge 
 
 
Appendix I. Wasted government program fermentation facilities during field work in 2014 and 2015 
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Appendix J. Raw data of cocoa farm cost allocated by the farmers in Polewali Mandar 
Farmers  Pruning Organic 
Fertilizer  
Chemical 
Fertilizer 
Sanitation Harves
ting  
Sortation 
- Drying 
Chemical 
Pesticides 
Organic 
Pesticides  
1 250,000 0 300,000 50,000 0 425,000   0 
2 250,000 0 300,000 100,000 0 450,000 108,000 0 
3 400,000 200,000 400,000 50,000 0 250,000 119,000 460,000 
4 550,000 0 300,000 100,000 0 150,000 278,000 20,000 
5 100,000 300,000 120,000 100,000 0 250,000 260,000 385,000 
6 200,000 0 300,000 50,000 0 450,000 127,000 0 
7 300,000 150,000 200,000 50,000 0 300,000 60,000 460,000 
8 210,000 100,000 150,000 0 0 200,000 245,000 0 
9 150,000 0 200,000 235,000 0 450,000 195,000 0 
10 100,000 0 300,000 150,000 0 270,000 180,000 0 
11 200,000 0 400,000 50,000 0 400,000 193,000 0 
12 50,000 0 100,000 50,000 0 150,000 85,000 0 
13 200,000 0 500,000 50,000 0 250,000 135,000 0 
14 450,000 200,000 250,000 0 0 200,000 75,000 460,000 
15 150,000 0 400,000 50,000 0 300,000 138,000 0 
16 150,000 0 100,000 50,000 0 200,000 145,000 0 
17 200,000 0 300,000 40,000 0 350,000 130,000 0 
18 150,000 0 100,000 50,000 0 250,000 65,000 0 
19 240,000 0 350,000 50,000 0 350,000 110,000 0 
20 400,000 200,000 150,000 50,000 0 200,000 121,000 460,000 
21 150,000 250,000 250,000 50,000 0 300,000   0 
22 250,000 350,000 400,000 50,000 0 450,000 500,000 0 
23 300,000 200,000 250,000 0 50,000 200,000 356,000 0 
24 250,000 200,000 150,000 0 0 100,000 121,000 0 
25 300,000 250,000 450,000 0 0 200,000 128,000 652,500 
26 0 250,000 600,000 75,000 0 200,000 101,000 1,098,000 
27 350,000 100,000 350,000 0 0 250,000 82,000 15,000 
28 50,000 350,000 150,000 0 0 300,000 200,000 0 
29 150,000 100,000 200,000 0 0 150,000 115,000 820,000 
30 300,000 0 250,000 0 0 150,000 136,000 0 
31 250,000 250,000 150,000 20,000 0 150,000 50,000 750,000 
32 200,000 0 150,000 0 0 150,000 69,000 0 
33 150,000 150,000 150,000 0 0 150,000 30,000 582,000 
34 350,000 100,000 200,000 0 0 150,000 105,000 700,000 
35 50,000 50,000 200,000 50,000 0 250,000 184,000 0 
36 300,000 100,000 200,000 0 0 150,000 169,000 0 
37 250,000 50,000 200,000 0 0 250,000 71,000 850,000 
38 100,000 60,000 0 0 250,000 141,000 814,000 0 
39 100,000 150,000 0 0 200,000 145,000 650,000 0 
40 0 250,000 0 0 250,000 127,000   0 
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Appendix J. Raw data of cocoa farm cost allocated by the farmers in North Luwu 
Farmers  Pruning Organic 
Fertilizer  
Chemical 
Fertilizer 
Sanitation Harvesting  Sortation 
- Drying 
Organic 
Pesticides 
Chemical 
Pesticides  
1 300,000 0 50,000 250,000 150,000 150,000 0 350,000 
2 50,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 200,000 0 300,000 
3 100,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 200,000 0 400,000 
4 0 0 100,000 0 150,000 400,000 0 50,000 
5 50,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 450,000 0 400,000 
6 450,000 0 150,000 350,000 150,000 100,000 0 350,000 
7 0 0 50,000 100,000 300,000 300,000 0 350,000 
8 100,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 150,000 0 250,000 
9 50,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 250,000 0 250,000 
10 50,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 150,000 0 450,000 
11 150,000 0 100,000 150,000 150,000 250,000 0 400,000 
12 50,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 100,000 0 400,000 
13 100,000 0 100,000 0 150,000 200,000 0 400,000 
14 200,000 100,000 0 50,000 250,000 300,000 0 400,000 
15 150,000 0 150,000 100,000 150,000 350,000 0 450,000 
16 250,000 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 400,000 0 350,000 
17 200,000 0 100,000 100,000 250,000 200,000     
18 200,000 0 100,000 100,000 250,000 300,000 0 350,000 
19 100,000 0 50,000 50,000 250,000 250,000 0 300,000 
20 300,000 0 100,000 350,000 200,000 100,000 0 500,000 
21 50,000 0 100,000 0 50,000 100,000 0 300,000 
22 100,000 0 350,000 0 150,000 100,000 0 250,000 
23       50,000                   ‐     150,000        50,000     100,000                   ‐       250,000  
24       50,000                   ‐                   ‐     200,000        50,000                   ‐                   ‐     700,000  
25       50,000                   ‐     100,000     300,000                   ‐                   ‐                   ‐     200,000  
26    100,000  0 150000 0 0 0 0 300000 
27 0 0 100,000 300,000 50,000 0 0 250,000 
28 50,000 50,000 250,000 100,000 0 50,000 0 450,000 
29 100,000 0 100,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0 400,000 
30 100,000 0 0 100,000 50,000 0 0 300,000 
31 50,000 0 50,000 0 100,000 100,000 0 350,000 
32 0 0 300,000 0 50,000 100,000 0 250,000 
33 200,000 0 100,000 50,000 50,000 0 100,000 350,000 
34 100,000 0 50,000 150,000 150,000 100,000 0 350,000 
35 100,000 0 100,000 50,000 0 100,000 0 400,000 
36 150,000 0 100,000 0 200,000 200,000 0 400,000 
37    100,000                   ‐     150,000     250,000     350,000     150,000                   ‐     600,000  
38 100,000 0 0 50,000 0 0 0 400,000 
39 100,000 100,000 200,000 100,000 100,000 150,000 0 450,000 
40 100,000 0 100,000 50,000 0 0 0 300,000 
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Appendix K. Result sections of the impact assessment on certification scheme in Indonesian cocoa 
industry 
3. Results of the pilot survey97 
It should be emphasised that the following results are preliminary and are based on a set of draft 
indicators that will be further reviewed. The primary purpose of this study was to trial a survey 
method, with a secondary purpose of analysing impacts from participation in a certification scheme. 
Results are presented here for initial discussions with relevant stakeholders only and should 
certainly not be used to judge the success, failure or otherwise of certification schemes. The survey 
format itself was organised into 6 sections, but the results (only) were focus on: C. Economic 
Sustainability indicators; D. Environmental Sustainability indicators; E. Social Sustainability 
indicators; and F. Perceptions towards certification. The results for each section of the survey will 
now be discussed. 
C. ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY 
The economic sustainability of the cocoa sector is required to continue productive farming 
activities as well as to maintain quality of life. To develop indicators of economic sustainability, 
a range of parameters were used: production and post‐harvest activities; income and expenditure; 
quality and market access; and access to microfinance. 
C.I. Cocoa production, prices and competitiveness 
Production is a common indicator to determine improvements in the farming system. However, 
getting an answer to questions about a farmer’ production in the previous year was difficult. This is 
because farmers rarely keep records of their produce sales to middlemen or local traders (as shown 
in Figure 3 above). Nor is it standard practice for these buyers of cocoa to provide a receipt. This 
means that answers are reliant upon the memory recall of the farmer. 
Cocoa Production and yield 
Not all of farmers are able to accurately estimate their cocoa production in the previous year (only 
80% of the control group and 65% of the target group), although more were able estimate their 
cocoa harvest during the previous month (90% of the control group and 97% of the target group). 
The surveys were conducted in June through to August during the main harvest in Sulawesi. Target 
farmers reported much higher productivity during both time periods (Figure 9). 
                                                          
97 The summary based on the pilot survey result of the emerging certification schemes, as detail found in Hafid, H., 
Neilson, J., Mount, T., & McKenzie, F. (2013). Sustainability impact assessment of a certification scheme in Indonesian 
cocoa industry: 2012 Pilot survey result. http://www.geosci.usyd.edu.au/documents/cocoa2.pdf  
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Post-harvest handling and marketing 
There was a very significant difference between the two groups in relation to post‐harvest handling 
and marketing, suggesting that certification has been associated with a considerable transformation 
in this area. Figures 10 and 11 clearly show that most target farmers are drying their cocoa much 
longer (4‐5 days) compared with most control farmers (1‐2 days). Farmers receive significantly lower 
prices for wetter beans because of the high water content. Figure 12 shows that the certified target 
group is now overwhelmingly selling directly to the exporter rather than selling through more 
traditional local collector networks. However, target group farmers did also admit to selling some of 
their beans to local traders if they needed money quickly, or if the harvested volume was relatively 
small, or if they still had outstanding debts with the local collector. 
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Due to the lower moisture levels, target farmers received much higher prices than control group 
farmers. With each further day of drying, moisture content decreases and begin to approach the 
required 10% level. It is difficult to accurately estimate the moisture level from the survey based on 
number of days dried, as this will depend on a number of factors (drying yard materials, weather 
etc). Based on an assumption that cocoa dried for at least 5 days has reached the optimal moisture 
level (10%), and is therefore used as an index of 1, we have then adjusted the prices received for 
cocoa dried less than 5 days to take into account higher moisture levels and so obtain a more 
accurate estimate of prices received per content of cocoa98.  
 
These adjusted prices are presented in Figure 13, and suggest that the prices received by target 
farmers are still significantly higher than in the control group. Interestingly, however the control 
group farmers who dried their beans properly for 5 days or more did actually receive a similar price 
to those in the target group. It seems likely that the direct trading relationship with the exporter has 
also contributed to the higher farm‐gate price. This price data was collected during the period March 
                                                          
98 We have estimated that the price of cocoa sold after being dried for 4 days, should be divided by 0.95, 
for 3 days (0.9), for 2 days (0.8), and 1 day (0.6). This calculation is open to debate, but appears to be a 
best ‘guestimate’ at this stage 
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– July, 2012, and global price fluctuations might have influenced this data. According to data from 
the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO, 2013), however, international process were relatively 
stable over the time period the survey was conducted. Monthly averages (in USD/ tonne) were: 
March (2,359); April (2,267); May (2,314); June (2,264), and July (2,350). The survey collected asked 
the date of the last sale, so it is possible to determine farm‐gate prices as a percentage of prevailing 
world prices.  
In addition to market fluctuations, bean quality, debt owed and absence of sales receipts, 
determining the influences on farm‐gate price is further complicated because prices are subjectively 
determined by the collector. It is extremely difficult to differentiate the effects on farm‐gate prices 
caused by variations in the marketing system from the effects of the certification process itself. 
 
Cocoa bean quality 
In order to access certified markets, good quality is required by the exporter, as well as good farm 
management practices. If farmers do not meet the bean quality standard, then the price is 
discounted. As explained above, discount prices can be applied because of excess moisture content, 
as well as for smaller bean size or the presence of waste and mould. 
Farmers were asked to rate the quality of their cocoa (Figure 14). Perhaps not surprisingly, most 
farmers in both control and target groups rated their bean quality as ‘good’ for the various 
categories, although a significantly higher amount of control farmers answered ‘don’t know’. This 
suggests that certification, or perhaps the altered marketing system, has been associated with an 
improvement in quality awareness amongst farmers. 
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Expenditure of cocoa income 
Farmers were asked how they used money from cocoa sales (answered were provided by 100% of 
respondents from both groups). Figure 15 Suggests that income was allocated primarily to education 
for each group, followed by daily needs, new house, motor bike, and new mobile phones. The 
purchasing of farm inputs was purportedly a low priority for both groups. Overall, the target group 
appeared to have a greater purchasing capacity than the control group, with more individuals 
spending cocoa income on a new house, ceremonies and furniture, although more control farmers 
bought a motorbike and a new mobile phone. 
 
Access to credit 
38% of the control group and 57% of target group farmers confirmed they had obtained credit, and 
provided details of credit sources and amounts. Figure 16 suggests that the target group was more 
likely to access credit through a cooperative, while the control group accessed credit through local 
collectors (tengkulak). The average amount of credit obtained within both groups from these sources 
was relatively low (less than 2 million Rupiah). Bank credit was also reported by around 10% of each 
of the groups, and was generally of much higher amounts. 
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C.II. Involvement in Producer Organisations 
Benefits of participation 
Development programs are often implemented through farmer groups (kelompok tani) rather than 
directly with individual farmers. It was therefore anticipated that farmer groups are able to provide 
some sort of benefits to individuals. Farmers were asked if they were a member of a farmer group 
and, if so, what direct benefits they obtained from participation in the group. 100% of target farmers 
and 80% of control farmer claimed to be members of a farmers group. Farmers surveyed reported 
that benefits of farmer group participation include labour sharing, and the capacity to participate in 
the training and community meetings. Additional benefits were reported by the target group, who 
also participated in collective marketing and certification schemes (Figure 17). Target group farmers 
reported significantly greater benefits from participation in producer groups than control group 
farmers. 
 
Role of women 
While farmer groups have become a vehicle for delivering development activities, equality in 
terms of an individual’s right to group involvement is important – the lack of which can indicate 
discrimination that may be embedded in cultural and social norms or religious practices. Figure 18 
shows that male farmers of both groups were considered by respondents to be the most active in 
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farmer groups, although more target group respondents (28%) felt that women were at least as 
active as men in the group. 
 
In response to the question about whether there were woman leaders of any kind (association, head 
of village, school principle, etc) in the village, more respondents from the target group answered 
affirmatively (Figure 19). This could either demonstrate an improved awareness of gender within the 
target group, or an actual greater number of women in leadership roles within the target group 
villages. 
 
C.III. Farmer perceptions of economic sustainability 
Farmers were asked to compare cocoa farming today to five years ago (Figure 20) and to provide 
their opinion on the future prospects of cocoa farming (Figure 21). The responses to both of these 
questions indicate that the target group is generally a lot more positive towards the increasing 
benefits associated with cocoa farming compared to the control group. It is possible that the recent 
introduction of the certification program, and its associated exporter linkages, have reinvigorated 
interest in cocoa farming amongst the target group. This outcome, of course, would be considered a 
substantial indicator of success for the corporate proponents of certification schemes, many of 
whom are concerned over long‐term supply sustainability. 
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D. ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
D.I. Water 
Clean water is essential not only for drinking, but also for other household purposes. It is also used 
for agricultural activities. Water availability and access are therefore important indicators of 
environmental sustainability. In this survey, questions were asked about water sources, access and 
contamination. 
Water sources and access 
Groundwater from wells was the main source of drinking water for both groups, although more 
target group farmers were connected to a public water supply, again suggesting a greater affluence 
within this group (Figure 22). 
204 
 
 
Interestingly, in terms of access (Figure 23), a greater percentage of the target group had to 
travel further away to obtain water. In other words, the control group had more immediate access 
to clean water, with only 2% with water more than 20 minutes away, compared to 17% 
of the target group. 
 
Preventing water contamination 
Figure 24 shows the different activities reported to have been undertaken by farmers in an effort to 
prevent water contamination. 56% of all control group farmers reported doing nothing to prevent 
water contamination, compared to only 18% of target group farmers. Overall, the target group 
respondents appear to have taken a greater number of efforts to prevent water contamination 
compared to the control group. While these claims were not verified, it suggests an enhanced 
awareness of the importance of preventing water contamination. 
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D.II. Use of agrochemicals 
Application of agrochemicals 
Two types of agrochemical inputs are commonly applied to cocoa trees: fertilizers and pesticides. In 
this survey, some form of pesticide or herbicide was used on almost every farm (96% of all farms). 
Previously (see Figure 15), farmers had said they allocated a small proportion of cocoa revenue to 
buying inputs. However, Figure 25 suggests a high percentage of farmers using synthetic fertilizers 
and pesticides. This may come back to an interpretation of revenue and the difference between 
ongoing farm costs and investments versus outright profit. 
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There were substantial differences in the types of pesticides used in the control and target group. 
For killing weeds, Gramoxone (active ingredient Paraquat) was used much more widely in the 
control group than the target group, which tended to prefer Supremo (Glyphosate). (Paraquat 
dichloride is an active ingredient found in Gramaxone that has been prohibited by some certification 
standard bodies.) Similarly, no use or highly reduced use of other pesticides such as Alika and 
Matador (both with active ingredient Lambda Cyhalothrin) were reported within the target group. 
Bento, Supremo and Vigor were both (relatively) commonly applied by both groups, possibly 
because these agrochemicals were distributed for free as part of the GERNAS program. Most 
farmers apply pesticides themselves, although the target group tended to hire more external 
contractors than the control group (Figure 26) – again suggesting greater affluence. 
 
The need to restrict individuals from vulnerable groups (eg. pregnant woman and under age) from 
contact with chemicals through spraying was relatively well recognized by the members of both 
groups. In this survey, additional restrictions for old and sick people are accounted for in the 
category ‘other’ (Figure 27). It is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of these claims. 
 
Subjective responses to the question of whether farmers think they have been using more or less 
pesticides now compared to previously is reported in Figure 28. The target group generally reported 
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using less pesticides now than 5 years ago, while the control group reported an increase use of 
pesticides. 
 
Almost all farmers from both groups reported having concerns over the negative effects of 
pesticides, although target farmers showed a heightened concern for environmental impacts (Figure 
29). 
 
D.III. Soil 
More than 90% of cocoa farmers from both groups reported having sloping farm plots. However, 
Figure 30 below shows that more target farmer respondents claimed to have enacted soil control 
measures. 
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Most farmers from both groups relied primarily on synthetic fertilizers to replenish soil nutrients 
(Figure 31), although more target farmers reported that they supplemented this with composting 
and manuring. 
 
D.IV. Attitudes towards the environment 
Interestingly, the perception of the importance of environmental issues was relatively similar for 
both groups (see Figure 32). One difference was that target group farmers were more concerned 
with solid waste/plastic management, while control group farmers were more concerned about 
chemical pollution ‐ although they may not link this concern with their agrochemical practices. On‐
farm biodiversity seemed to be less important, while soil health and soil fertility was considered 
most important, followed by soil erosion and water quality in rivers. 
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E. SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Social sustainability refers to the provision of basic needs, human rights and equity that contribute 
to creating a productive and humane working environment in the community. Four parameters were 
trialled here to assess social sustainability: 1) availability of basic public services; 2) basic human 
rights, worker rights and equity; 3) building smallholder capacity through training participation; and 
4) smallholder perceptions. 
Availability of basic public services 
The affordability of proper basic public services is a key indicator of quality of life, particularly 
community health and education services. The most common accessible health service available 
around the village or hamlet were community health centres (PUSKESMAS) and paramedics (doctor 
or nurse), while public hospitals and private clinics were often available in nearby towns. Medical 
service costs were relatively affordable according to both groups, where the costs are either low and 
do not cause difficulty, or treatment is free (see Figure 33). 
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In terms of access to education, the distance of public schools from the place of residence was 
similar for both target and control groups (Figure 34). 
 
Despite this similarity in access to public schools, the target group spent more on education in the 
last year (2011) than the control group (Table 4), possibly suggesting a greater awareness of the 
value in education, or possibly greater disposable income. 
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Occupational health and safety is another component of social sustainability, with injuries and illness 
an important factor. In terms of on‐farm injuries, the target group reported a total of 19 on‐farm 
incidents in the previous year compared with the control having only 8. The inappropriate 
application of pesticides can potentially harm the health of smallholders. The use of protective 
clothing and equipment for the application of pesticides has therefore become a requirement of 
certification bodies. In measuring the use of protective measures, Figure 35 shows how more target 
farmers’ claimed to have used protective clothing and equipment than control farmers. 
 
E.I. Basic human rights, worker rights, and equity 
As an indicator of welfare, farmers were asked how many days they, or their family, went without 
rice in the previous year. No farmers reported going without rice for more than 10 days, and most 
(96% from both groups) reported going without rice for between 1 and 9 days in a year. Considering 
that few of the respondents actually grew enough rice to sell, and that most rice was purchased 
from the market, this suggests that few household across both groups were experiencing extreme 
poverty. 
Women on the farm 
Cocoa farming is commonly a family business where the on‐ and off‐farm work is shared among the 
household members. Figures 36 and 37 show a strong gender division of labour for specific activities 
across both the control and target groups. While financial management and marketing is 
traditionally allocated to women, it is interesting that more men seem to have become involved in 
this activity within the target group. It may be that the organisational requirements of collective 
marketing and certification have acted to increase the household role of men in this particular 
activity. It is unclear what implications this may have for the role of women in the division of on‐ and 
off‐farm work. 
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E.II. Perception 
We assessed farmers’ perceptions on how their general quality of life had changed in the last 5 years 
and also how they felt environmental practices had changed (Figure 38). This second point was 
asked in terms of how their own environmental practices had changed, and then how they felt the 
environmental practices of others in their community had changed. There was little difference in 
terms of quality of life, with the control group having a marginally more positive attitude. It appears 
that the target group felt that their community’s management of the environment had improved 
only marginally, although these results are inconclusive. 
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F. FARMER PERCEPTIONS OF THE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM 
The survey asked a number of questions specifically to those farmers participating in the 
certification program (the target group), particularly about their perceptions of change since 
implementation. There have been instances, elsewhere in Indonesia, where farmers were not aware 
that they had been included within a certification program. However, in this study, only 1 
respondent (from 76 within the target group) claimed to be unaware that they were part of a 
certification scheme. 
Changes in farm practices 
All respondents claimed to have changes their on‐farm practices in some way as a result of 
certification. They were then prompted about which particular farm practices had changed since 
becoming certified (Figure 39). Certified farmers claimed to have changed their practices most in 
relation to their use of safety equipment, increasing on‐farm shade diversity and decreased chemical 
use. When asked if they had changed any other practices, a further five respondents claimed to have 
changed agronomic practices, such as pruning and sanitation, which should probably be included in 
future surveys. 
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Changes in expenditure and costs 
Certified farmers were asked how they felt expenditure and labour allocation had changed since 
certification (Figure 40). Compliance with certification standards had contributed to a significant 
increase in time spent on training (acknowledged by 89% of farmers). A number of farmers (around 
30%) reported spending more on hired labour, and the use of their labour, as a result of certification. 
Opinions seemed to be divided about whether certification had led to an increase or a decrease in 
expenditure on inputs, and whether it had led to an increase in paperwork and administration. This 
could perhaps be explained by the fact that each farmer group has an ICS (Internal Control System) 
team consisting of marketing and administration personnel who are responsible for sales and for 
managing group administration. The head of the farmer group is often responsible for both 
activities, and presumably these individuals are spending more time on administration, but this may 
not affect other individuals in the group. 
 
Other Perceptions 
Farmers were asked about their perceptions of the impact of being involved in a certification 
scheme against a number of variables (Figure 41). In general, smallholder farmers had a positive 
response to certification, particularly in regard to economic aspects, including improved cocoa 
services, marketing, income, and better farm management respectively. Perceptions towards 
impacts on environmental conditions and environmental awareness were also positive, although less 
emphatically so ranging between ‘somewhat agree’ and ‘neutral’. 
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